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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ Pl:iRCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, 
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WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and 
GARY E. MEISNER, 
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Case No. CV 08-01226 
DEFENDANT WILLIAM V, MCCAi'\fN 
JR.'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
DEFENDANT WILLIAM V. MCCANN JR. 1S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT~ 1 32J 
40100.oooti. maraa., 
NO.559 P.3/4 
JqN, 19.2010 2:05PM 
Defendant. William V, McCann. Jr,, through his counsel of record, joins in the Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Mccann R.a:o.ch & Livestock, Inc. and adopts the 
Affidavits and Memorandum In Support of Motion as if filed by this Defendant. 
DATED THI#~fJanua,:y, 2010. 
HAWLEY TROXllLL El\TNIS & Ii.A WLEY LLP 
By-+,--,,,.~~~~~~-,------
J ... .,.....,,vTr • Clark, ISB No. 1026 
Attorney:; for Defendant William V. McCann, 
Jr. 
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JOThTDER IN McCANN RANCH 
& LIVESTOCK COMP ANY'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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Defendant Gary Meisner joins in the MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT filed by defendant McCann Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc., and joins in 
the affidavits and memorandum in support. 
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No. CV08-01226 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MEMORANDUM 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMORANDUM -- l 
INTRODUCTION 
LC. 30-1-1430(2) establishes two, and only two, elements necessary to obtain a court 
ordered dissolution of a for profit corporation, in a proceeding brought by one of its 
shareholders: 1) that those in control of the corporation have acted in an oppressive manner, and 
2) said oppression threatens irreparable injury to the corporation. 
The Defendants concede that Plaintiff can introduce sufficient evidence to establish 
oppress10n. The issue today is whether that evidence of oppression, including all reasonable 
inferences which can be drawn therefrom, creates a material issue of fact as to whether the 
oppression threatens the corporation with irreparable harm. 
What is irreparable harm to a closely held Idaho corporation? Defendants offer no 
proposed definition of this element. They argue that because the Corporation is operating 
profitably, Plaintiff's evidence necessarily is insufficient. The amount of the Corporation's 
profits might be relevant, but do not control this issue. It is possible that the Court may choose 
to make a factual determination of whether the value of any harm caused or threatened is 
meaningful when compared to profits, but profitability does not rule out the possibility of harm. 
We suggest a proper interpretation is twofold: harm that cannot be repaired and which 
harm involves a material financial amount. 
Curiously, the defense cites authority from other jurisdictions for the proposition that 
dissolution is a draconian remedy and therefore the Court's power should be exercised "with 
great restraint and only upon a strong showing of gross mismanagement." Defendants' 
memorandum page 15. 
However, the defense immediately thereafter quite correctly notes that Idaho's 
shareholder dissolution statute 1s umque. Contrary to the Model Corporation Act and the 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMORANDUM -- 2 
dissolution statutes of virtually the rest of the United States, Idaho adds threat of irreparable 
harm as an additional element. Under the Model Act, and the law of the other states, for 
example, RCW 23B.14.300 and .340 in Washington State, a shareholder of a closely held 
corporation who can establish oppression is entitled to seek equitable relief - the Court may, but 
need not order dissolution, the court may grant a remedy tailored to the oppressed shareholder's 
situation. It was this sort of remedy we sought in Count I. We alleged a squeeze out and sought 
an individual remedy. 
Under the defense analysis, the shareholder of a closely held Idaho corporation who is the 
subject of oppression can bring no direct action, seeking a personal remedy, rather, he is limited 
to a corporate dissolution action and must establish this additional element. In interpreting this 
element, this Court should be conscious of its prior ruling. In short, we believe the appropriate 
definition of "threat of irreparable harm" given the uniqueness of the statutory element and this 
Court's determination that a shareholder in Ronald McCann's position, although oppressed, may 
not bring an individual action, must necessarily be liberally construed in light of the evidence of 
oppression and the closely held nature of the Corporation. 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
The defense motion should be denied because the very substantial evidence of oppression 
creates a threat of irreparable harm. The material issues of fact are many. 
A. The substantial transfers from the Corporation to Gertrude McCann further no 
legitimate corporate purpose. They have harmed the Corporation by depleting its available and 
needed cash, thus not being able to meet its responsibility to distribute profits to its shareholders. 
And it threatens future harm in that it is unlikely that the Corporation will be able to recover 
what it claims Gertrude McCann owes. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMORANDUM -- 3 
1. Since January 1, 2001, through December 31, 2008 (we have yet to receive the 
yearend totals for 2009), the Corporation has advanced $282,036 for the benefit of Gertrude 
McCann - see Exhibit A to Dennis Reinstein's Affidavit. This does not include the purchase of 
her house. Of this total, the Corporation asserts that approximately $151,678 should be 
considered advances for which Mrs. McCann is obligated to repay. The balance takes the form 
of alleged upkeep and maintenance on Mrs. McCann's home which the Corporation claims to 
have purchased for fair market value. In considering whether these advances create a threat of 
irreparable harm, this Court should consider that Mrs. McCann denies any responsibility to repay 
these sums: 
Q. Mrs. McCann, what I'm trying to figure out, if this document means 
what it says, I'm trying to figure out why you would owe the corporation a 
hundred and sixty-five thousand dollars? 
A. I don't owe them a dime. In my book, I don't owe them nothing. They 
owe me. 
2. While Mrs. McCann denies owmg anything to the Corporation, she has also 
testified she has done nothing to earn the advances from the Corporation: 
Q. Okay. When was the last time you worked for the corporation? 
A. I don't know. I don't remember. What do I do for the corporation? 
Q. That's what I'm trying to find out. Since you've been eighty-fie years 
old, have you worked for the corporation? 
A. I used to fix lunch once in a while for them when they was branding, 
and that's the only thing I ever did. (Gertrude McCann Deposition page 
48) 
Thus, the record at this point establishes that the Corporation has paid substantial sums to 
Mrs. McCann for nothing - for no corporate purpose. But rather, for the reason William 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMORANDUM -- 4 
McCann, Jr. testified to at his deposition: "Because she needed the money". William McCann, 
Jr. Deposition page 84. 
3. Ronald McCann has figured out that it is likely to do him no good for the 
Corporation to assert a creditor claim against his mother's estate in the event of her death, as the 
history of oppression establishes that cash in the Corporation doesn't result in dividends flowing 
to him (or any other benefit). And thus, as he states in his affidavit, as a natural heir of his 
mother, he will oppose any effort by the Corporation to recover these bogus transfers and deprive 
him of an inheritance from his mother. 
4. The defense argues in its memorandum that if those in control of the Corporation 
have made improper advances, a derivative action can fix the problem. However, the evidence at 
this point establishes that William McCann, Jr. denies any misconduct - he denies that the 
transfers to his mother subject him to personal liability. Most telling is the lack of action by the 
Defendants in regard to the resolution adopted September 6, 2000: 
BE IT RESOLVED that the Corporation shall terminate the current 
consulting agreement with and discontinue making compensation 
payments to A. Gertrude McCann and to initiate such reasonable action as 
shall be necessary to determine if any ultra vires compensation has been 
paid to A. Gertrude McCann and if so, to secure or recover for the 
Corporation such payments, if any there be, from A. Gertrude McCann, 
who is now 84 years of age. 
The evidence is that the Corporation has recovered none of the ultra vires payments 
("consulting fees" of over $100,000) to Mrs. McCann and the statute of limitations has clearly 
expired. The evidence is that the recipient of these advances denies any liability therefore. The 
evidence is that the Corporation has not carried the promissory notes on its books as legitimate 
assets or liabilities. 
PLAINTIFFS RESPONSIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMORANDUM --5 
The "cure" suggested by the defense, a subsequent derivative action against those who 
authorized these transfers, itself harms the Corporation - it would consume the energy and 
resources of the Corporation and its principals. 
5. Accountant Snowball's affidavit at Paragraph 9 puts the Corporation's income 
from 2002-2008, inclusive at $851,487.60. Payments to Gertrude McCann of $282,036 
(Reinstein Affidavit) plus house payments total well over $600,000. The Court will have to use 
its fact finding power to determine what portion of the $600,000 is improper and then use its fact 
finding power to determine if the improper payments are material in comparison to the 
Corporation's income. 
B. The Corporation's history of utilizing its cash to make advances to Gertrude 
McCann, which are not usual and ordinary business expenses, but are part of the Defendants' 
efforts to squeeze out Ron McCann, threaten the Corporation with the irreparable harm of 
adverse tax consequences. 
The corporate CPA, Dorothy Snowball, considers the financial transactions between the 
Corporation and Gertrude McCann to be legitimate expenses which do not expose the 
Corporation to any risk of liability for tax fraud. Plaintiff's experts, CPA Dennis Reinstein and 
CPA Karen Ginnett, disagree. This is very material issue of fact. They point out that in fact 
neither the IRS nor the State of Idaho has audited the Corporation since approximately 1986 and 
at that time the State found that the Corporation's practice of paying personal expenses for 
William McCann, Sr. and his wife, Gertrude, in fact was improper. And the evidence presently 
before the Court is that the Corporation since that audit nevertheless has continued with its 
practice of paying personal expenses for Gertrude's benefit. The balance presently is 
approximately $198,000. 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMORANDUM -- 6 
As Plaintiff's experts opine, paying auto expenses for a 93 year old non-employee is not a 
legitimate business expense. And Plaintiff's experts note that Gertrude McCann herself has 
testified that she has done nothing to earn these advances. 
And William McCann, Jr. has testified that his rationale in promoting this business 
practice, is not because it's in the best interest of the Corporation, but simply because "his 
mother needs the money." 
What Plaintiff must establish, is not irreparable harm, but the threat thereof. In this 
regard, Dorothy Snowball's conclusory affidavit should be compared to that of Karen Ginnett, a 
person with seven years experience as an Idaho Tax Commission auditor: 
Ms. Snowball states that the expenses paid to Gertrude McCann are 
legitimate expenses of the Corporation which do not expose the 
Corporation to any risk of liability for tax fraud. The term "fraud" as used 
in the tax law, means an actual and deliberate, or willful, wrongdoing with 
the specific intent to evade tax believed to be owed. The existence of fraud 
is a question of fact to be determined on a case by case basis considering 
the entire record of transactions. Fraudulent intent can seldom be 
established by a single act. The Tax Court in Schmitz, John Noehl, (1983) 
TC Memo 1983-482, set out three elements of fraud: (1) a knowing 
falsehood; (2) an underpayment of tax; and (3) an intent to evade tax. It is 
important to understand that the tax evasion motive need not be the only 
motive or even the principal motive for the transaction(s), as long as it is a 
motive. 
The entire record of transactions, between the Corporation and Gertrude McCann, is 
extremely relevant in interpreting the post-2001 transactions. Despite the Court's order barring 
Plaintiff from seeking discovery of pre-2001 transactions, the defense in this summary judgment 
proceeding has considered itself not to be so limited. The affidavit of James Schoff sets forth 
eleven paragraphs that purport to describe factual information, two of which discuss in detail 
pre-2001 matters. The affidavit of Gary Meisner includes seven paragraphs of factual 
information, four of which discuss pre-2001 matters. The affidavit of the corporate CPA, 
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Dorothy Snowball, contains twenty one factual paragraphs, eight of which discuss pre-2001 
matters. And William McCann, Jr.'s affidavit has fifteen paragraphs of factual information, 
eleven of which review pre-2001 matters. The defense finds it impossible to enable the 
Court to understand the current situation without repeated extensive resorting to pre-2001 
information. 
The records that have been made available and have been reviewed by our expert include 
the minutes of the Board meetings. These minutes, and the corporate tax returns, unambiguously 
disclose the history which prompted the post-2001 corporate advances to Gertrude McCann. In 
the late nineties the Corporation paid to Gertrude approximately $100,000, taking it as a business 
deduction for "consulting fees''. Upon the objection of Ron McCann, and the advice of the 
corporate attorney, this practice ceased. And therefore, those in control of the Corporation, 
Defendants William McCann, Jr. and Gary Meisner, voted to provide Gertrude McCann with a 
lifetime annuity. This effort was terminated upon the advice of corporate counsel. The amount 
of the lifetime annuity was to have been $106,000 - it is no coincidence that that is the amount 
the Corporation then decided it owed Gertrude for "back rent", never having received any such 
demand for rent from Gertrude McCann or her late husband, William McCann, Sr. This led to 
the post-2001 promissory notes - a purported liability of the Corporation owing to Gertrude 
which was never carried on the corporate books. The Corporation then decided to purchase 
Gertrude McCann's home. And as our expert's affidavit clearly explains, the Corporation paid 
far more than the fair market value of the house when one considers the relevant details of the 
transaction - that the Corporation granted to Gertrude McCann a life estate during which it 
would pay all normal expenses a purchaser would pay, i.e., taxes, insurance, maintenance and 
upkeep. And then, the corporate resolution of July 2006 states "Whereas, the Corporation has 
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recently completed the purchase of certain real estate from Gertrude McCann; and, whereas the 
Corporation's accountant has recommended that these obligations be evidenced by a promissory 
notes .... " Simply put, because the payments on the house purchase had been completed, 
William McCann, Jr. was desirous of finding a new method of funneling funds to his mother and 
the actions taken were the creation and execution of the promissory notes at issue. 
Since Defendants concede for the purposes of this motion that Plaintiff has been 
oppressed, we have an oppressed shareholder who has nothing to lose by going to the tax 
authorities with the facts of this Corporation's behavior. Thus, the Court will have to use its fact 
finding power to determine the probability of an audit and the amount of the harm which will 
result. This will have to be added to sums found to be improper payments to Gertrude McCann 
and this new figure again compared to the Corporation's income to determine materiality. 
C. The ten year plus history of oppression, makes clear that those in control of this 
Corporation will continue in this manner unless or until a court orders otherwise. The depletion 
of corporate resources defending acts of oppression not only threatens but actually causes 
irreparable harm. 
The defense concedes for purposes of the present motion that it has engaged in 
oppression, and acknowledges that rather than stopping the activity complained of, it continues. 
The cash flowing to Gertrude McCann for no legitimate corporate purpose, in exchange for 
nothing of value from Mrs. McCann continues. And yet, the defense has spent according to their 
affidavits, over $250,000 io defend and be allowed to continue in this manner. There are only 
three shareholders of this closely held corporation. Plaintiff owns 36.68% of a multi-million 
dollar private enterprise. Who wouldn't, if they were in Plaintiff's shoes, seek a remedy against 
the Defendants' oppressive acts? 
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Oppression is conceded for purposes of this motion and Plaintiff's affidavit states that in 
the absence of the oppression, he would not be suing. Thus, the oppression has cost the 
Corporation at least $250,000 and will have cost much more by the conclusion of the suit. 
Thus the Court will need to use its fact finding power to determine the size of this harm. 
Again, this must be added to the previous amounts that the Court had to determine for 
comparison with the Corporation's income to determine materiality. When the Court finishes its 
fact finding, it may find the total harm exceeds the total corporate income and would certainly be 
a material harm. 
To suggest that each time the Corporation improperly spends money Plaintiff must bring 
a derivative action is simply inaccurate. Annual derivative actions, even if they result in 
corporate coffers being replenished, cause irreparable harm - the depletion of corporate 
resources and energy in defending its improper conduct. And, of course, such derivative 
actions would provide no direct, individual relief to Ronald McCann, who is being 
oppressed by a squeeze out. 
D. The Court should not be limited to dissolution as the sole remedy. 
Scott v. Trans-SYS., 148 Wn.2d 701, 64 P.3d 1 (2003) involved a corporate dissolution 
action brought be a stockholder of a closely held corporation. Just as in Idaho, the Washington 
Supreme Court noted the equitable nature of the action and determined it was not limited to the 
draconian remedy of dissolution, stating at page 716: 
Alternative Remedies to Dissolution 
Dissolution suits under Washington's dissolution statute are 
fundamentally equitable in nature. Henry George & Sons, 95 Wn.2d at 
952. Relying on this equitable nature, both Oregon's Supreme Court and 
Missouri's Court of Appeals stated that the court may consider alternative 
equitable relief besides dissolution. Fix, 538 S.W.2d at 357. In Baker, the 
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court summarized the equitable remedies that various jurisdictions had 
used depending on the facts of the case, the most relevant of which 
include: 
(a) The entry of an order requiring dissolution ... at a specified 
future date, to become effective only in the event that the 
stockholders fail to resolve their differences prior to that date; 
(b) The appointment of a receiver, not for the purposes of 
dissolution, but to continue the operation of the corporation for the 
benefit of all the stockholders, both majority and minority, until all 
differences are resolved or "oppressive" conduct ceases; 
(c) The appointment of a "special fiscal agent" to report to the court 
relating to the continued operation of the corporation, as a 
protection to its minority stockholders, and the retention of 
jurisdiction of the case by the court for that purpose; 
( d) The retention of jurisdiction of the case by the court for the 
protection of the minority stockholders without appointment of a 
receiver or "special fiscal agent"; 
(e) The ordering of an accounting by the majority in control of the 
corporation for funds alleged to have been misappropriated; 
G) An award of damages to minority stockholders as compensation 
for any injury suffered by them as the result of "oppressive" conduct 
by the majority in control of the corporation. 
Baker, 264 Or. at 632-33 (footnotes omitted); see also Fix, 538 S.W.2d at 
357 n.3; Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.\V.2d 269, 274-75 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) 
(allowing courts ability to provide other equitable remedies pursuant to 
former Iowa Code § 496A.94(1) (now Iowa Code § 490.1430 (2002)), 
which is essentially the same as Washington's). Accordingly, alternative 
remedies are available that are far less severe than dissolution. 
We believe that this Court likewise has inherent authority to grant equitable relief short of 
a dissolution, for example, the Court could order dissolution at a date in the future, if in the 
meantime the Corporation does not redeem Plaintiff's shares for their fair market value, which 
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could, and should be accomplished by a tax reorganization, spin-off to Plaintiff of 37% of 
the corporate assets. 
CONCLUSION 
The many year history of oppression, for which the defense concedes evidence is 
available, creates a material issue of fact whether the Corporation is being threatened with 
irreparable harm thereby. The defense motion for summary judgment should be denied . 
.,. '-'t 
DATED: This j_Q__ day of February 2010. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
V. 
WILLIAMV. McCANN, JR., and 
GARY E. MEISNER, individually 
as a director of McCann Ranch 
Livestock Company, Inc., and as a 
shareholder of McCann Ranch & 
Livestock, Inc., in his capacity as 
Trustee of the William V. McCann, 
Sr. Stock Trust, 
Defendants, 
McCANN RANCH & 
LIVESTOCK COMP ANY, INC., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______ N_omm_· _a_l _D_e_fe_n_dan_t_. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Ada ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS R. REINSTEIN -- 1 
No. CV08-01226 
AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS R. 
REINSTEIN, CPA/ ABV, ASA, CV A 
Dennis R. Reinstein, being first duly sworn on oath deposes and says: 
1. Identity of Expert/Experience. I am a certified public accountant licensed in the 
State of Idaho and have been continuously so licensed since 1976. I am a principal in the Boise 
firm of Hooper Cornell, PLLC. My experience and training is set forth on my resume attached. 
I am over the age of 18, am competent to testify to the matters as set forth below and I have 
personal knowledge of those matters. 
2. Material Reviewed. At the request of Plaintiff's attorney, I have reviewed all the 
financial material provided by the Corporation, including the state and federal income tax 
returns, trial balances, income statements and balance sheets from 1996 through 2008, the 706 
estate tax return for the William McCann, Sr. Estate, the general ledgers for the years 2001 
through 2008, the Quick.Books records since 2004, minutes of the shareholder and director 
meetings, as provided since 1997, corporate resolutions for these years, the Articles of 
Incorporation and Bylaws of the Corporation, the work papers of Dorothy Snowball, as provided, 
including the supplemental papers per the Court's order and other documents provided by 
Defendants. I have reviewed the deposition testimony of William McCann, Jr., Gary Meisner, 
Lori McCann, Gertrude McCann and Dorothy Snowball. I have also reviewed the summary 
judgment affidavits recently filed by the defense, those of Gary Meisner, Dorothy Snowball and 
William McCann, Jr. and James Schoff 
3. Karen A. Ginnett. Karen A. Ginnett, an experienced CPA in my firm, has worked 
with me on this case. 
4. Corporation's Transactions with Gertrude McCann. We have reviewed the 
Corporation's transactions with Gertrude McCann. The history thereof is set forth in the minutes 
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of the meetings of the corporate directors, corporate resolutions and the financial records of the 
corporation. The facts as I understand them are as follows: 
4.1. Gertrude McCann Compensation. The minutes of the September 6, 2000, 
Board of Directors meeting state: 
A. Gertrude McCann Compensation . . . has been employed by the 
Corporation as a consultant since the death of her husband, the founder of 
the Corporation, on October 27, 1997. 
President McCann then advised the Board that the Shareholders, in a 
meeting earlier on the same date, had passed by a 2-1 vote a Resolution 
recommending the Board of Trustees pay a lifetime annuity to A. Gertrude 
McCann and as deferred compensation for the services that she and 
William V. McCann, Sr., had provided to the Corporation for minimal 
consideration since the Corporation's inception on July 2, 1974. 
WHEREAS, Corporate Counsel, Cumer L. Green, has advised the Board 
that inasmuch as one Shareholder voted against that Resolution, to-wit 
Ronald R. McCann, that there might be certain exposure to the Directors 
should such compensation program be instituted; and 
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Board of Directors of 
McCann Ranch and Livestock, Inc. decline to approve the 
recommendation of the Shareholders or to authorize payment of a deferred 
compensation annuity to A. Gertrude Mccann. 
BE IT RESOLVED that the Corporation shall terminate the current 
consulting arrangement with and discontinue making compensation 
payments to A. Gertrude McCann and to initiate such reasonable action as 
shall be necessary to determine if any ultra vires compensation has been 
paid to A. Gertrude McCann and if so, to secure or recover for the 
Corporation such payments, if any there be, from A. Gertrude McCann, 
who is now 84 years of age. 
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4.2. Advances for Expenses. Beginning before 2001 and continuing since, the 
Corporation has routinely paid personal expenses for Gertrude McCann, including, but not 
limited to, utilities, insurance and automobile expenses. At the end of each year, the 
Corporation's accountant, Dorothy Snowball, increases the account receivable due from Gertrude 
McCann for an estimated amount for some of these expenses and calculates interest on the 
balance of the receivable at year end. The Corporation deducts the balance of the expenses on its 
tax returns. As noted in the Affidavit of Dorothy Snowball, the December 31, 2005 balance, 
including interest, was $165,341. With further advances and interest, the Corporation's books 
report the balance of Gertrude McCann's account receivable to be $198,945 as of December 31, 
2008. 
4.3. Purchase of Residence. Pursuant to a sales agreement dated December 27, 
2000, the Corporation agreed to purchase Gertrude McCann's home for the sum of $310,000. 
The contract called for $40,000 to be paid at closing, the balance to be paid in monthly 
installments of $5,000 including interest at 7½%. As part of the agreement, the Corporation 
provided a life estate to Gertrude McCann who was 84 years old at the time. The Corporation 
further agreed to pay the utilities, taxes, insurance and maintenance. 
According to William McCann' s affidavit, "the Corporation paid her the fair market 
value of the property purchased." This is consistent with his deposition testimony in which he 
stated at pages 87-88: 
Q. So, the corporation bought your mother's house in order to get money 
to her? 
A. She needed money to live on. 
Q. Okay. You didn't take advantage of her in the price, did you? 
A. I have never taken advantage of her. 
Q. So you didn't get more value for the corporation that what you paid 
out? 
A. It was considered fair market value when the deal was put together. 
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Q. So, the corporation has paid out this money to get her cash, and, in the 
meantime, the corporation is not getting any benefit from it? 
A. I think they are getting benefit. I believe it's appreciating as real estate 
appreciates. 
Q. Okay. What's its worth today? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. But the corp - the house is not producing any mcome for the 
corporation? 
A. That's correct. 
At page 84, Mr. McCann testified: 
Q. Why did the corporation buy her house? 
A. Because she needed money. 
4.4. House Maintenance. As part of the purchase of the family home, the 
Corporation agreed to pay Gertrude McCann $400 per month to maintain the property. 
According to a March 2, 2009 corporate resolution, the $400 per month maintenance payment 
was increased to $500 per month on November 15, 2006, and again increased to the amount of 
$1,000 per month on June 1, 2007. 
4.5. Hired Man. In addition to the monthly maintenance payment to Gertrude 
Mccann, on May 24, 2007, the Corporation agreed to provide, at its expense, a hired hand to 
perform maintenance and repairs on the property for Gertrude Mccann. 
4.6. Advances from Bill and Lori McCann. By 2007 the Corporation's 
payments to Gertrude McCann for her house had been completed. William McCann, Jr. and Lori 
McCann agreed to deposit $1,500 a month into her checking account beginning on May 17, 
2007. 
I have asked Plaintiffs attorneys to ascertain what amount William Mccann, Jr. and/or 
his wife, Lori, assert is owed to them by Gertrude McCann and/or the Trust for which she is the 
beneficiary. I am informed that they have refused to provide that discovery. I expect that the 
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amount claimed owing to William Mccann, Jr. and Lori McCann will compete with the amount 
purportedly owed by Gertrude McCann to the Corporation. 
4.7. 2006 Promissory Notes. By Corporate resolution dated July 2006, the 
Corporation resolved that it would execute and deliver a promissory note dated January 1, 2006, 
in the principal amount of $106,000 payable to the order of Gertrude McCann, in exchange for a 
promissory note from Gertrude McCann in the principal amount of $165,341, also to be dated 
January 1, 2006. The note from Gertrude McCann to the Corporation represents the advances 
made to her and those to her late husband. Gertrude McCann testified that she does not owe the 
Corporation any money, nor did she even acknowledge the existence, let alone validity, of the 
promissory note she purportedly owes. 
An amortization schedule for each of the notes disclosed that despite the substantial 
difference between the principal amounts owed, the Corporation would pay Gertrude McCann 
$191,711, including interest, and she would pay the Corporation $192,111, the payments to be 
made over the next five years. 
Even though the resolution called for both notes to be dated January 1, 2006, the 
Corporate note, in the principal amount of $106,000, was back dated to August 1, 2000. The 
reason for the notes, according to the Resolution, is: 
The Corporation is indebted to Gertrude McCann for rental of real 
property for a period of 12½ years to August 1, 2001, in the sum of 
$106,000, plus interest accruing after August 1, 2000 at the rate of 7.5% 
per annum, and Gertrude is indebted to the Corporation for various 
payments made to and on her behalf, in the sum of $165,341.49 as of 
December 31, 2005, with interest accruing at the rate of 5½% per annum. 
And, whereas the Corporation has recently completed the purchase of 
certain real property with Gertrude McCann and, whereas the 
Corporation's accountant has recommended that these obligations be 
evidenced by promissory notes and that they be amortized over five years. 
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I have been provided no documentation or deposition testimony that would suggest that 
Gertrude McCann claimed to be owed anything for this alleged past due rental. I have been 
provided no evidence of a writing (other than the Corporate Resolution) that would support this 
liability that purportedly extends for some twelve years previous to the year 2000 decision. 
The promissory note from Gertrude Mccann to the Corporation is reported as an asset on 
the Corporation's books and in its financial statements. The promissory note from the 
Corporation to Gertrude McCann has never been reported as a liability of the Corporation in its 
books and records or on its financial statements. Ms. Snowball states in her affidavit that she 
"was waiting until Gertrude and the Corporation traded checks," at which time she "would post 
the payment as deductible rent expense of the Corporation." Waiting until payment is made is 
not the proper accounting treatment for a liability of a corporation. Liabilities should be reported 
when incurred regardless of whether or not a deductible expense has occurred for tax purposes. 
5. Opinions. Based upon our investigation, I express the following opinions which I 
hold to a reasonable degree of certainty based upon my personal knowledge, experience and 
training as an accountant, and upon information that certified public accountants typically and 
reasonably rely upon in forming such opinions. 
5.1. In my opinion, the financial transactions the Corporation has engaged in 
with Gertrude McCann, were not in furtherance of the ordinary and necessary business purposes 
of the Corporation, but were designed as a means to support her lifestyle as an alternative to 
declaring dividends and/or redeeming Corporate stock from the Trust to which she is a 
beneficiary. 
5.2. Plaintiffs counsel has asked me to assume that an appropriate definition 
of "threat of irreparable harm" is twofold: 1) harm that cannot be repaired, e.g., a loss of money 
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that cannot be recouped; and 2) that the hann is of a significant amount. Utilizing this definition, 
in my opinion, the transactions between the Corporation and Gertrude McCann threaten the 
Corporation with irreparable harm in at least two ways: 
First, they create the potential for the taxing authorities to reclassify these transactions as 
disguised dividends. This could result in substantial taxes, interest and penalties being assessed 
against the Corporation, and possibly the William V. McCann, Sr. Stock Trust and/or Gertrude 
McCann. 
Second, there is a receivable from Gertrude McCann owing to the Corporation increasing 
in both principal and accruing interest, from which amounts due to the Corporation may never be 
collected. 
6. Analysis/ Material Facts which Support Opinions. 
6.1. If the business affairs of the Corporation were selected for audit by either 
the Idaho State Tax Commission or the Internal Revenue Service, such audit would evaluate 
whether the transactions between the Corporation and Gertrude McCann were ordinary and 
necessary business expenses. I believe that on a more likely than not basis, such an audit would 
find that these transactions were not for an ordinary and necessary business purposes and 
therefore would not be allowable deductions under the tax code. 
6.2. The deposition testimony of Gary Meisner and William McCann, Jr. 
reveals that they are unaware of what assets Gertrude McCann has and they are unable to 
identify assets from which she or her estate can repay the Corporation. 
6.3. If the Corporation paid Gertrude McCann the fair market value for her 
home, it in fact received in return substantially less value than what it paid. At the date of the 
purchase Gertrude McCann was 84 years old and received a life estate. The value of property 
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subject to a life estate can be divided between the life estate and remainder interest utilizing IRS 
Table S. Application of this table provides that, at the date of the purchase of her home for 
$310,000, the value of the life estate Gertrude McCann received was $102,598 and the value of 
the remainder interest to the Corporation was $207,402. 
Further, as I understand a life estate, the life tenant retains rights and obligations related 
to the property until the grantee's rights terminate. The fact that the grantor Corporation is 
paying expenses related to the property further magnifies their over payment of value. 
6.4. According to the defense summary judgment affidavits, the lack of 
dividends is justified by the insufficient cash flow available to the Corporation. In response, I 
assert that the cash flow made available to Gertrude McCann could have been utilized for 
dividends. 
6.4.1. Attached as Exhibit A is an itemization of the cash flow provided 
by the Corporation for the benefit of Gertrude McCann since January 1, 2001 and for other 
reasons. While a portion of the net income was utilized to repay Corporate debt, it is clear that 
had the transactions with Gertrude McCann not been engaged in, the Corporation would have 
had funds available to pay dividends. 
6.5. In Paragraph 26 of Dorothy Snowball's affidavit she asserts that corporate 
dissolution would have "potentially devastating tax consequences to the corporation and 
shareholders." 
6.5.1. When a corporation sells assets for an amount greater than their 
depreciated book value, the corporation faces a capital gain tax on the difference. If the 
corporation then distributes the proceeds of the sale to its shareholders, they face tax on this 
dividend income. This potential double tax is not a penalty, it is a tax that a C-Corporation and 
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its shareholders eventually face unless the corporation maintains perpetual existence and does 
not sell its assets and/or distribute dividends. The double tax could have been avoided, so that 
there would only be a tax at the shareholder level, had the corporate directors elected to have the 
corporation taxed as an S-Corporation and the S-Corporation requirements were met. This was 
not done. 
6.5.2. These alleged "potentially devastating" taxes could be avoided if a 
court ordered dissolution was accomplished by means of a tax free re-organization - a spin-off. 
Simply put, if whatever share of the corporate assets that should be distributed to Ron Mccann 
were distributed to a subsidiary corporation, then Ron McCann's stock in the parent corporation 
were exchanged for the stock in this newly formed subsidiary corporation, he would then own 
( control) those assets. This would avoid "devastating tax consequences." 
DATED: This 9-!!-' day of Fe.bru..o..-r~ , 2010. 
D~~ 
Dennis R. Reinstein, CPA/ ABV, ASA, CV A 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ~ day of ___._KhtM-=-="'-'---=-=-"---"---rt--f\------' 2010. 
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McCANN v. McCANN SUMMARY EXHIBIT A 
Mccann Ranch Company 
Cash Flow Analysis 
12/31/01 12/31/02 12/31/03 12/31/04 12/31/05 12/31/06 12/31/07 12/31/08 5/28/09 
ADJUSTED CASH AT END OF YEAR $15,496 $33,343 $71,780 $98,342 $53,975 $158,406 $119,871 $44,078 $45,284 
Add: 
Payments to/on behalf of Gertrude Mccann 88,877 83,452 89,506 90,278 90,460 58,957 47,915 57,275 15,586 
Legal Fees 0 0 0 245 557 2,216 44,247 89,062 
CASH AVAILABLE TO PAY DIVIDENDS 104,373 116,794 161,286 188,865 144,991 219,579 212,033 190,415 
Less: 
Dividends paid 0 0 0 (10,000) 0 0 (25,000) (35,000) 0 
CASH AVAILABLE $104,373 $116,794 $161,286 $178,865 $144,991 $219,579 $187,033 $155,415 $100,396 
Page 1 or ·1 
McCANN v. McCANN DETAILS EXHIBIT A-1 
Mccann Ranch Company 
Cash Flow Analysis 
12/31/01 12/31/02 12/31/03 12/31/04 12/31/05 12/31/06 12/31/07 12/31/08 5/28/09 
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES 
Net income (loss) ($102,023) $69,765 $129,160 $23,181 $106,310 $309,067 $75,866 $138,140 $238,446 
Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash 
provided by operating activities 
Depreciation 218,520 259,058 279,485 245,320 262,209 278,452 297,936 205,575 
Net cllange - accumulated depreciation 
Amortization - loan fees 27,455 12,281 12,281 12,281 
(Gain) loss on sale of fixed assets (3,295) (1,485) (5,027) (1,634) (23,219) (16,500) (12,750) 
(Gain) loss on sale of livestock (5,191) (41) 
(Increase) decrease in: 
Miscellaneous receivable (900) (100) 675 698 (374) (1,074) 1,07 
Bill Sr. and Gertrude Mccann receivables (11,930) (8,642) (9,094) (9,526) (10,162) (10,620) (10,812) (12,172) 
Estate of William Mccann Sr. loan (1,171) 
Prepaid commissions (44,221) 8,373 (8,127) 11,973 4,526 9,160 
Prepaid commissions and loan fees (26,050) (11,109) (10,789) 12,281 
Increase (decrease) in: 
Accounts payable 161 16,449 
Rental deposits 200 300 1,500 
Accrued liabilities - income and payroll taxes 6,478 (859) 30,139 (29,480) 45,608 108,621 (110,079) 51,370 (33,267) 
Deterred gain on involuntary conversion (18,310/ (6,141) 197,776 (23,831) 
NET CASH PROVIDED (USED) BY OPERATING ACTIVITIES 21,294 298,976 416,516 260,196 407,460 687,255 445,428 366,819 224,201 
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES 
> Investment - DA Davidson (21,898) 14,309 5,837 14 74 (101,973) 44,224 59,120 
:j Purchase of equipment/building/improvements (61,023) (35,488) (63,755) (87,860) (1,303) (1,249) :j 
~ Purchase of land (8,405) 
_, 
> Purchase of cattle and bulls (13,450) (44,417) 
.-
(13,875) (12,090) (6,700) (23,815) 
~ Net change - prop, equipment and cattle (845,093) (74,407) (55,619) 
-< 
-:i Purchac.e of horses (3,500) (7,500) 
) Proceeds from sale of equipment 5,500 18,600 22,000 16,500 12,750 r1 
-j Proceeds from sale of cattle/bulls 22,697 3,936 6,725 2,733 2,400 5,851 .., 
rj Proceeds from sale of horses 335 624 
2 Loan to Gertrude Mccann (44,383) (44,449) (47,877) (51,615) (55,612) (27,867) 
-< Receivable - Luke & Debbie Lowe (18,000) 9,000 0 9,000 f.l 
:::! Miscellaneous adjustment 1,547 (148) (0) 1 
:::! NET CASH PROVIDED (USED) BY INVESTING ACTIVITIES (888,677) (95,111) (79,059) (129,706) (132,858) (201,070) (24,041) 56,991 (16,064) 
r:1 
z: CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES 
/'1 Banner Bank line of credit 72,000 (72,000) 24,758 19,088 ., 
Long term borrowings 849,062 80,000 42,623 5,981,103 Tj 
2 Refinance costs (135,374) 
Reduction of long term debt (181,323) (251,709) (335,805) (5,949,670) (381,044) (411,726) (415,699) (440,241) (191,019) 
N~SH PROVIDED (USED) BY FINANCING ACTIVITIES 667,739 (171,709) (293,183) (103,941) (309,044) (483,726) (415,699) (415,483) (171,9;31) 
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Mccann Ranch Company 
Cash Flow Analysis 
12/31/01 12/31/02 12/31/03 12/31/04 12/31/05 12/31/06 12/31/07 12/31/08 5/28/09 
NET INCF'lEASE (DECREASE) IN CASH (199,644) 32,156 44,275 26,548 (34,442) 2,459 5,688 8,326 36,206 
CASH AT BEGINNING OF YEAR 191,864 (7,780) 24,376 68,651 85,200 50,758 53,217 33,905 7,232 
CASH AT END OF YEAR (7,780) 24,376 68,651 95,200 50,758 53,217 58,905 42,232 43,438 
Adjustments: 
Cash invested in DA Davidson account 23,276 8,966 3,129 3,143 3,217 105,190 60,966 1,846 1,8~6 
ADJUSTED CASH AT END OF YEAR 15,496 33,343 71,780 98,342 53,975 158,406 119,871 44,078 45,284 
Add: 
Monthly payments to Gertrude - repairs & maintenance 
of Stewart Avenue 4,800 9,600 4,800 5,600 5,500 10,000 13,000 4,000 
CASH AVAILABLE 20,296 33,343 81,380 103,142 59,575 163,906 129,871 57,078 49,284 
Add: 
Stewart Avenue Expenses - repairs & maintenance, taxes 
utilities, telephone, Mike Curtis salary 10,345 14,810 10,812 15,952 14,699 14,268 27,103 32,103 11,586 
CASH AVAIL.ABLE 30,641 48,153 92,192 119,094 74,274 178,174 156,974 89,181 60,870 
Add: 
Increase to Gertrude's account receivable 11,930 8,642 9,094 9,526 10,162 10,620 10,812 12,172 0 
CASH AVAIL.ABLE 42,571 56,795 101,286 128,621 84,435 188,794 167,786 101,353 60,870 
Add: 
rj Principal payments on loan to purchase Gertrude's home 44,383 44,449 47,877 51,615 55,612 27,867 
3 Interest payments on loan to purchase Gertrude's home 17,419 15,491 12,063 8,385 4,388 702 
!> Escrow fees on loan to purchase Gertrude's home 60 60 
..... 
"-; 
61,802 60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000 28,569 0 0 0 -< 
-l 
) CASH AVAILABLE 104,373 116,794 161,286 188,620 144,435 217,363 167,786 101,353 60,870 
"i1 
j Add: Tj g Legal tees 245 557 2,216 44,247 89,062 39,526 
/.l CASH AVAIL.ABLE TO PAY DIVIDENDS 104,373 116,794 161,286 188,865 144,991 219,579 212,033 190,415 100,396 
:rj 
:rj Dividends paid (10,000l (25,000) (35,000) 
Tj 
CASH AVAILABLE $104,373 $116,794 $161,286 $178,865 $144,991 $219,579 $187,033 $155,415 $100,396 z: 
Zl 
-l 
:r:I ~ z 
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Birthdate: 
Education: 
Certification: 
Career 
Experience: 
DENNIS R. REINSTEIN, CPNABV, ASA, CVA 
University of Idaho 
BS Agri-business, "197 4 
BS Business (Accounting), "1975 
Licensed in Idaho as CPA, "1976 
CVA designation, "1995 
ABV designation, 200"1 
ASA designation, 2003 
Hooper Cornell, PLLC 
Partner January, 2002 - Present 
Presnell-Gage Accounting & Consulting 
Firm-wide supervisory responsibilities for business consulting services and 
electronic data processing services 
Boise office 
Partner 
Partner-in-charge 
Partner 
Moscow office 
Partner-in-charge 
Lewiston office 
Partner 
Manager 
Staff Accountant 
January, "1996 - December 3"1, 200"1 
October, "199"1 - January, "1996 
July, "1989 - September, "199"1 
October, "1983 - June, "1989 
May, "1980 - September, "1983 
"1979 - "1980 
"1975 - "1978 
Professional experience includes: 
("1) Valuation of small businesses and professional practices. 
(2) Assistance to clients with the analysis of business operations and 
significant business transactions. These include negotiations on purchase 
and sale of a business or business segments, including assistance with 
valuation of business entities. 
(3) Design and assist with implementation of financial accounting and control 
systems for various clients served by the firm. 
( 4) Supervision of accounting and auditing services provided by the firm's 
professional staff and consultation on procedures and methods of 
providing client services. 
(5) Member of team conducting review of complex mainframe and 
microcomputer accounting systems. 
(6) Co-authored and presented eight-hour course on cash management. 
Presented other client educational seminars and seminars to other service 
professionals such as bankers and attorneys. 
(7) Duties as a partner-in-charge included the responsibility for managing an 
office and personnel in accordance with firm policies. 
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Career 
Experience 
continued: 
Professional 
Memberships 
and Activities. 
Public Service 
and Community 
Activities. 
DENNIS R. REINSTEIN, CPNABV, ASA, CVA (Co11tinued) 
Farmer's Home Administration - Assistant County Supervisor, 197 4. 
Duties included: 
(1) Evaluation of credit applications and preparation of application 
packages for review and approval. 
(2) Residential real estate and farm appraisals. 
Idaho Society of CPAs, member 
Chairman of Management of an Accounting Practice Committee 
Member of Committees on 
Public Relations 
Continuing Professional Education 
Relations with Bankers 
Northern Chapter of Idaho Society of CPAs, president 
American Institute of CPAs, member 
American Society of Appraisers, member - Business Valuation 
National Association of Certified Valuation Analysts, member 
The Institute of Business Appraisers, member 
Continental Association of CPAs, Past Chair of Litigation Services Committee 
and Information Technology Committee 
Boise Estate Planning Council, member, Treasurer 
Past Program Chairman 
Boise Chamber of Commerce 
Member of Small Business Recognition Sub-committee 
Member of Small Business Education and Advisory Sub-committee 
Chair of Small Business Committee 
Member of Garden City Chamber Council 
Discovery Center of Idaho, Vice President of Board 
Kiwanis 
Moscow Chamber of Commerce 
Past-President, V. Pres. Treasurer & Board member 
Moscow Executive Association 
Moscow Rotary 
Lewiston Chamber of Commerce 
Lewiston Jaycees 
Held various offices & a member of Board of Directors 
Prepared and presented accounting seminars for Human Advancement's 
Inc., Minority Contractors Awareness Seminars and the Lewis-Clark 
Homebuilders Association. 
Taught night classes in bookkeeping at the Clarkston Branch of Walla Walla 
Community College. AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS R. REINSTEIN 
QUALi FiCA TIONS 
See curriculum vitae attached. 
COMPENSATION 
Hourly rate of $295 plus out-of-pocket costs. 
PUBLICA T/ONSIPRESENTA TIONS 
The following is a list of publications I have authored or co-authored over the last 10 years. 
1) Selling Your Business - Non-Family Valuation and Tax Issues, presented to the National 
Auctioneers Association - 52nd Auctioneers Conference and Show on July 20, 2001 . 
2) Litigation Questions, Problems & Solutions: The Bench, Bar and Clients Speak Out. 
Participant on the client panel - presented to the Idaho State Bar Litigation Section on 
January 10, 2003. 
3) Using Business Valuations To Build An Estate - presented to the Boise Estate Planning 
Council on I\Jovember 3, 2003. 
4) Business Valuation Basics - presented to the Boise Wells Fargo Business Bankers 
meeting on December 5, 2003. 
5) Business Valuation Basics: How to Use Valuation/Financial Theory to Increase the Value 
of Your Business - presented to TechHelp, Manufacturers Luncheon on January 28, 
2005. 
6) Tax Planning for Sales of Real Estate - sponsored by Premier Alliance on March 16, 
2005. 
7) Valuation and Credit Analysis: Similarities and Differences - presented to Boise area 
U.S. Bank business bankers on May 11, 2005. 
8) The Guideline Publicly Traded Company Method and The Market Value of "invested" 
Capital: Should Market Value of "Stakeholder" Capital be the Appropriate Reference -
Business Valuation Review; Summer, 2006. 
9) A Hybrid Restricted Stock/Pre-lPO Data Point: Lack of Marketability Discount for 
ESOP's. - Business Valuation Review; Summer, 2007. 
10) Pension Plans and Closely-Held Companies: Valuing Tricky Assets in Divorce -
presented to the Idaho State Bar Association on May 9, 2008. 
11) Co-presenter on damages in Personal Injury litigation to various Treasure Valley area law 
firrns-2009 
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PRIOR DEPOSITION OR TH/AL TESTIMONY 
The following is a list of cases in which I have given testimony in either deposition or at trial in 
the last four years. 
1) Ray Martin and Robert & Lois Short v. Shirley S. Grant 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - February 2006 
2) Idaho State Department of Agriculture v. TFM, LLC, et al. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - February 2006 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - April 2006 
3) Richard Gomez v. Mastec North America, Inc., et al. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - February 2006 
Trial - Boise, Idaho - August 2006 
4) United States Bankruptcy Court 
In re: Steven Paul Cady and Connie Jean Cady 
Trial - Boise, Idaho- August 2006 
5) Roy Hall v. Glenns Ferry Grazing Association 
Trial - Boise, Idaho -August 2006 
6) MSN Communications, Inc. v. CompuNet, Inc., et al. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - October 2006 
7) Serenic Software, Inc. v. Protean Technologies, Inc., et al. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - October 2006 
8) Shannon L. Allison, et al., v. Daniel R. Torrez et al. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - November 2006 
9) Chris Matey, et al., v. Ford Motor Company et al. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - November 2006 
AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS R. REINSTEIN 
PRIOR DEPOSITION OR Ti 7AL TESTIMONY - continued 
10) Michael P. Fisher, et al., v. Christian Cusimano, et al. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - March 2007 
11) Saint Alphonsus Diversified Care, Inc. v. MRI Associates, LLP 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - June 2007 
12) Idaho State Department of Agriculture v. Wheatland Agribusiness, Inc., et al. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - April 2008 
13) J.R. Simplot Company v·. Nestle USA, Inc. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - May 2008 
14) United States of America ex rel. Cherri Suter and Melinda Harmer v. National Rehab 
Partners Inc. and Magic Valley Regional Medical Center 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - August 2008 
15) Hobson Fabricating Corp. v. SE/Z Construction, LLC, et al. 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - September 2008 
16) George C. Turner. v. Russell E. and Victoria F. Turner 
Trial - Murphy, Idaho - July 2009 
17) Ronald R. Mccann. v. William V. Mccann, Jr., et al 
Hearing on Motion to Compel - Boise, Idaho - August 2009 
18) Darel Hardenbrook, et al. v. United Parcel Service, Co. 
Trial - Boise, Idaho - January 2010 
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Timothy Esser #6770 
Esser & Sandberg, PLLC 
520 East Main Street 
Pullman, Washington 99163 
Phone: (509)332-7692 
Fax: (509) 334-2205 
Andrew Schwam #1573 
Schwam Law Finn 
514 South Polle #6 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Phone: (208) 882-4190 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, Il\J AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
V. 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and 
GARY E. lvlEISNER, individually 
as a director of McCann Ranch 
Livestock Company, Inc., and as a 
shareholder of McCann Ranch & 
Livestock, Inc., in his capacity as 
Trustee of the William V. McCann, 
Sr. Stock Trust, 
Defendants, 
McCANN RANCH & 
LIVESTOCK COMP ANY, INC., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Nominal Defendant. ) 
-------------
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Ada ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF KAREN A GINNETI -- 1 
No. CV08-01226 
AFFIDAVIT OF KAREN A. GIJ'illETT, 
CPA, CFE, MST 
Karen A. Ginnett, being first duly sworn on oath deposes and says: 
1. I am a certified public accountant licensed in the State of Idaho and have been 
continuously so licensed since 1996. I am a manager in the Boise firm of Hooper Cornell, 
PLLC. My experience and training is set forth on my resume attached, and includes working for 
the Idaho State Tax Commission for seven years as an auditor. I am over the age of 18, am 
competent to testify to the matters as set forth below and I have personal knowledge of those 
matters. 
2. I have assisted Dennis Reinstein in this matter and have reviewed all the material 
mentioned in his affidavit. I share his opinions. I specifically respond to assertions made in 
Paragraphs 16 and 17 of Dorothy Snowball's affidavit to the effect that the amounts paid to 
Gertrude McCann are: 
Legitimate expenses of the corporation and do not expose the corporation 
to any risk of liability for tax fraud .... Neither the Idaho State Tax 
Commission or the IRS have ever objected to the amount of compensation 
paid to William McCann, Jr. or the payments to Gertrude Mccann .... In 
fact, in all the years I have been serving as accountant for the corporation 
and preparing its tax returns, neither the IRS nor the State of Idaho have 
questioned any deductions taken by the corporation or any returns filed by 
the corporation. 
3. Ms. Snowball states that the expenses paid to Gertrude McCann are legitimate 
expenses of the Corporation which do not expose the Corporation to any risk of liability for tax 
fraud. The term "fraud" as used in the tax law, means an actual and deliberate, or willful, 
wrongdoing with the specific intent to evade tax believed to be owed. The existence of fraud is a 
question of fact to be determined on a case by case basis considering the entire record of 
transactions. Fraudulent intent can seldom be established by a single act. The Tax Court in 
Schmitz, John Noehl, (1983) TC Memo 1983-482, set out three elements of fraud: (1) a knowing 
falsehood; (2) an underpayment of tax; and (3) an intent to evade tax. It is important to 
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understand that the tax evasion motive need not be the only motive or even the principal motive 
for the transaction(s), as long as it is a motive. 
The deductions claimed on the Corporation's tax returns for questionable 
payments to Gertrude McCann and a portion of her personal expenses may be viewed as a way 
to avoid paying tax and therefore tax evasion. The assessment of the civil fraud penalty would be 
available to the auditor. 
4. Ms. Snowball's affidavit indicates that neither the IRS nor the State of Idaho has 
audited the Corporation since approximately 1986/87. To the extent Ms. Snowball's affidavit 
could be read to infer that the taxing authorities have approved these transactions - that is 
simply inaccurate. According to Ms. Snowball's affidavit, the taxing authorities have never 
reviewed the post-January 5, 2001, transactions between the Corporation and Gertrude 
Mccann. It appears that during the 1986/1987 audit, the taxing authorities did review the 
transactions between the Corporation and one of its principals, specifically William Mccann, 
Sr., and found that the Corporation was improperly deducting as business expenses the personal 
expenses of Mr. Mccann, Sr. 
5. Ms. Snowball appears to reconcile the deduction of some of the payments to 
Gertrude Mccann on the Corporation tax returns by stating that "Gertrude McCann receives a 
1099-MISC each year. .. and she pays tax on that income." The Corporation and Gertrude 
McCann are two separate entities for tax purposes. The fact that Gertrude McCann reports some 
income on her tax return does not change the question as to the legitimacy of deducting these 
payments as business expenses of the Corporation. If an expense is not deemed to be ordinary 
and necessary under Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, the fact that Gertrude McCann 
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has reported some of the payments as income will not affect the denial of the deduction on the 
Corporate return. 
6. It is my opinion, and for the reasons set forth in detail in Dennis Reinstein' s 
affidavit, the financial transactions that the Corporation has engaged in since January 5, 2001 
with Gertrude Mccann do expose the Corporation to substantial liabilities in the event of an 
audit. Simply put, the Corporation is lucky that it has not been audited and had these 
questionable transactions reviewed. These transactions create a threat of additional taxes and 
assessment of interest and penalties which threaten harm to the Corporation. 
DATED: This _B__ day of b::BR..uAIL:-/, 2010. 
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Education: 
Certification: 
Career 
Experience: 
Professional 
Memberships 
and Activities: 
KAREN A. G!NNETT, CPA, CFE, 
University of Maryland - B.S. Business Management/Accounting 
Golden Gate University- M.S. Taxation 
CPA, Ucensed in Idaho 
Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE), 2008 
Hooper Cornell, P.L.L.C. 
Manager, January, 2008 - Present 
SuperValu, Inc. 
Income Tax Manager, November 2006 - November 2007 
Bauknight, Pietras & Stormer, P.A. 
Tax Manager, November 2005 - October 2006 
Idaho State Tax Commission 
Income Tax Auditor, 2003 - 2005 
Nexus Unit Supervisor, 1998 - 2003 
Tax Policy Specialist, 1998 
Public Accounting 
Staff Accountant to Manager, 1980 - 1997 
Professional experience includes: 
• Fraud related investigations for private companies and governmental 
agencies. 
• Litigation support projects including personal injury losses, lost 
wages, wrongful death, lost business profits and contract breach. 
Support services include research, data analysis, economic loss 
calculation, and computation of future and present values. 
• Investigation of out of state businesses to determine and enforce 
compliance with Idaho state income and sales tax laws. 
• Auditor of income tax returns filed by individuals and businesses. 
• Preparation and review of business and individual income tax returns. 
• Tax research and planning. 
• Preparation of audited, reviewed and compiled 'financial statements. 
• Assisting businesses in establishment and implementation of 
accounting systems and control. 
• Speaker at various tax related seminars. 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
Boise Chapter of Certified Fraud Examiners 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
Idaho State Society of Certified Public Accountants 
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REN A. G!NNETT, CPA, CFE, M 
PRIOR DEPOSITION OR TRIAL TESTIMONY 
The following is a list of cases in which I have given testimony in either deposition or at trial in 
the last four years. 
1) James E. Hawe and Tamara J. Hawe v. Van Hees Properties, LLC; Hark's Corner, Inc. -
Case No. CV-Pl-0704871 
Trial - Ada County, Boise, Idaho - June 2009 
2) William 0. Goodrich and Khuy V. Goodrich v. Jeffrey Sadler, Edward G. Rainford, and 
Clear Wealth, Inc. - Case No. CV-OC-0911997 
Deposition - Boise, Idaho - January 2010 
QUALi FiCA TIONS 
See curriculum vitae attached. 
COMPENSATION 
Hourly rate of $160 plus out-of-pocket costs. 
PUBUCA T/ONS/PRESENTA T/ONS 
1) Idaho Additions and Subtractions - presented to the Idaho State Tax Commission 
Income Tax Audit Bureau in August 2000. 
2) I\Jexus - presented to the Idaho State Tax Commission Income Tax Audit Bureau on 
April 22, 2000. 
3) Entity Overview - presented to the Idaho State Tax Commission Income Tax Audit 
Bureau on October 1, 2003. 
4) Co-presenter on damages in Personal Injury litigation to various Boise law firms - 2009. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KAREN A. GINNETT 
Timothy Esser #6770 
Esser & Sandberg, PLLC 
520 East Main Street 
Pullman, Washington 99163 
Phone: (509) 332-7692 
Fax: (509) 334-2205 
Andrew Schwam #1573 
Schwam Law Firm 
514 South Polk #6 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Phone: (208) 882-4190 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ~'EZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McC~N, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and 
GARY E. MEISNER, individually 
as a director of McCann Ranch 
Livestock Company, Inc., and as a 
shareholder of McCann Ranch & 
Livestock, Inc., in his capacity as 
Trustee of the William V. McCann, 
Sr. Stock Trust, 
Defendants, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
McCANN RANCH & ) ) 
LIVESTOCK COMP ANY, INC., ) 
) 
______ N_o_m_in_a_I _D_e_fe_n_d_an_t_. ) 
STATE OF WASHINGTON) 
: ss 
County of Whitman ) 
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD McCANN-- l 
No. CV08-01226 
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD McCANN 
Ronald McCann, being first duly sworn on oath deposes and says: 
1. I am the plaintiff in this action. I am over the age of 18, am competent to testify to the 
matters as set forth below and I have personal knowledge of those matters. 
2. I note that according to the defense summary judgment affidavits, the Corporation 
has spent $250,000 in defending my complaint which alleges oppression, and further, they 
concede that for purposes of their motion that I have been oppressed. The fact is that if the 
Defendant controlling directors/shareholders had not engaged in the pattern of oppression I 
complain of, I would not have brought this lawsuit. If I were not oppressed, the Corporation 
would not have squandered $250,000 in needless litigation expenses. 
3. When the Corporation was formed, and then 36.68% of its stock gifted to me and 
a like amount to my brother, it was my understanding that this was done as an inheritance 
device - that would allow our father to transfer real estate to us. And the real estate the 
Corporation owns today is the same real estate it owned when it was formed. Today, the 
Corporation has timber/cattle pasture ground and a cattle operation, the same as at the time it 
was formed. In other words, if I was to receive 36.68% of the corporate assets in existence 
today, I would be receiving what I would have received had the Corporation not been formed 
and my father had simply left me that percentage of his estate. Gertrude Mccann, my mother, 
has stated in her deposition that she does not owe the Corporation anything. As a natural heir of 
Gertrude McCann, I will use her statement to oppose any effort by the Corporation to recover 
any amounts it claims it is owed from her estate. The alternative would be for the Corporation, 
fully controlled by my brother after my mother's death, to assert a creditor claim in her estate. 
If successful, that would result in me not receiving my expected inheritance from my mother. 
And so far, because of the oppression of Defendants, I have not received the fruits of my 
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father's intended inheritance to me. I attach pages 6-9, 14-17, 38-41 and 46-49 of Gertrude 
McCann's deposition. 
4. I also believe that it is unlikely the Corporation can recover from my mother's 
estate what it purports to be owed given that I believe her estate consists of not much more than 
100 acres of ground near Craigmont. She has little in the way of other assets - she essentially 
spends her cash flow. As my brother testified at his deposition, he caused these transfers 
because she needed the money. 
5. I attached a true copy of the Minutes of the September 6, 2000, Board of 
Directors meeting. Despite the resolution set forth therein, that the Corporation would recover 
the ultra vires compensation paid to my mother (the phony consulting fees) the Corporation has 
recovered nothing from my mother nor has it made any effort to do so. 
DATED: This /{) day ofFebruary%20 . '. :) ,/7 -;; ,., _ . ., 
f. ~l-/Jr~/ kl :fjf ~=~ 
' Ronald McCann 
· r~~-;c,THY ESSER 
. I STArE OF WMKINGlON 
·1 NOlARY PUBLIC 
. M'f r;OMMISSfON 1:XFIRES 
,_ ·- _ .~2-~1-1,2 
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 15, 2009- 9:04 A.M. 
Page 8 l 
Thereupon, 
MR. ESSER: 1 don't your objection is noted. J 
2 We'll receive the evidence. i 
GERTRUDE McCANN, 3 
a witness of lawful age, having first been duly sworn 4 
upon her oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and 5 
nothing but the truth, testified as fallows: 6 
EXAMINATION 7 
BY MR. ESSER: 8 
Q. Mrs. McCann, how old are you? 9 
A. Ninety-three. 10 
Q. Now, do you have anybody that helps you with 11 
your daily life? 12 
A. l have a hired man. 13 
Q. What's he do? 14 
A. He works. 15 
Q. Does he -- what kind of work does he do for 16 
you? 17 
A. l live on thirty-five acres, so there's lots of 18 
work to be done. 19 
Q. So he works outside the house? 20 
A. Certainly. 21 
Q. Does he help with the cooking or the 22 
A. No, he doesn't. 23 
Q. He doesn't. You take care of everything insidt 24 
the house? 25 
Page 7 
A. Yes. 
Q. (BY MR. ESSER) What was your husband doing ~1 
1941 [sic]? I 
A. Farm work. } 
MR. McNICHOLS: Do you mean to say '41? i 
Q. (BY MR. ESSER) Excuse me. What was your j 
husband doing at the time of his death? You know, was i 
he active with the corporation? Was he active with the !' 
ranch? 
MR. McNlCHOLS: Same objection, also on the 
grounds that it's compound. May l have a continuing 1 
objection then to everything prior to January 5th of J 
2001? i 
MR. ESSER: Certainly. That will make things li 
smoother. 
MR. McNlCHOLS: Yes. Thank you. j 
MR. ESSER: Your objection is we can't even ask 1 
any questions about anything that occurred before 2001, 1 
that's your objection? l 
MR. McNlCHOLS: Unless it has effects or j 
consequences which arise after that time. I 
MR. ESSER: And 1 think every question I'm I 
going to ask meets that standard, but we'll deal with 
that later. 
Page 9 
\ Q. (BY MR. ESSER) Sorry, Mrs. McCann. What w, s 
2 Q. How about driving; do you do your own driving? 2 your husband doing workwise shortly before his death, ! 
you know, in the year before his death? j 3 A. Yes. 3 
4 Q. Do you have anyone else that helps or works fo 4 A. I don't know. 1 didn't go with him. I was i 
5 you? 5 home working. ] 
6 A. No. 6 Q. (BY MR. ESSER) But was he active in the j 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1 
Q. Who pays for this hired hand? 7 
A. McCann Ranch and Livestock. 8 
Q. Okay. How long have you had his services? 9 
A. Probably three years. 10 
Q. Okay. Before that, did you have someone else 11 
helping you? 12 
A. Yes, I've always had somebody help me outside 13 
Q. Okay. Your husband died in 1997. About how 14 
many years had you been married when he died? 15 
business? i .. A. Partly, I suppose. 
Q. Okay. At the time you married him, what was he 
doing, in 1941? i 
A. He was a farmer. ) 
Q. Okay. l 
A. And cattleman. · 
Q. Did he own his own land? 
A. No. He worked for his father. 
A. We were married in 1941. You figure it out. 16 Q. His father was alive when you guys got married? 
Q. Well, that looks like about fifty-six years, 17 A. He certainly was. 
lmh? 18 Q. Okay. And how did you guys suppo11 yourself in I 
A. Yeah, something like that. 19 the early years of your marriage? 1 
Q. Okay. What was he doing at the time of his 20 A. I guess you would say by working. j 
death? 21 Q. In a cattle operation, a farm operation? J 
MR. McNICHOLS: I'm going to object on the 22 A. Yeah. l 
grounds that I think the cou11 has entered an order that 23 Q. There -- Bill was born in 1944, 1 think, and -- i 
~4 the discove1-y is to be limited to events that occuned 24 A. No, he wasn't. j 
/ 2 5 afterJuly 5th of 2001. 25 Q. What year was he born? j{J,$ ~ 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
3 (Pages 6 to 9) 
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1 was? 
2 A. No, I don't. 
., Q. Do you know today where Bill's office is? .) 
4 A. I ce1tainly do. 
5 Q. Is that where the corporation's office was? 
s A. I don't know. 
7 Q. The corporation has some commercial prope1ties 
8 doesn't it? 
9 A. As far as I know, they have some, but I don't 
10 know where or what. 
1.1 Q. Do you know when the corporation first started 
12 developing commercial prope1i.ies? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Okay. According to the records I've seen, the 
15 corporation was formed in 1974. 
16 A. I don't know that even. 
17 Q. Well, assuming that's accurate, I'm -- just for 
18 today, I'm telling you that that's accurate. I've seen 
19 records that tell me that. l was going to ask you, 
20 whose idea was it to form this corporation? 
21 A. I don't know. 
22 Q. Was it your idea? 
23 A. No, it was not my idea. I don't know anything 
24 about it. 
25 Q. Do you know why the corporation was formed? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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A. We raised chickens. l raised ducks, and I j 
raised, had sheep. I was -- most everything to make 
money, baby-sit. 
Q. And that was at around the family home where 
you live today? 
A. Certainly. 
Q. Okay. But in terms of being down at the 
corporate office, you didn't do that? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. In terms of, did you have anything to do with 
developing commercial real estate? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Okay. Did you have anything to do with runnin 
the cattle? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Did you have anything to do with --
A. Only my own cattle. :1 
Q. Only your own cattle at the home, at the home? Ii 
A. (Witness nods head.) { 
Q. Correct? I 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have some cows there today, don't you. 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. About how many do you have? 
A. Eight. l 
t------------------------4---------------------Pa-ge---ll71 
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I A. No. 
2 Q. Do you know in 1974, if that's when the 
3 corporation was formed, maybe you've answered this, but 
4 at that point, were there any commercial properties, or 
5 was it just cattle and timber and --
6 A. I don't know. 
7 Q. ranch property? 
8 A. I don't know. 
9 Q. You don't know. Who ran the corporation after 
i.O it was formed? 
11 A. Bill Mccann, Senior. 
12 Q. And did he run it pretty much until he died? 
13 A. I think so. 
14 Q. What did you do as far as running the 
15 corporation or helping the corporation? 
16 A. Whatever there was to do, I did, for me. 
17 Q. And I'm talking before your husband died. 
18 A. I did --
19 Q. Okay. 
20 A. everything before. 
21 Q. And what --
22 A. We raised -- we did a lot of things. 
23 Q. Okay. 
~4 A. At home. 
25 Q. Like what did you do? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. And you've always had cows at home? ! 
A. Yes, 1 have. I 
Q. Before your husband died, you know, what di 
Ron do with the family business operation? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. What did --
A. I don't remember. 
Q. What did Bill do before your husband died? 
A. His law office, I guess. 
Q. After your husband died, did you do anything o 
get a job or a different -- 1 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. You didn't do anything to get a different -- J 
A. I worked enough during my [ife that 1 don't l 
need a job. 
Q. Okay. We're going so fast we're going to get l 
done here pretty quick. j 
A. Well, we better. 1 
Q. Now, you get Social Security, I assume? .i 
A. Yes, I do. j 
Q. Okay. And you've received financial benefits ~ 
from the corporation? 1 
A. I don't know that. . i 
Q. Okay. Well, J'll give you some examples, and { 
we'll talk about that. But I'm trying to figure out, do j 
?I 111/ ~ .i·' 
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Q. Looking at some records of the corporation, J A. Somebody had to tell me to do that, because I 1 
2 never read it. I don't owe them nothing. 2 
3 Q. Did Ron tell you to sign that? 3 
4 A. No, I don't think so. I don't think it was 4 
I -- I see where the corporation provided benefits to l 
you down through the years, and but I can't tell if they \ 
claim that you owe that back to thern or not. We haven'; 
been able to figure that out. That's what -- ! 5 him. 5 
6 Q. Did Gary Meisner tell you to sign that? 6 A. I don't owe them a dime. i 
1 
7 A. I don't know who it was. 7 Q. Okay. What benefits does the corporation i 
8 Q. Did Bill tell you? 8 
9 A. When was this? 9 
10 Q. January 1st, 2006. 10 
11 A. January '06, three years ago. I don't remembe1 11 
12 this. 12 
13 Q. Mrs. McCann, what I'm trying to figure out, if 13 
14 this document means what it says, I'm trying to 14 
15 out why you would owe the corporation a hundred an 15 
16 sixty-five thousand dollars? 16 
1 7 A. I don't owe them a dime. In my book, I don't 17 
18 owe them nothing. They owe me. 18 
19 Q. What do they owe you for? 19 
20 A. Living, living expenses. That1s what they owe 20 
21 mefor. 21 
22 Q. And why is that? 22 
23 A. I helped make that. 23 
24 Q. You helped make the corporation? 24 
25 A. I helped make what is made. 25 
pay for your car? 
A. No, I paid for it myself. 
Q. Does the corporation pay for your gas? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How does do you have a credit, a corporate 
credit card? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. And you can charge gas with it? 
A. I do charge gas with it. 
Q. Okay. Is it a VISA or a Master Card, what, 
what is it? 
A. I don't know. It me there. That's all I 
care. 
Q. Do you have it with you? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. Can I see it, please? 
A. It's McCann Ranch and Livestock. 
Q. And that's the only thing I'm going to ask for 
ii 
! 
l 
l 
l 
l 
f j 
! 
l 
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l Q. And do you feel that the corporation is 1 you to pu,11 out of your wal Mrs. McCann. 
2 treating you fairly? 2 A. Yeah, that better be. l ~ 
It doesn't I 3 A. No. 3 Q. Now this one says William McCann. 
4 Q. 4 say the corporation. 
5 A. Because we have too many expenses and lawsuit 5 A. Well, he's he is it. 
6 to make any money off of that thing. 6 Q. But that's the one you use? 
7 Q. What are the -- what's the lawsuits about? 7 A. Yes, that's the one I use. 
8 A. I don't know. This is the first one I had 8 Q. Okay. Can I see it again, please? I want to 
9 anything to do with. I don't know anything about them. 9 write down the number. 
10 Q. What is this lawsuit all about? 10 MR. McNICHOLS: Well, I guess you won't. I 1 
l 1 A. I don't know. That's what I wonder. I don't 11 guess we don't have to worry about you using it but.. .. j 
12 do anything to deserve any of this. 12 MR. ESSER: I thought you represent the ;i 
13 Q. Has anybody explained to you what this 13 corporation. 
14 lawsuit's about? 14 MR. SCHWAM: He's worried about you i, 
15 A. Yes. But I didn't pay any attention. 15 MR. ESSER: Oh, well, I'm not about to use it. 1 
16 Q. Who's explained to you what this lawsuit is 16 Q. (BY MR. ESSER) That's the credit card you us· 
17 about? 1 7 to pay for things? 
18 A. This man right here. I 8 A. That's the only thing I pay for on that is gas. 
19 Q. We.II, I don't want to know what Mr. Aherin told 19 Q. Gas. 
20 you. Or I would like to know, but I'm not allowed to 20 A. I use my own money, what I get. ·1 
21 ask that. What has Bill, Junior, told you? 21 Q. Do you take trips from time to time? , 
I 22 A. Bill, Junior, doesn't say anything about it. 22 A. I intend to, too. ,1 
23 He respects me. 23 Q. And, Sandy Scott helps you with those, bookin j 
(4 Q. What's Ron told you about it? 24 those and.... ,j j 25 A. Nothing. 25 A. She is the guide. She is the one that runs I., j 
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Q. Do you know why the corporation would owe you 
2 hundred and six thousand? 
,.., 
.) 
4 
A. Why not? 
Q. But I mean, is there some specific transfer of 
5 asset or some specific thing you did? I've heard what 
6 you've testified to before, that, that your sons and the 
7 corporation, based on the whole history here, have an 
8 obligation to you, but I'm --
9 A. You're right, they do. 
10 Q. But I'm asking, you know, did you sell a 
11 valuable asset to the corporation for a hundred and six 
12 thousand or did you --
13 A. 1 did not. I never sold them anything. 
14 Q. Did you do any specific thing in exchange for a 
15 hundred and six thousand? You don't remember? 
16 A. Not to my knowledge. 
17 
] 8 
19 
20 
Q. Do you know what dividends are? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What are they? 
A. I'm not getting any. 
21 Q. Okay. Dividends is income that a corporation 
22 kicks out to its shareholders, is that right? 
23 A. Yeah, that's right, and I'm not getting any. 
24 Q. How do you feel about that? 
25 A. Well, I think l would have got some if he 
Page 48 ~ 
1 A. Yes. I'm ninety-three, working on ninety-four. , 
Q. Okay. Is it correct you don't do anything for 1, 2 
3 the corporation today? . 
A. That's right. f 4 
5 Q. Okay. When was the last time you worked for j 
6 the corporation? l 
7 A. I don't know. I don't remember. What do I do !' 
8 for the corporation? 
9 Q. That's what I'm trying to find out. Since 1 
10 you've been eighty-five years old, have you worked for i 
11 the corporation? l 
12 A. I used to fix lunch once in a while for them l 
13 when they was branding, and that's the only thing I eve1 ' 
14 did. 
Q. Okay. 15 
16 A. But a good housewife and a mother, that's 
17 enough. That's a full operation. 
18 MR. SCHW AM: I agree with it. J 
19 Q. (BY MR. ESSER) And that's -- you'1·e owed for j 
20 that? 
21 A. Huh? 
22 
23 
Q. You are owed for that? 
A. I agree. 
24 Q. Now, who owns the car that you drive? 
25 own it or does the corporation own it? 
l 
I 
l 
Do you 1 
J 
i 
-----------------------+-------------------------------,i 
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hadn't put that in the meeting where I would be paid A. I own my car, and McCann Ranch and Livestock ! 
2 just shares and not money. l'd rather have the money 2 owns the little car. .j 
3 and not the shares. 3 Q. Okay. If your account -- ·1
1 
4 Q. So you think that Ron caused something to occur 4 A. And l've always been given by my husband a car 
5 in one of the director meetings so that you couldn't 5 for my birthday, and I figure that red one is mine. ; 
6 have dividends; is that correct? 6 Q. Which one's the red one? ~ 
7 A. That's right, couldn't have monthly payment. 7 A. The Honda. j 
8 Yes, that's right. 8 Q. Okay. I 
9 Q. Wel1, I'm about done. I'm going to take a 9 A. Because 1-- I traded in the one I had got for 1 
l O break and -- 10 my birthday for this one, so 1 figure that's mine. I 
11 A. You don't need one; I do. 11 Q. If your bank account ever runs low, do you j 
12 MR. ESSER: Well, that -- I'm going to take a 12 ever, do you do anything about -- J 
13 break. 13 A. No. Itakecareofthat. i 
14 (Whereupon, the deposition was in recess at 14 Q. 1 mean, have you ever got to where you needed j 
15 9:56 a.m. and subsequently reconvened at 10:01 a.m.; .an 15 more money, and do you do anything about that? Do yot ! 
16 the following proceedings were had and entered of 16 go to Bill? j 
17 record:) 17 A. I told you I could use more money but I skimp. :/ 
I 
18 Q. (BY MR. ESSER) Well, we're about done. I 18 Q. Has there ever been a time where you've gone to :1 
19 thought I asked you this, but they didn't think I was 19 Bill or Mr. Meisner and said, hey, I need more money? 
20 clear enough. What do you do for the corporation today, 20 A. Yes. But so what? 
21 anything? 21 Q. And what do they tel I you? 
22 A. At my age, what should I do? 22 A. It's all gone in lawsuits. 
23 Q. I'm assuming you don't do anything for the 23 Q. Okay. 
A corporation today, but I just -- you're ninety-three, 24 A. We don't even get anything at all for it I 25 but is that correct? 25 because of the lawsuits. You've got to pay for those ~G::I . 
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MINUTES OF THE SPECIAL MEETING OF THE 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK, INC. 
September 6, 2000 
A Special Meeting of tbe Board of Directors of McCann Ranch & Livestock, Inc. was 
held pursuant to Notice on September 6, 2000, copy of which Nolice is attachecl hereto and 
included herein as Ex.hibit "A", at the offices of the Corporation located at 1027 Bryden Avenue, 
Lewiston, Idaho. 
Present at the meeting were Directors William V. McCann, Jr., Larry J. Durkin a11d Gary 
E. Meisner. Also present were Michael E. McNichols, attorney for Gary E. Meisner, corporate 
counsel Cumer L. Green, Merlyn W. Clark, attorney for William V. McCann, Jr. ancl Chantell 
Hoisington, Corporate Secretary 
President 1vfcCann called the meeting to order al 11 :25 a.rn. 
iV(inutcs 
President McC:rnn said that the first order of business would be approval oC the tv[inutcs 
of the Board of Directors Meeting held on August 9, 2000. 
A discussion tben ens1.1ed concerning the draft of the Minutes which had been d1stributccl 
by fax on rbe ;,ftemoon of September 5, 2000 to the Directors. As a result of the discussio11, it 
was determined that certain ch;rnges needed to be made to the Minutes, to-wit: 
Corrections to 
August 9, 2000 Meeting Minutes 
l. On Page 1, insert a new paragraph immediate1y after the first paragraph of the. sec.lion 
entitled "Allegations" as follows: 
President McCann then delivered to Mr. Baltins, counsel for 
Ronald R. McCann, a copy of the August 9, 200.0 lette[· to Mr. 
Green requesting further infom1ation to ex.plain certain specific 
allegations contained in Mr. Baltins' letter of June 9, 2000 (a copy 
of which is attached hereto as Exhibit Band inc111dccl herein as if· 
set forth in full). 
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l. On Page 2, insert a new paragraph immediately after the third paragraph oC the section 
entitled "Ailegations" as follows: 
Mr. Baltins infom1ed the Directors that Ronald R. McCann desired 
to be appointed as a member of the Gertn.1de McCann 
Compensation Committee. The President deferred the re.quest. 
2. On Page 2, paragraph 3, line 4, insert after the words ''excepting those items" the words 
"See Hems No. 5c, 6b and 6c of Exhibit A". 
3. On Page 4, first sentence of first full paragraph, delete the words "Mr. Bal tins" ancJ insert 
the words "Mr. Durkin". 
4. On Page 4, second line of first full paragraph, delete the words "and felt he" and inserl 
the words "and inquired as to whether or not he". 
5. In the last sentence at tbe bottom of Page 4, delete Lbc words "and that fees and costs Lo 
date were approximately $3,000 to $5,000''. 
After full and complete discussion and upon motion duly made by Larry J. Durkin and 
seconded by Gary E. Meisner, the following Resolution was presented: 
That tbc Minutes of the Meeting oftbe Board of Directors held on 
August 9, 2000, including the corrections (set forth above) be hereby 
approved. 
Vote being had on the above and foregoing Resolution and the same havi11g beell counted 
and found to be unanimously in favor thereof, President McCann declared saicJ Resolution 
adopted. 
,L\. Gertrude tv(cCann Compensation Comm\ttee 
President McCann then noted that during the Director's Meeting on August 9, 2000 thal 
be had deferred a decisi011 on Ronald R. McCann's request to become a member of tlie A. 
Gertrude tvkCann Compensation Committee. President McCann stated that he had considered 
the matter and based on his consideration and evaluation of the request, has cJecided Lo a11cl 
hereby does deny the same. 
A. Gertrude McCann Compcusatjon 
The President then announced that the Board would consider the mali.er of A. GenrucJe 
McCann's compensation noting that she had been employed by the Co171orntio11 as a consultar1t 
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since the dearh or her husband, the founder of tbc Corpo1·JLion, 011 October ?.7, l ')')7 
Presidem McCann then advised the Board that rhe Shareholders, tn a 111ceti11g c;1rlic1· 011 
the S.Jrne date, had passed by a 2-1 vote a Resolution recommending the Board ofTn1stccs pay a 
lifetime annuity to A. Gertrude McCmn and us deferred compensc1tion Co1· the ser-viccs that she 
and \Villiam V. McCann, Sr. had provided to the Corporation ror minimal considcrat1on si11cc 
lhe Corporation's inception on July 2, 1974. 
After full and complete discussion and uµon motion duly made by Gary E. tvkisner ~,nci 
seconded by Larry J. Durkin, the follow·1ng Resolution was presented: 
WHEREAS, lhe Shareholckrs of the Corporation have by a 2-1 vote 
recommended lhat the Board of Directors provide a lifetime annuity to A. 
Gertrude McCann for services rendered by both she and her husb;:rnd to lhe 
CorporcJtion for minimal compensation since forrnatiOl1 of L11e Corporc1lion 011 
July 2, l 974. (See Minutes of the Shareholder's Meeting held on Septemhei- 6, 2000); 
ancl 
\VHEIU<'.AS, Corporc1te Counsel, Cumer l.. Green, has advised lhc 
Board that inasmuch cis one Sbarcl1older voted against thcit 11..esohJtion, to-wil 
Ronald .R. McCmrn, that there might be certain exposure lo the Directors ,,hould 
such compcnscition program be instit11ted; and 
WHEREAS, the Directors are not willing to uccepl such potential 
liability, paiiicularly in light of the lawsuil lhat has been filed by Ron;ilcl 
R. McCann against the Corporation and cc11ain of it::; Directors. 
NOW TI{EREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Board of Directors 
ofMcCann Rancb ::md Livestock, Tnc. decline lo approve the. recommend;ition or 
tbe Share:hnlders or to authorize payment of cJ defcrrt:d cornpc1lSatio11 ;:inm1ity to 
A. Grn:rude McCan11. 
Vole being had on the .:ibovc and foregoing Resolution and tbc: same having bee:n counted 
and found to be unanimously in favor thereof, President McCann decl.:ired s;iid Resolution 
adopted. 
CuITcnt Consultin~ Contr;ict \Vith /\. Gertnrdc \·fcC,rnn 
J)1esidcnt McCann lhcn announced the Bo:i.rd would consider the cum'.nt conlract witl-t 1\. 
Genrude McCann for consulting services. 
Aftu a Cull n.nd complete discussion, upon motion duly rnadc by Llrry ./. Durlcrn and 
sccondi::d by Gciry E. Meisner·, the followi11g, Resolution wns presenlcd. 
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BE IT RESOLVED that the Corporation shall lerminalc lbe c:urn:nl 
COJ:lSulting arrangement with ;ind discontinue making compensation payments 
co A. Gertrude McCann and to initiate such reason::ib\e ,1ction as shall be 
necessa.ty to detcrrnir1c ifc1ny ultra vin::s cornpcnsation has been paid ru A. 
Gertrude McCann and if so, to secure or recover tor the Corporatio11 such 
paymrnts, ifimy there be, from A. Gutrude :v1cC8nll, who is now 84 years 
of age. 
Voce being bad on the above and foregoing Resolution and the s3rne h~ving been counted 
and found to be lfnanimously in favor tbereof, President McCann dccl:1red s<1id Resolution 
adopted.. 
Past Due Rcnt~l of Shop :rnd Ston1['.e Facilities to A. Gertrude McC:rnn 
President Mc.Cann then announced that the Board would consider the rn,Hter o[ payment 
of past due rent lo A. Gertrude McCann. 
Al1.er a full ;rnd complete discussion, upon motion duly made by Lan)' J. Du1·kin 811d 
seconded by Gary E. Mcisner, the following Resolution was presented. 
\VHEREAS, the Corporation on March 1, 1988 caused to be co11stn1clccl 
upon the properly owned by A. Gcrt;udc McCann (jointly with Willic1111 V. 
McC,rnn, Sr. prior to his death) certain shop and storage foci lilies including a steel 
buildine;· and 
""" 
WHEREAS, the Corporation constructed such facilities on March I, 
1988 and have utilized that building, lhe surrounding grounds and parking 
an:3s and the means of ingress and egress continuously since said dealb or 
William V. McCann, Sr. witbout payment ofre;ntal Eompensc1rio11 lO the 
property owners; and 
\VHEREAS, during said period of time, wirhout compens<1lion from 
the Corporation, in addition to allowing use of said property, A. G~rtmdc 
McCann c1nd her deceased spouse paid ad va\orcm taxes, insurance costs 
and n1aintenane;e costs with respect to said property; ,.111d 
\VHEREAS, the Board of Directors have reviewed and :rn;:i \yzecl 
\bi:: value of such usage and have determmed that a fair m,nket rcnl 
commencing on March l, 1988 through present dace would be the sum oC 
$5,500 per year and that such unpaid past due amounts should reasonably 
carry interest at tl1e rate of" 8% per ~nnum, compounded monthly; .111d 
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WHElillAS, said umounts through Augusl I, 2000, ( l ~-1/2 ycirs 
101;:i] in excess of$ I 06,000), which the Directors believe is foir and 
adequ;ite consider;ition for the use or s;,id property and the benefits the 
the Corporation lus dcnveJ thcrt:Crom; anJ 
WHEREAS, the Corporalion is desirous of utilizing the payrnent 
of such proceeds to A. Gertnide McCann and her deceased husband (which also 
have been interest bearing), to offse,t aga1nsl ultra vires payments made to 
A. Gertrnde lv[cCarm, if any there be, to pay o[[ debt owed to the Corpora lion 
arising from advances to \Villiarn V. Mccann, Jr. nnJ A Gertrude McCnnn and 
ro pay Lhe residual, 1fany, in cash to A. Gertrude McC;rnn; and 
"WHEREAS, sucl1 benefils should be paid to A. Gertnide McCrnn 
only wilh her consent in a manner agreenble to both A. Gertrude McC1nn 
and Lhe Corporation. 
NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, Lhat the Board oCDircclors 
of McCmn Ranch and Livestock, Inc. liercby authorize and di reel Lhe O!T1ccrs 
of the Corporation to pay by way of credit or otherv.,ise to A. Gertrnde McCmn 
fair and reasonable compensation for the use, or the property of A. Gerti-ude 
Mc Cann lbe amount of at least $ J 06,000, as describt:u above. 
BE IF FURTFIEft RESOLVED that Director G::uy E. Me.isner is hereby 
auLJ1orizetl ancl Jirceted to confer with A. Gertrude MeCann and to secure lier 
approval and authorization for ZI mode and manner of offset and/or payment consistenl 
with the above Recitals and to report to the Coq)oration President the results of 
such negotiation. 
I-.m IT FURlHER RESOLVED thal if such negotiations can result in 
,1grcemcnt consistent with the above parameters, thnL Gary E. Meisner, a fler 
receiving approval from Presi.dent William V. McCann, Jr. document, cx.ccule 
and enter into the necessary agreements with A. Gerlrude McCann to effecl:ualc 
the intent of this Resolution and directive. 
Vote being had on the nbove and foregoing Resolution and the same having been counted 
and found to be unanimously in favor thereof, President McCann declared snid Resolutio11 
adopted. 
(-
Rental;of Shop and Sto1·ac:c Facilities 
Tbe President then announced t\13.t Lbe l;ist order of business would be consicierntio11 01· nl\ 
ongoing rental amount for current rent for the Corporate: shop and storage facilities localctJ 011 
the property of A. Gertrude McCmrn. 
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After full and complele discussion and upcn motion duly rnade by Larry J. Durl,it1 and 
seconded by Gary E. Meisner, the following Resolution was presented: 
I3E IT RESOLVED that the Board of Directors of McCann Ranch 
and Livestock, Jnc. hereby aulho1ize and cltrcct Gary E. Me:isner to negotiate 
and enter into a Lease Agreement 1•,;ith A. Gertrude McCann for use of thal 
prnperiy upon which the Corporate shop and storage facilities arc locatccl, 
together with the rights of ingress, egress, parking, etc. ;mJ lo cause the s,1mc 
to be fonnalized ioto a Lease Agreement apprnved by Corpor:ite Counsel, the 
use ofsc1id facilities, obtaining nonnal and acceptable protections for the 
Corporation, for an amount of $500 per month, Lancllord Lo pay taxes, 
insurance and maintenance for a term of one (l) year witlt five (5) automatic 
one ( l) year extensions if notice not given to terminate. 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that upon completion of negotiations 
witl1in these parameters and presentalion to anr! approval of the Lease by President 
William V. McCann, Jr., Director Gaty E. Meisner is autl10rized to execute ancl 
enter into said Lease Agreement on behalf of this Coq,oration. 
Vote being bad on the above aud foreg01ng Resolution and the same hc1v111g been counted 
and found to be unanimously in Lavor thereof, President McCann declared said Resolution 
adopted. 
Corpor;ite Action/Alle[!"ations 
The President then announced tbat the next order of business concerned Lbe Jrn1G 9, 
2000 letter of Maris Bal tins, sent on behalf or Ronald R. McCann, making demand ltpon tlie 
Corporation to take certain actions, a copy ofwhicl1 is attached hereto :is Exhibit "B". 
Tbe discussion ensued whereby 1t was noted that President McCann had made ,·1 written 
response to tl1e Board, a copy of which is ,1ttacbed hereto as Ex.hibil "C", which had been 
conveyed to Mr. Baltins on which the Board, after clue consideration, took action to ;iccept 
President McCann's report and take no Corporate action on the iterns reported on thci-cin, cxcepr 
fa, four specific items upon ,vbich tlie Co171oration directly and through Cumer· L. Green, 
requested additional information from Ronald R. McCann and his counsel, Maris Baltins. (See 
M.inutes of August 9, 2000 Meeting and letter or William V. McCann, Jr. attachccl hccelo as 
Exhibit "D"). 
il~r. Green noted that no further infomiation had been received from Mr. Oalti11s in Lhosc 
regards. 
It was also noted that last evening Mr. Baltins at 5: 10 p.m. M.D.T. on September 5, 2000 
lrnd submitted a letter to Cumer L. Green, Corporate Counsel, requesting certain ~clclitional 
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infom1ution ,rnd rcraising ollr::gations ilnd mc1king new ullegations. 
The Board expressed its desire to respond fully to Mr. Bi.duns and Sh;,1reholde1· Ronald R. 
McCann with respect to the action it had taken regarding, the allegations conta111ed in Mr. 
Br1lt;ns' June 9, 2000 letter, including those acuons laking place during tbis meeting, to have 
s1.1ch responses prepared by Corporale Counsel, Cumer L. Green, snd sent to Mr. Bal11ns be101·c 
week. end. 
After fi.111 and complete c.Jiscussion and upon motion duly made by Gary E. J\1cisner and 
seconded by Larry J. Durkin. the following Resolution was presented: 
WHEREAS1 011 August 9, 2000 tbe Board of Direclors witb respect to the 
allegations raised in Mr. BcJltins' June 9, 2000 letter resolved as follow·s: 
; and 
"After a full and complete discussion, a motion WcJS made by GcJry 
E. Meisner anrl seconded by Larry J. Durkin lo accepl Prc:s1dcnt 
McCann's responses as set forth on Exhibit "A", to note the 
corrective cJCtions lhat had been lcJken and LO take no further action 
on the same, exce1)ting those items (See Items No. Sc, 6b ancl 6c of 
Exhibit "A") tliat needed flll1her clarification and explanation from 
Ronald McCann and Mr. B;iltins before tbey could be fully 
answered and then only subsequent lo the receipt of such information. 
Gary E. Meisner, Lm.y J. Durkin and Willi;im Vern McCa1rn, Jr. 
voted "aye" and Ronald R. Mc:Cann abstained from voting The 
Chaim1an thrn cleclcJrcd the Resolution adopted." 
WHEREAS, since thcJt time no additwnal information has been 
received with rcsriect to the four cxcepkt.l items set fortb in lhtc above 
paragraph; and 
\VHEREAS, the Board h;is reviewed Mr. Baltin's September 5, 2000 
letter ( a copy ofwbich is attached hereto as Exhibit "E") and has determinc:cl 
that certain numbered items (3, ,j, Sa, Sf, Sg, 6d, 7a-7d, 7e, 7f, 8a, Sb, 9, l 0, 
11, 12, 13), contained therein lrnve already been considered by the Board 31ld 
pursuit of the same by \.Vay of any fom1 of action on bcbalf of the Corvoration 
would. not be in the. best interests oftlie Corporation; and 
vVHEREAS, al lt:ast one other item set forlli in Ml·. BalLrn's letter appears 
to be a new item which, even though proper demand has not been made 011 the 
Corporation, a determin;it1on will be mndr. afrer investigation as to ,vbethcr 
any further action is needed. 
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NO\V, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED lhat no Further ini"omrnlion 
having been rcccivt,d from ]V!r. Ba\tins with n::gard to the four items 1dcntifier:I 
1n tile ubovi:: Recitals ancl on Exhtb1l "D" 2nd lhe sc1mc being de m1rnrn1s on their 
face, it 1s tl1e decision of this Board of Directors. after due cons1cJer;:it1on, tl1,1t 
1t i:; not in rhe best interests of the Corporc1t1on to pmsuc any claim with regard 
to those four (4) items; and 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, rhal w1lh rcgarcl lo Mr. 8alt111's letter 
of September 5, 2000, the ~\legations or req11ests contained rn numbered 1te111s 
(identified in the above Recitals) ha\T been previously investigated and considci-cci 
,md acted upon by the Dirccto,s and no furtber action will be taken with rcg,ml lo the 
same, it being cktennined that there is no cause of action or that any error has be:cn 
corrected. 
BE 1T FURTHER RESOLVED, that with respect to the remaining 
al legations and requests, Lliere ,ire delermined to be new requests by the 
Board of Directors and the President of the Col-poration ts directed to invcsl1gc1te 
the same and report to the Bo.1rd within a rrnsonab\e li111e. 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that Corporate Counsc_l, Cumcr L. Green, 
is hereby directed to prepare a report for issuance to Maris Baltins as lhc 1·cp1·esentative 
of Ronald R. McCann, and to the Directors of the Corporntion, reporting 011 the 
Corporate action that have been taken with rega,d to the allegations i:-aisccl by Mr. 
Bal tins on behalf of Ronald R. tvlcCann in bis June 9, 2000 letter and otherwise as 
detennined by Mr. Gcccn and to issue such report by ·wcek t:nd. 
Vote being had on the above and foregoing Resolution and the same havi11g been counted 
and found to be unanimously in favor thereof, President McCann decl,ired s~id Resolution 
adopted. 
l!'.xecutive Compcns;-ition 
Tl1c President then announced the last item to be tbe report o [" lhc Compe11s,111on 
Committee with regard to the s;ilary of President William V. McCann, Jr. 
After full and complete discussion c1nd upon motion duly rnaJc by Lan-y J. Durkin and 
seconded by Gary E. Meisner, tbe following Resolution was presented: 
WHEREAS, at tbe August 9, 2000 Board lVIeeting the Compensation 
Committee was directed to review I he adequacy of Lhe compensation of lhc: 
President of the Corpo,;ition, William V. McCann, Jr.; ;rnd 
\VHEREAS, the members of tlrnt Conm11ttee, lo-w1t: Gary E. Meisner 
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c1.nci Larry J. Durkin, have ccv1cwccl the same und lwve dctenrnneJ, basecl upon 
facts known to them ancl the11· extensive expc1·icnce in Lhc ureas of operc1l1011s 
conducted by the Cot-poration of which William V. Mc.Cann, Jr. has 
responsibilily, Lhat the existing compensation I eve! of Pres1de11 t \Vi 11 iam V. 
tv!cCrn11, Jr. is satisracto1-y. 
NOW, THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED Lh;it the Bonni orD11·eeLors 
of McC;ia11 Ranch and Livesrnck, T.nc. hereby confirm thc1t die present cornpcns·c1t1on 
program for President William V. MeCann, Jr. and direct tbal such pro::;rnm 
con1-inue. 
Vote being had on the above and foregoing Resolution ancl the same having bee11 eounLed 
ancJ found to be unanimously in favor thereof, President McCrnn declared said Resolurion 
adopted. 
Dividends 
Tl1e President then announced tl.1e next order of business would concern hearing Lhc 
report of rhe Dividend Committee. 
On behalf of the Committee, whose members are Larry J. Durkin and Gury E. Meisner, 
Mr. Durkin presented the report of Lhe Committee and reponed tliat in;isrnuch as the CorpOl"zition 
was presently a Defendant in a premature lawsuit filed by Shareholder Ronald R. McCa1111 ;incl 
incmring legal fees in defense of that act.ion Jnd because that action file:d by Rolla Id R. McC,inn 
caused lhe Board of Directors, ;ifler due consideration, lo agree to inclenmify OiL·ectors Gary E. 
Meisner c1.nd \Villiam V. McCann, Jr., 'Nho had bee. named as Defendants in said Stlll c1ncl ;is a 
result of such indemnification to pay the legal fees and costs incurred by s;iid Directors, all or 
which fees, costs ;incl expenses arc ongoing, that dividends should not be declared 01· ri:iid by the 
Corporation at this tirne. 
After full and complete discussion and upon motion duly made by L1rry .I. Durkin and 
seconded by Gary E. Meisner, the following Resolution was presented: 
BE IT RESOLVED that Lhe Board of Directors for the 1easo11s stated in 
tl1e 1·eport oftbe Dividend Committee, hereby declines to clccbrc or p:,y a dividend. 
Vote being had on the above and foregoing Resolmion and the same h:iv111g been cou11icd 
and found to be unanimously in favor thereof, Pres·1denl McC,mn dc:clarccl s.1id Resolution 
;:idorited. · 
Tl1ere being no futiber business to come beCore the Board, the President declared 1he 
meeting adjourned. 
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Chas. F. McDevitt (ISB No. 835) 
Dean J. Miller (ISB No. 1968) 
MCDEVITT & MILLER LLP 
420 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2565-83701 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208-343-7500 
Fax: 208-336-6912 
Attorneys for Nominal Defendant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, ) Case No. CV 08-01226 
) 
Plaintiff, ) MCCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK 
vs. ) COMP ANY, INC.' S MOTION TO 
) STRIKE AND DISREGARD 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and ) TESTIMONY FROM THE AFFIDAVITS 
GARY E. MEISNER. ) OF KAREN A. GINNETT, CPA, CFE, 
) MST, AND FROM THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
Defendants. ) DENNIS R. REINSTEIN, CPA/ABV, 
) ASA, CVA, AND THE RELATED 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK ) ARGUMENT CONTAINED IN 
COMPANY, INC., ) PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Nominal Defendant. ) MEMORANDUM 
) ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
COMES NOW McCann Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc. (the "Corporation"), by and 
through its undersigned counsel of record, McDevitt & Miller LLP, and moves the Court for an 
order to strike and disregard certain testimony presented in the affidavits of Karen A. Ginnett, 
CPA, CFE, MST, and Dennis R. Reinstein, CPAIABV, ASA, CVA, and all related argument 
provided in Plaintiff's Responsive Summary Judgment Memorandum. 
MCCANN RANCH & LNESTOCK COMPANY, INC.'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND DISREGARD TESTIMONY - 1 
......... , ....... -~ ... -~---
# 3/ 21 
02-17-10;03:04PM; ;2083366912 
This motion is supported by the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 
ORAL ARGUMENT ~ESTED. 
DATED TIITS--c;;.__day of February, 2010. 
MCDEVITT & :MJLLER LLP 
By~~?= 
Attorneys for Nominal Defendant McCann 
Ranch & Livestock Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \::f~y of February, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing McCann Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc.' s Motion ro Strike and 
Disregard Testimony by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
addressed to each of the following: 
Timothy Esser 
ESSER & SANDBERG. PLLC 
520 East Main Street 
Pullman, WA 99163 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Andrew Schwam 
SCHWAMLAWFIRM 
514 South Polk, #6 
Moscow, ID 83843 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS BROWN 
321 13th Street 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501-1510 
[Attorneys for Defendant Gary Meisner] 
Merlyn W. Clark, ISB No. 1026 
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP 
877 Main Street, Suire 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
[Attorneys for Defendant William V. McCann, Jr.] 
-¼u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
-¥--E-mail 
__ Telecopy: 509.334.2205 
_/_. U.S. MaiJ, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
....¼E-mail 
Telecopy 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
~E-mail 
__ Telecopy: 208.746.0753 
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
XE-mail 
Telecopy: 208.336.6912 
Chas. F. McDevitt 
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Chas. F. McDevitt (ISB No. 835) 
Dean J. Miller (ISB No. 1968) 
MCDEVITT & MILLER LLP 
420 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2565-83701 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208-343-7500 
Fax: 208-336-6912 
Anomeys for Nominal Defendant. 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and 
GARY E. MEISNER, 
Defendants. 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK 
COMP ANY, INC., 
Nominal Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV 08-01226 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MCCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK 
COMP ANY. INC. Is MOTION TO 
STRIKE AND DISREGARD 
TESTI1\1ONY FROM THE AFFIDAVITS 
OF KAREN A. GINNETT, CPA, CFE, 
MST, AND THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
DENNIS R. REINSTEIN, CPNABV, 
ASA, CY A, AND THE RELATED 
ARGUMENT CONTAINED IN 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
MEMORANDUM 
COl\1:ES NOW McCann Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc. (the "Corporation"), by and 
through its undersigned counsel of record, and respectfully submits the following Memorandum 
in support of its Motion to Strike and Disregard Testimony From the Affidavits of Karen A. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MCCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK COMP ANY, INC.' S 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND DISREGARD TESTIM:ONY FROM THE AFFIDA vrrs OF 
KAREN A. GINNETT, CPA, CFE, MST, AND THE AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS R. 
REINSTEIN, CPNABV, ASA, CVA, AND THE RELATED ARGUMENT CONTAINED JN 
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Ginnett, CPA, CFE, MST, and Dennis R. Reinstein, CPNABV, ASA, CVA, and the Related 
Argument Contained in Plaintiffs Responsive Summary Judgment Memorandum. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Corporation's Motion to Strike and Disregard certain objectionable affidavit 
testimony presented by Karen Ginnett and Dennis Reinstein should be granted because these 
affidavits filed in support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment fail to meet the 
requirements of admissibility under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), and under Idaho Rules 
of Evidence 402, 403, 602, 702 and 802. Accordingly, prior to considering the argument and 
evidence pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the Court must determine the 
admissibility of evidence submitted by Plaintiff. See Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 
205 P.3d 650 (2009) (judge abused discretion when he failed co determine the admissibility of 
/ 
evidence prior to ruling on summary judgment motions). 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Legal Standard Of Admissibility. 
The standard of admissibility in a summary judgment proceeding is governed by Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), which provides that: 
I.R.C.P. 56(e). 
Supporting or opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent 
to testify to the matters stated therein. 
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Rule 56(e) is clear that affidavits must contain admissible evidence. See Hecla Mining 
Co. v. Srar-Moming Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778,782,839 P.2d l 192 (1992). In Hecla Mining, 
the Idaho Supreme Court held that affidavits which consist only of conjecture, conclusory 
allegations as to ultimate facts, or conclusions of law are to be disregarded. Id. Furthermore, 
conclusory statements, statements based on hearsay, statements that lack adequate foundation, 
and statements not made on personal knowledge are insufficient. See State v. Shama Resources 
Ltd. Partners, 127 Idaho 267, 271, 899 P.2d 977 (1995). In Shama Resources, the Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's rejection of statements made by an affiant regarding the 
knowledge or beliefs of persons other than the affiant. 127 Idaho at 271. 
Further, in Sprinkler Jrrig. Co., Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., 139 Idaho 691, 85 P.3d 667 
(2004), the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed rhe district court's action striking plaintiffs expert's 
affidavit wherein the affidavit was filled with rambling, nonspecific, inaccurate and unsupported 
statements, numerous counts of speculation, unfounded facts and hearsay statements. Id. at 697. 
The Idaho Supreme Court stated that the district court properly concluded that the expert's 
affidavit degenerated into an argumentative diatribe against the defendant and often lacked the 
specificity required by Rule 56(e). Specifically, the court stated, "It is intermittently generalized, 
conclusory, speculative and argumentative. The affidavit includes a significant number of 
factual assertions rhat would not be admissible in evidence, often lacking foundation by failing to 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify regarding the factual allegations." Id. 
Expert opinion evidence is governed by Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, which provides 
that: 
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If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact ro understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form 
of an opinion or otherwise. 
See Swallow v. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, PA, 138 Idaho 589,592, 67 P.3d 68, 71 (2003). 
This Rule provides the appropriate test for measuring the reliability of evidence. Id.; see Weeks 
v. Eastern Idaho Health Services, 143 Idaho 834, 153 P.3d 1180 (2007); State v. Merwin, 
131 Idaho 642,962 P.2d 1026 (1998). 
To be admissible, the expert's testimony must assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue. An expen opinion that is speculative or unsubstantiated 
by facts in the record is inadmissible because it would not assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or determine a fact that is at issue. Swallow, 138 Idaho at 592; see Bromley v. Garey, 
132 Idaho 807,979 P.2d 1165 (1999). 
Additionally, expert opinion that merely suggests possibilities would only invite 
conjecture and may be properly excluded. Bromeley v. Gary, 132 Idaho 807, 979P.2d1165 
( 1999) (excluding testimony of shotgun repair expert concerning possible causes of misfiring 
where expert never performed an internal examination of the weapon and only speculated about 
possible causes was not error). 
Furthermore, Federal courts have consistently held that testimony consisting of legal 
conclusions offered to assist the trier of fact in determining questions of Jaw is inadmissible 
under Federal Rule 702. For example, in Ada/man v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 360 ( 41h Cir. 
1986), the court upheld the trial court's decision to preclude an attorney from testifying as an 
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expert witness concerning the applicability and meaning of securities laws. Similarly, in Marx & 
Co. v. Diners Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977), the court held 
it was error for the trial court to have admitted the opinion of an expert qualified in securities 
regulation as to the legal obligations of parties pursuant to the contract in issue. The coun stated: 
"It is not for the witnesses to instruct the jury as to applicable principles of law, but the judge. 
As Professor Wigmore has observed, expert testimony on law is excluded because 'the tribunal 
does not need the witness' judgment." Id. at 509-10. 
The federal courts hold that a witness may not offer opinions about applicable law even if 
the witness has prior experience in interpreting and applying the law in question. For example, 
the Ninth Circuit Coun of Appeals has observed that it .. condemn[s] the practice of attempting to 
introduce law as evidence." G. F. Co. v. Pan Ocean Shipping, 23 F.3d 1498, 1507 (9th Cir. 
1994); Unired Scates v. Unruh, 855 F.2d 1363, 1376 (9 th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 488 U.S. 974 
(1988); see also United States v. Scholl, 166 F.3d 964 (9 th Cir. 1999). Other circuit courts have 
also condemned that practice. Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 947; United Srates v. Curtis, 782 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Zipkin, 
729 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1984); Paner v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7 th Cir. 1981); 
Hogan v. AT&T, 812 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1987); Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 689 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 
1983). 
Idaho law is in accord. An opinion of an expert that calls for a legal conclusion is not 
admissible in the courts of Idaho. Martin v. Hackworth, 127 Idaho 68, 896 P.2d 976 (1995); 
Hawkins v. Chandler, 88 Idaho 20, 396 P.2d 123 (1964). 
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III. 
LEGAL OBJECTIONS 
A. The affidavit testimony of Karen Ginnett should be stricken. 
~[NO. 
2 
3 
STATEMENT 
I have assisted Dennis Reinstein in th.is 
matter and have reviewed all the 
material mentioned in his affidavit. I 
share bis opinions. 
The term "fraud" as used in the tax 
law. means an acrual and deliberate, or 
willful wrongdoing with the specific 
intent to evade tax believed to be 
owed. The existence of fraud is a 
question of fact to be determined on a 
case by case basis considering the 
entire record of transactions. 
Fraudulent intent can seldom be 
established by a single act. The Tax 
Court in Schmitz, John Noehl (1983) 
TC Memo 1983-482, set out three 
elements of fraud: (1) a knowing 
falsehood; (2) an underpayment of tax; 
and (3) an intent to evade tax. It is 
imponant to understand that the tax 
evasion motive need not be the only 
motive or even the principal motive for 
the transaction(s) as long as it is a 
motive. 
The deductions claimed on the 
Corporation's tax returns for 
questionable payments to Gertrude 
Mccann and a portion of her personal 
expenses may be viewed as a way to 
OBJECTION 
The statements Jack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility in that 
they do nor set forth any specific 
facts of who, what, where, when 
and how; the statements are 
generalized, condusory and 
irrelevant. I.R.E. 402. 
These statements constitute 
improper legal argument and 
improper assertions of legal 
conclusions, speculation, and 
irrelevanL I.R.E. 402, 602. 
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4 
5 
6 
STATEMENT 
avoid paying tax and therefore tax 
evasion. The assessment of the civil 
fraud penalty would be available to the 
auditor. 
It appears that during the 1986/1987 
audit, the taxing authorities did review 
the transactions between the 
Corporation and one of its principals, 
specifically William McCann, Sr., and 
found that the Corporation was 
improperly deducting as business 
expenses the personal expenses of 
Mr. McCann, Sr. 
The fact that Gertrude McCann reports 
some income on her tax return does not 
change the question as to the 
legitimacy of deducting these 
payments as business expenses of the 
Corporation. If an expense is not 
deemed to be ordinary and necessary 
under Section 162 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, the fact that Gertrude 
McCann has reported some of the 
payments as income will not affect the 
denial of the deduction on the 
corporate return. 
It is my opinion, and for the reasons set 
forth in detail in Dennis Reinstein's 
affidavit, the financial transactions that 
the Corporation has engaged in since 
January 5, 2001 with Gertrude 
McCann do expose the Corporation to 
substantial liabilities in the event of an 
audit. Simply put, the Corporation is 
lucky that it has not been audited and 
had these questionable transactions 
reviewed. These transactions create a 
threat of additional truces and 
;2083366912 
OBJECTION 
The statements lack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility in that 
they do not set forth any specific 
facts of who, what, where, when 
and how; the statements are 
generalized, conclusory and 
irrelevant, and inadmissible 
hearsay. I.R.E. 402, 802. 
These statements constitute 
improper legal argument and 
improper assertions of legal 
conclusions, speculation, and 
irrelevant. I.R.E. 402, 602. 
# 1 5/ 21 
The statements lack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility in that 
they do not set forth any specific 
facts of who, what, where, when 
and how; the statements are 
generalized, conclusory and 
irrelevant. I.R.E. 402; these 
statements constitute improper legal 
argument and improper assertions 
of legal conclusions, speculation, 
and irrelevant. I.RE. 402, 602. 
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assessment of interest and penalties 
which threaten harm to the 
Corporation. 
;2083366912 
OBJECTION 
B. The affidavit testimony of Dennis R. Reinstein should be stricken. 
{_!{NO. 
4.1 
4.2 
STATEl\l.lENT 
Gertrude McCann Compensation. The 
minutes of the September 6, 2000, 
board of directors meeting state: .... 
Advances for Expenses. Beginning 
before 2001 and continuing since, the 
Corporation has routinely paid 
personal expenses for Gertrude 
McCann, including, but not limited to, 
utilities, insurance and automobile 
expenses. At the end of each year, the 
OBJECTION 
This Court has indicated that it will 
only consider facts subsequent to 
January 5, 2001, the date on which 
the district court dismissed 
McCann I. See March 4, 2009 
Order at 7 ("In addressing the new 
claims on the merits, the Court 
anticipates that it will be 
considering events that took place 
after January 5, 2001"). In the 
Court's August 31, 2009 Order 
addressing discovery disputes, this 
Court referenced the statement by 
the Idaho Supreme Court in 
McCann I that the Plaintiff could 
subsequently assert "new" claims 
"that may arise following the order 
of dismissal." See August 31, 2009 
Order at 2 (citing McCann L 
138 Idaho 228,332, fn.2). This 
exclusion of facts pre-1/5/2001 
does not apply to the history of the 
promissory notes. 
The time period before 2001 is 
irrelevant in this action. The 
statements lack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility, 
generalized and conclusory 
summation of actions taken by the 
Corporation's accountant, Dorothy 
# 16/ 21 
:MEMORANDUM IN" SUPPORT OF MCCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK COMP ANY, INC.' S 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND DISREGARD TESTIMONY FROM THE AFFIDA vrrs OF 
KAREN A. GINNEIT, CPA, CFE, MST, AND THE AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS R. 
REINSTEIN, CPNABV, ASA, CVA, AND THE RELATED ARGUMENT CONTAINED IN 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMORANDUM - 8 
-------···-······ ............... -··--···------------------
02-17-10;03:04PM; 
'I[ NO. 
4.6 
4.7 
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STATEMENT 
Corporation's accountant, Dorothy 
Snowball. increases the account 
recejvable due from Geruude McCann 
for an estimated amount for some of 
these expenses and calculates interest 
on the balance of the receivable at year 
end. The Corporation deducts the 
balance of the expenses on its tax 
returns. 
I have asked Plaintiff's attorneys to 
ascertain what amount William 
Mccann, Jr. and/or his wife. Lori, 
assert is owed to them by Gertrude 
McCann and/or the trust for which she 
is the beneficiary. I am informed that 
they have refused to provide that 
discovery. I expect that the amount 
claimed owing to William McCann, Jr. 
and Lori McCann will compete with 
rhe amount reportedly owed by 
Gertrude McCann to the Corporation. 
Gertrude McCann testified that she 
does not owe the Corporation any 
money, nor did she even acknowledge 
the existence, let alone validity. of the 
promissory note she purportedly owes. 
I have been provided no 
documentation or deposition testimony 
that would suggest that Gertrude 
McCann claimed to be owed anything 
for this alleged past due rental. I have 
been provided no evidence of a writing 
(other than the corporate resolution) 
that would support this liability that 
purportedly extends for some 12 years 
previous to the year 2000 Decision . 
. . . The promissory note from the 
Corporation to Gertrude McCann has 
;2083366912 
OBJECTION 
Snowball. lacks personal 
knowledge, and is irrelevanr. 
I.R.E. 402, 403. and 602. 
The statements lack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility, lack 
personal knowledge, inadmissible 
hearsay, speculation, inadmissible 
argument, and is irrelevant. 
lR.E. 402, 403, 602, and 802. 
Inadmissible hearsay and improper 
attempt to present hearsay 
testimony by an expert. I.R.E. 802 
and 703. 
The statements lack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility, 
speculation, conclusory and 
irrelevant. I.RE. 402, 403 and 602. 
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'II NO. 
5.1 
5.2 
STATEMENT 
never been reported as a liability of the 
Corporation in its books and records or 
on its financial statements. 
In my opinion, the financial 
transactions a corporation has engaged 
in ·with Gertrude McCann, were not in 
furtherance of the ordinary and 
necessary business purposes of the 
corporation, but were designed as a 
means to support her lifestyle as an 
alternative to declaring dividends 
and/or redeeming corporate smck from 
the trust to which she is a beneficiary. 
Plaintiff's counsel has asked me to 
assume that an appropriate definition 
of "threat of irreparable harm" is two-
fold: (1) harm that cannot be repaired, 
e.g., a loss of money that cannot be 
recouped; and (2) that the hann is of a 
significant amount. Utilizing this 
definition, in my opinion, the 
transactions between the corporation 
and Gertrude McCann threatened the 
corporation with irreparable harm in at 
least two ways: first, they create the 
potential for the taxing authorities to 
reclassify these transactions as 
disguised divjdends. This could result 
in substantial taxes, interest and 
penalties being assessed against the 
corporation, and possibly the William 
V. McCann, Sr. Stock Trust and/or 
Gertrude McCann. Second, there is a 
receivable from Gertrude McCann 
owing to the corporation increasing in 
both principle and accruing interest, 
from which amounts due to the 
corporation may never be collected. 
:2083366912 
OBJECTION 
The statements lack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility, 
speculation, conclusory and 
irrelevant. I.R.E. 402, 403 and 602. 
The statements lack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility, 
speculation, conclusory and 
irrelevant. LR.E. 402, 403 and 602; 
these statements constitute 
improper legal argument and 
improper assertions of legal 
conclusions, speculation, and 
irrelevant. I.RE. 402,602. 
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STATEMENT 
If the business affairs of the 
corporation were selected for audit by 
either the Idaho State Tax Commission 
or the Internal Revenue Service, such 
audit would evaluate whether the 
transactions between the corporation 
and Gertrude McCann were ordinary 
and necessary business expenses. I 
believe that on a more likely than not 
basis, such an audit would find that 
these transactions were not for an 
ordinary and necessary business 
purposes and therefore would not be 
allowable deductions under the tax 
code. 
Further, as I understand a life estate, 
the life tenant retains rights and 
obligations related to the property until 
the grantee's rights terminate. The fact 
that the gramor corporation is paying 
expenses related to the property further 
magnifies their overpayment of value. 
In response, I assert that the cash flow 
made available to Gertrude McCann 
could have been utilized for dividends. 
While a portion of the net income was 
utilized to repay corporate debt, it is 
clear that had the transactions with 
Gertrude McCann not been engaged in, 
the corporation would have had funds 
available to pay dividends. 
These alleged "potentially devastating" 
taxes could be avoided if a court 
ordered dissolution was accomplished 
by means of a tax free re-organization 
- a spjn-off. Simply put, if whatever 
;2083366912 
OBJECTION 
The statements lack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility, 
speculation, conclusory and 
irrelevant. I.R.E. 402,403 and 602; 
these statements constitute 
improper legal argument and 
improper assertions of legal 
conclusions, speculation, and 
irrelevant. IR.E. 402, 602. 
# 19/ 21 
These statements constitute 
improper legal argument and 
improper assertions of legal 
conclusions, speculation, and 
irrelevant. I.R.E. 402, 602. 
The statement is conclusory; 
contains speculation; and is 
irrelevant. LR.E. 402, 602. 
The statement is conclusory; 
contains speculation; and is 
irrelevant. I.RE. 402, 602. 
The statement lacks a necessary 
foundation for admissibility; 
conclusory; contains speculation; 
improper assertion of legal 
conclusion, and is irrelevant. I.R.E. 
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share of the corporate assets that 
should be distributed to Ron McCann 
were distributed to a subsidiary 
corporation, then Ron McCann' s stock 
in the current corporation were 
exchanged for the stock in this newly 
formed subsidiary corporation, he 
would then own (control) those assets. 
This would avoid "devastating tax 
consequences." 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
;2083366912 
OBJECTION 
402,403, and 602. 
Based upon each of the foregoing objections to evidence, the above-identified affidavit 
testimony, and aJ1 related argument in Plaintiffs Response of Summary Judgment 
Memorandum, should be stricken and disregarded by the Court in deciding the Corporation's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. ~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TIUS _/.1day of February, 2010. 
MCDEVITT & MILLER LLP 
By-z:;?i,-=.J~/~ 
Charles F. McDevitt, ISB No. 835 
Attorneys for Nominal Defendant McCann 
Ranch & Livestock Company 
# 201 21 
MEMORANDUM lN SUPPORT OF MCCANN RANCH & LNESTOCK COMPANY, INC.' S 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND DISREGARD TESTIM:ONY FROM THE AFFIDA vrrs OF 
KAREN A. GINNETT, CPA, CFE, MST, AND THE AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS R. 
REINSTEIN, CPA/ABV, ASA, CVA, AND THE RELATED ARGUMENT CONTAINED 1N 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MEMORANDUM - 12 
02-17-1O;O3:O4PM; ;2083366912 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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Chas. F. McDevitt (ISB No. 835) 
Dean J. Miller (ISB No. 1968) 
MCDEVITT & MILLER LLP 
420 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2565-83701 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208-343-7500 
Fax: 208-336-6912 
Attorneys for Nominal Defendant 
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lN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAMV. McCANN, JR., and 
GARY E. MEISNER, 
Defendants. 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, lNC., 
Nominal Defendant. 
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) 
Case No. CV 08-01226 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MCCANN RANCH'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MCCANN RANCH'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
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The McCann Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc. (the .. Corporation"), by and through its 
counsel of record, submits this reply memorandum in support of its motion for summary 
judgment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Corporation's motion for summary judgment turns on one single issue-whether, 
under the undisputed facts and admissible evidence asserted by Plaintiff, there is a material issue 
of fact as to whether "irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered." 1 See 
LC.§ 30-1-1430(2). Plaintiff has not, and cannot, raise any such issue of fact. Plaintiff has 
offered only a speculative assertion that certain transactions entered into between the 
Corporation and Gertrude McCann subject the Corporation to a risk of unspecified tax liability in 
the future in the event that the Corporation might someday be audited. This assertion is purely 
speculative and does not establish any threat to the Corporation of irreparable injury. Even if the 
Corporation were someday subjected to some tax liability to the IRS, such a monetary injury 
does not, as a matter of law. constitute irreparable injury to the Corporation. Plaintiff offers no 
evidence that the Corporation, which Plaintiff asserts is worth approximately $20 Million, could 
not easily pay any monetary penalty assessed by the IRS. Finally, the alleged injury asserted by 
Plaintiff is not an irreparable injury in that it could be compensated for through an action at law. 
1 The judicial dissolution statute sets forth two required elements: (1) that the directors have 
acted in a manner that is "illegal, oppressive or fraudulent," and (2) that "irreparable injury to 
the corporation is threatened or being suffered by reason thereof." LC. § 30-1-1430. 
Defendants have focused this motion for summary judgment on the second element. 
Defendants do not concede that oppression has taken place, but Defendants do not challenge 
that element for purposes of this summary judgment motion. 
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IT. SUMMARY OF UNDISPUTED FACTS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY 
A. Pre-2001 Transactions 
Much of Plaintiff's response to the Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
focused on events and transactions that occurred prior to 2001. For example. Plaintiff focuses on 
the fact that in "the late nineties," Gertrude Mccann received "consulting fees" from the 
Corporation. These payments of consulting fees were a large focus of Plaintiffs claims in 
McCann I and were discussed by the McCann I trial court in its January 5, 2001 Order 
dismissing Plaintiffs complaint and denying Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint. See 
McCann I Complaint (Exhibit 1 to Motion to Dismiss, filed July 15, 2008); see also McCann I 
January 5, 2001 Order (Exhibit 4 to Motion to Dismiss, filed July 15, 2008), p. 2, 4-5 (discussing 
the consulting fees paid to Gertrude McCann, and noting that those consultation fees stopped in 
September of 2000). Plaintiff also focuses on the fact that, in 2000, the Corporation agreed to 
pay Gertrude Mc Cann $106,000 in back rent for the use of the Corporation's large shop building 
on Gertrude McCann's property. Again, this transaction was the subject of Plaintiff's motion to 
amend his complaint in McCann I and was discussed by the McCann !trial court in its January 5, 
2001 Order dismissing Plaintiff's complaint and denying Plaintiffs motion to amend bis 
complaint. See McCann I Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to 
Amend Complaint (Exhibit 3 to Motion to Dismiss, :filed July 15, 2008), p. 5; see also McCann I 
January 5, 2001 Order (Exhibit 4 to Motion to Dismiss. filed July 15, 2008), p. 5 (explaining that 
'"Plaintiff objects to paying Gertrude back rent for the shop for over twelve years."). Plaintiff 
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also focuses on the Corporation's purchase, in 2000, of Gertrude McCann·s property, which 
consists of a home, barn, shop and several out buildings set on 252 acres. 
These transactions pre-date the McCann /trial court's dismissal of McCann I on January 
5, 2001 and are not a proper subject of this new lawsuit. In recognition that this is the second in 
a series oflawsuits containing virtually identical factual allegations, this Court has ordered that it 
will consider only facts subsequent to January 5, 2001, the date on which the District Court 
dismissed McCann I with prejudice. See March 4, 2009 Order. p. 7 ('•In addressing the new 
claims on the merits, the court anticipates that it will be considering events that took place after 
January 5, 2001."). In a re]ated March 5, 2009 Order addressing discovery disputes, this Court 
held that Defendants' responses to Plaintiff's discovery requests could be limited to events and 
transactions occurring after January 5, 2001. In an August 31, 2009 Order addressing related 
discovery disputes, this Court referenced the statement by the Idaho Supreme Court in McCann I 
that the Plaintiff could subsequently assert ·'new,, claims "that may arise following the order of 
dismissal." Seep. 2 (citing McCann I, 138 Idaho 228,232, fn. 2). 
Consistent with the statement by the Idaho Supreme Court. and as this Court has 
previously indicated, the Court should not consider any pre-2001 transactions in this case. It is 
true that the Corporation, in its Motion for Summary Judgment, made reference to the history of 
the promissory notes between Gertrude McCann and the Corporation and the purchase of the 
property from Gertrude McCann, which occurred prior to 2001. However, that discussion was in 
the context of explaining that the corporation has historically advanced payment for certain items 
2 In prior briefing, the Corporation had inadvertently described the property as consisting of 35 
acres. 
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to Bill, Sr. and Gertrude McCann since the Corporation's inception and has carried those 
balances on an account receivable. That recitation of general background does not change the 
fact that Plaintiff's pre-2001 claims were litigated in McCann I and cannot be re-litigated here. 
B. William V. McCann, Jr.'s Salary 
Plaintiff had previously indicated that he would be challenging William V. Mccann, Jr.'s 
salary as being excessive in support of his claim for dissolution of the Corporation. Plaintiff's 
Responsive Brief, however, makes no mention of the issue. Not surprisingly, Plaintiff's experts 
offer no opinion that the salary is excessive or threatens irreparable :injury to the Corporation. 
By failing to address the issue ofWil1iam V. McCann, Jr's salary, Plaintiff has waived that issue. 
C. The Corporation's Purchase of Gertrude McCann~s Property 
As explained above, the Corporation's purchase of Gertrude McCann's property predates 
January 5, 2001, and therefore is not a proper subject of this litigation.3 The Corporation agreed 
to purchase Gertrude McCann' s property, which consists of a home, barn, shop and several out 
buildings set on 25 acres, for the sum of $310,000. Gertrude McCann, who was 84 years old at 
the time, retained a life estate in the property. The contract called for $40,000 to be paid at 
closing, the balance to be paid in monthly installments of $5,000, including interest at 7 ½ 
percent per annum. 
3 The Corporation did not object to discovery related to the purchase of Gertrude Mc:Cann' s 
property, even though it pre-dates Januacy 5, 2001, because the pre-2001 purchase of the 
property has some relation to Plaintiff's post-2001 claims that the Corporation improperly 
provided Gertrude with payments for the maintenance of the property. The fact that 
discovery was allowed related to the pre-2001 purchase of the home does not mean that 
Plaintiff can now raise this pre-2001 claim. 
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Plaintiff now appears to be offering a half-hearted contention that the Corporation may 
have paid more than fair market value for the property. However, Plaintiff offers no evidence for 
this contention. Plaintiff's expert accountant, Dennis Reinstein, offers only the following: 
If the Corporation paid Gertrude McCann the fair market value for 
her home, it in fact received in return substantially less value than 
what it paid. At the date of the purchase Gertrude Mc Cann was 84 
years old and received a life estate. The value of the property 
subject to a life estate can be divided between the life estate and 
remainder interest utilizing IRS Table S. Application of this table 
provides that, at the date of the purchase of her home for $310,000, 
the value of the life estate Gertrude Mccann received was 
$102,598 and the value of the remainder interest to the Corporation 
was $207,000. 
See Reinstein, 16.3. 
Mr. Reinstein' s affidavit is more notable for what it does not say than for what it does 
say. Mr. Reinstein does not offer any opinion as to the fair market value of the property or that 
the Corporation paid more than that fair market value. Plaintiff has offered no appraisal or other 
evidence of the value of the property, nor is Mr. Reinstein qualified to opine as to its fair market 
value. Indeed, Mr. Reinstein appears to assume that the Corporation did pay the fair market 
value for the property. The only opinion given by Mr. Reinstein is that, "[i]fthe Corporation 
paid Gertrude McCann the fair market value for her home," i.e., the fair market value to purchase 
a fee simple estate, then it overpaid because the Corporation received the property subject to 
Gertrude McCann's life estate. However, there is no evidence in the record that the Corporation 
paid anything other than the fair market value for what the Corporation received - the property, 
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subject to Gertrude McCann's life estate.4 In fact, Plaintiff testified in his deposition that the 
purchase of the property "was a steal" because, in Plaintiff's opinion., the property was worth 
much more than the Corporation paid for it. See Affidavit of Chas. F. McDevitt, filed 
concurrently herewith, Exh. 1, p. 101. 
D. Dennis Reinstein Affidavit 
Plaintiff has offered the Affidavit of Dennis Reinstein in opposition to the Corporation's 
Motion for Summary Judgment The opinions offered by that affidavit lack foundation, are 
speculative and are not relevant to the issue raised on summary judgment. Mr. Reinstein opines 
that ''the financial transactions the Corporation has engaged in with Gertrude McCann, were not 
in furtherance of the ordinary and necessary business purposes of the Corporation, but were 
designed as a means to support her lifestyle as an alternative to declaring dividends and/or 
redeeming Corporate stock from the Trust to which she is a beneficiary." Id. at ,r 5.1. Mr. 
Reinstein does not define or quantify the ••financial transactions" to which he is referring, nor 
does he give any explanation as to the total monetary value he attaches to the allegedly wrongful 
"'financial transactions." 
Mr. Reinstein assumes the following definition of''threat of irreparable harm": 
4 Plaintiff selectively quotes from William V. McCann, Jr.' s testimony that Gertrude ''needed 
money" in connection with his testimony about the Corporation purchase of the property 
from Gertrude McCann. Plaintiff ignores the testimony about the purchase furthering the 
interests of the corporation. For example, William V. Mccann, Jr. testified that "I think [the 
Corporation is] getting benefit I believe it's appreciating as real estate appreciates." See 
Reinstein Alf., 'if 4.3 (quoting William V. Mccann, Jr. 's deposition testimony, p. 84). 
Plaintiff ignores the fact that the Corporation is in the real estate business and that this real 
estate acquisition merely added to the Corporation's other real estate holdings. 
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(1) harm that cannot be repaired, e.g., a loss of money that cannot 
be recouped; and (2) that the harm is of a significant amount. 
Id at ,r 5.2. Mr. Reinstein then goes on to opine that, under this definition, the transactions 
between the Corporation and Gertrude Mccann threaten the Corporation with irreparable harm 
in two ways. 
First, Mr. Reinstein opines that the transactions with Gertrude McCann "create the 
potential for the taxing authorities to reclassify these transactions as disguised dividends." Id 
"This could result in substantial truces, ~terest and penalties being assessed against the 
Corporation." Id Notably, Mr. Reinstein does not state that an audit has been threatened by any 
taxing authority, nor does he offer any opinion as to the likelihood that anything on the 
Corporate tax returns would trigger an audit. Moreover, Mr. Reinstein offers no opinion as to 
the amount of any potential taxes, interest or penalties that might be assessed as a result of an 
audit. More importantly, Mr. Reinstein offers no opinion that the Corporation would not be able 
to easily pay whatever unspecified amount of taXes, interest or penalties might someday be owed 
by the Corporation. 
Second, Mr. Reinstein opines that ''there is a receivable from Gertrude McCann owing to 
the Corporation increasing in both principal and accruing interest, from which amounts due to 
the Corporation may never be collected." Id (emphasis added). Toe receivable from Gertrude 
Mccann is approximately $198,000 (much of which was incurred long before 2001). Moreover, 
the receivable is largely offset by the comparable amount owed to Gertrude McCann by the 
Corporation. See Dorothy Snowball Affidavit. 125 ($165,341 Promissory Note to the 
Corporation). Notably, Mr. Reinstein has no factual basis for his conclusory assertion that the 
amount receivable "may never be collected." His only support for this assertion is that "[t]he 
deposition testimony of Gary Meisner and William Mccann, Jr. reveals that they are unaware of 
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what assets Gertrude McCann has and they are unable to identify assets from which she or her 
estate can repay the Corporation." Id at~ 6.2. Notably, in offering this conclusory opinion, Mr. 
Reinstein does not state that he has reviewed Gertrude McCann' s financial records or otherwise 
verified her financial status. Indeed, Mr. Reinstein reports in paragraph 2 of his affidavit the 
material he has reviewed. and that list does not include the deposition testimony of Plaintiff or 
Plaintiff's affidavit filed February 10, 2010. That very affidavit states that Gertrude McCann 
ovms approximately 100 acres of land near Craigmont. Mr. Reinstein has no way of knowing 
Gertrude McCann' s financial status or ability to pay the relatively small receivable to the 
Corporation. Thus, Mr. Reinstein's opinion that the "amounts due to the Corporation may never 
be collected" is purely speculative and is not factually supported. 
E. Karen Ginnett Affidavit 
Plaintiff has also offered the Affidavit of Karen Ginnett in opposition to the 
Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment. Ms. Ginnett's affidavit sets forth the test for 
detennining liability for tax fraud, a primary element of which is "an intent to evade tax." 
Without identifying any particular transactions, Ms. Ginnett offers the vague opinion that "[t}he 
deductions claimed on the Corporation's tax returns for questionable payments to Gertrude 
Mc Cann and a portion of her personal expenses may be viewed a.s a way to avoid paying ta-x and 
therefore tax evasion." Id. at iJ 3. Ms. Ginnett offers no explanation for this conclusory 
assertion, which is contrary to Mr. Reinstein's opinion in paragraph 5.1 of his Affidavit that the 
transactions with Gertrude Mccann "were designed as a means to support her lifestyle as an 
alternative to declaring dividends and/or redeeming Corporate stock from the Trust to which she 
is a beneficiary.'' 
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Ms. Ginnett offers the conclusory assertion that "the financial transactions that the 
Corporation has engaged in since January 5, 2001 with Gertrude Mccann do expose the 
Corporation to substantial liabilities in the event of an audit." Id. at 4] 6. Again, just like Mr. 
Reinstein, Ms. Ginnett. does not state that an audit has been threatened by any taxing authority, 
nor does she offer any opinion as to the likelihood that anything on the Corporate tax returns 
would trigger an audit. Ms. Ginnett offers no opinion as to the amount of interest or penalties 
that might result from an audit. Ms. Ginnett offers no opinion that the Corporation would not be 
able to pay any interest or penalties assessed. Indeed, Ms. Ginnett does not offer any opinion 
that the transactions threaten irreparable injury to the Corporation. Rather, Ms. Ginnett only 
opines that the transactions "threaten hann" to the Corporation, with no opinion as to whether 
that harm would be irreparable. 
ID. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Much of Plaintiff's opposition to the Corporation's motion for summary judgment is 
based on assertions that "material issues of fact" preclude entry of summary judgment. For 
example, Plaintiff asserts that "the Court will have to use its fact finding power to determine the 
probability of an audit and the amount of the harm which will result." In this case, however. 
there are no disputes as to the facts. For example. there are no disputes over what payments have 
been made to Gertrude McCann by the Corporation. There is only a legal dispute over whether 
the undisputed facts and evidence offered by Plaintiff satisfy the required element for dissolution 
of a corporation that "irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered" by 
reason of oppression of a shareholder. The question of whether irreparable injury to the 
corporation is threatened or being suffered is a question of law that this Court can resolve on 
summary judgment based on the undisputed facts before the Court. 
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Notably, because the question of whether irreparable injury to the corporation is 
threatened or being suffered is a question of law, it is not the proper subject of expert testimony. 
See Memorandum in support ofMcCann Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc.'s Motion To Strike 
and Disregard Testimony, filed concurrently herewith. Thus, the fact that Plaintiffs ex.-perts 
offer conclusory legal opinions of a threat of irreparable injury does not create an issue of fact. 
Moreover, Plaintiff erroneously asserts that the evidence, "including all reasonable 
inferences which can be drawn therefrom. creates a material issue of fact as to whether the 
oppression threatens the corporation with irreparable harm." See Responsive Brief, p. 2. 
Because plaintiffs complaint asserts only an equitable cause of action that would be tried to the 
Court without a jury, ''the trial court as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable 
inferences based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary 
judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences." lntermountain Farese Management, 
Inc. v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136 ldaho 233,235, 31 P.3d 921,923 (2001). 
Finally, the Idaho Supreme Court has explained that summary judgment is appropriate 
where "the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 
element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." 
Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A .• 138 Idaho 200, 205, 61 P.3d 557, 562 (2002) (citing 
Celorex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)). Here, Plaintiff has the burden of proof of establishing 
that "irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered." Given that plaintiff 
cannot establish that required element, summary judgment is appropriate. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Summary Judgment Is Appropriate Because Plaintiff Cannot Establish A Material 
Issue Of Fact As To The Required Element That "Irreparable Injury To The 
Corporation Is Threatened Or Being Suffered" 
Tbis motion for swnmary judgment turns on one single question - whether, under the 
undisputed facts and admissible evidence asserted by Plaintiff, there is a material issue of fact as 
to whether the "irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered" by reason of 
oppression of a shareholder. See I.C. § 30-1-1430(2). Even Plaintiff recognizes that this is the 
only question before the Court for purposes of this motion for summary judgment. See 
Plaintiffs Responsive Brief. p. 2 ("The issue today is whether that evidence of oppression ... 
creates a material issue of fact as to whether the oppression threatens the corporation with 
irreparable harm."). 
1. The Phrase "Irreparable Injury To The Corporation Is Threatened Or Being 
Suffered" Is Well-Defined 
Oddly, Plaintiff begins his briefing by asserting that "Defendants offer no proposed 
definition of this element." Id. To the contrary, the Corporation's supporting memorandum 
offered abundant authority as to how courts in Idaho and around the country have applied the 
terms ''irreparable injury," "irreparable harm," and a .. threat" of such injury. While there are 
relatively few opinions discussing these terms in the context of dissolution statutes, there are 
abundant authorities defining these terms in the context of preliminary injunction motions, 
motions for appointment of a receiver and other requests for equitable relief. Courts have 
repeatedly defined ''irreparable injury'' or "irreparable harm" as harm that is not remote or 
speculative, but actual and imminent and for which monetary damages cannot adequately 
compensate. For example, just a few months ago, Judge Winmill explained that "[a]n irreparable 
injury is defined as an acrual and concrete harm, or the imminent threat of an actual and concrete 
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harm" and that a "threat of harm is not 'imminent,' ifit is based upon remote possibilities or 
mere speculation." Mennick v. Smith, 2009 WL 1783505, *3 (D. Idaho 2009). Judge Williams 
offered that same definition in Gammell v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 2007 WL 2186896, 
•2 (D. Idaho 2007).5 Another court recently described the concept as follows: 
While the concept of irreparable harm may be difficult to define, it 
is abundantly clear that the impending harm must be certain and 
great, and it must be actual and not theoretical. . ... Additionally, 
the harm must be imminent .... [not] merely feared as liable to 
occur at some indefinite time .... Finally, it is well settled that 
economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable 
hann .... The only instance where economic loss can give rise to 
irreparable harm . . . is when such loss threatens the very existence 
of the movant's business. 
TD Intern., LLC v. Fleischmann, 639 F.Supp.2d 46, 48 (D. D.C. 2009) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has also defined "irreparable'' injury as an "injury which 
cannot be adequately compensared for monetarily." See Urah Power & Light Co. v. Idaho 
Public Utilities Com'n, 107 Idaho 47, 51 (1984) (citing Black's Law Dictionary). In Hall v. 
Glenn's Ferry Grazing Ass'n, 2006 WL 2711849 (D. Idaho 2006), the only Idaho authority 
discussing the corporate dissolution statute's "irreparable injury to the corporation" requirement, 
the court specifically held that there can be no threat of irreparable injury where the conduct 
5 Notably, many of these cases involve motions for preliminary injunction, which is a 
equitable remedy similar in many ways to a request for dissolution. In fact, the test for 
judicial dissolution should require an even stronger showing of an actual, imminent and non-
speculative injury than in the preliminary injunction context. The purpose of a preliminary 
injunction is to preserve the status quo, and a preliminary injunction can later be vacated ifit 
turns out that a party has been wrongfully enjoined. An order of judicial dissolution 
permanently dissolves a corporation, leading to all kinds of tax and other business 
consequences. 
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complained of could be remedied through an action at law. Id. at >1' 11 ("'Hall could have filed suit 
to set them aside, and the availability of that option means that the corporation was not faced 
with a threat of irreparable harm that required its dissolution."). 
Plaintiff's Responsive Brief does not address these authorities, but instead simply offers 
his own definition of"irreparable injury" without citation to any authority.6 Indeed, Plaintiff's 
suggested definition of ·'harm that cannot be repaired and which harm involves a material 
financial amount" is directly contrary to the well-settled rule that a monetary injury cannot 
constitute irreparable injury. See, e.g., Utah Power & Lighr Co. v. Idaho Public Utilities Com'n, 
107 Idaho 47, 51 (1984) (defining "irreparable" damage as an "injury which cannot be 
adequately compensated for monetarily"); Council v. Deparrment a/Veterans Affairs, 2010 WL 
98984, "'2 (M.D. Fla 2010) ("By definition, monetary injury is not irreparable as it is susceptible 
to repair by the payment of money."); Emily's Listv. Federal Election Com'n, 362 F.Supp.2d 43, 
52 (D. D.C. 2005) ("[F]inancial harm alone cannot constitute irreparable injury unless it 
threatens the very existence of the movant's business."). Even "[t]he United States Supreme 
Court has ruled definitively that irreparable injury must be something more than monetary 
injury." In re. Florida West Gateway, Inc., 993 F.2d 1543, 1993 WL 185761, "'4 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974), which held that "[m]ere injuries, however 
substantial, in terms of money, time and energy necessarily expended in the absence of a stay, 
are not enough. The possibility that adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be 
6 In fact, Plaintiff does not cite a single case authority in his entire Responsive Brief other than 
a few cases in the final section of his Responsive Brief addressing whether the Court has the 
equitable authority to order relief short of dissolution. 
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available at a later date, in the ordinary course oflitigation, weighs heavily against a claim of 
irreparable harm."). 
In light of the abundant authorities defining "irreparable injury;' the court should reject 
Plaintiff's proposed definition and apply the definition adopted by courts in Idaho and around the 
country. 
2. Plaintiff Has Not Alleged That Any Irreparable Injury Has Already Occurred 
Plaintiff could avoid summary judgment by either establishing that some irreparable 
injury to the Corporation is "being suffered" or that irreparable injury "is threatened.'' Plaintiff 
makes no contention that any irreparable injury has already been suffered. Rather, Plaintiff 
argues only that irreparable injury to the Corporation is threatened by a potential risk of future 
tax liability. 
3. Plaintiff Cannot Establish A Threat Of Irreparable Injury To The 
Corporation, And The Potential Risk Of Tax Liability Asserted By Plaintiff 
Is Purely Speculative 
The crux of Plaintiff's argument is that the transactions with Gertrude McCann expose 
the Corporation to some potential risk of tax liability in the event of an audit by a taxing 
authority. This assertion does not establish a material issue of fact that the Corporation is 
threatened with irreparable harm. First, this assertion of a possible risk of tax liability in the 
future in the event that the IRS someday perfonns an audit is pure speculation and does not 
constitute a threat of irreparable injury. See Mennick v. Smith, 2009 WL 1783505, "'3 (D. Idaho 
2009) (ex"J)laining that ''[a]n irreparable injury is defined as an actual and concrete ha.rm, or the 
imminent threat ofan actual and concrete harm" and that a "threat ofhann is not 'imminent,' if it 
is based upon remote possibilities or mere speculation"); see also Black's Law Dictionary (7th 
ed. 1999) (defining "threat" as "[a] communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another") 
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( emphasis added). There is no evidence that any taxing authority has communicated its intention 
to audit the Corporation or that any tax liability is otherwise imminent. Rather, Plaintiff offers 
only the speculative assertion that an audit may occur at some point in the future and may result 
in some unspecified tax liability. 
The speculative nature of Plaintiffs assertion could not be more apparent. Plaintiff is 
contending that the IRS might someday question amounts "claimed as deductions on the 
Corporation's tax returns for questionable payments to Gertrude Mccann." See Karen Ginnett 
Aff., ~ 3. However, Plaintiff does not even quantify what amount the Corporation has "claimed 
as deductions on the Corporation's tax returns" related to the so-called "questionable 
transactions" with Gertrude Mccann. 7 More importantly, Plaintiff does not offer any 
explanation of how much tax liability might result from an audit. 
Plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish that "irreparable injury to the corporation is 
threatened or being suffered," and the failure to raise an issue of fact as to this element makes 
summary judgment appropriate. See Thomas, 13 8 Idaho at 205 ( explaining that summary 
judgment is appropriate where ''the non.moving party fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear 
the burden of proof at trial"). Plaintiff's burden is to establish the element of irreparable injury, 
and that burden is not satisfied by a speculative assertion that the IRS might possibly assess some 
unquantified penalty based on some unquantified tax deductions taken by the Corporation. 
7 Citing Mr. Reinstein's Affidavit, Plaintiff asserts that "[s]ince January 1, 2001, the 
Corporation has advanced $282,036 for the benefit of Gertrude McCann." See Plaintiff's 
Responsive Brief, p. 4. However, neither Plaintiff nor his expert gives any explanation of 
what portion of this amount has been claimed as deductions on the Corporation's tax returns. 
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Plaintiff simply fails in his burden of establishing injury in any quantifiable amount, much less 
an "irreparable injury" in an amount that the Corporation, which Plaintiff asserts is worth over 
$20 Million, could not easily pay. 
Moreover, even assuming as true Plaintiff's contention that an IRS audit. if one were ever 
to occur, might result in tax penalties, those penalties do not constitute irreparable injury. As 
explained above in Section III. A. I, a monetary injury, as a matter of law, does not constitute an 
irreparable injury. 
Finally, the availability of a remedy at law establishes the lack of irreparable injury to the 
Corporation. See Hall v. Glenn's Ferry Grazing ks'n, 2006 WL 2711849 (D. Idaho 2006) 
( explaining that there can be no threat of irreparable injury where the conduct complained of 
could be remedied through an action at law; "the availability of that option means that the 
corporation was not faced with a threat of irreparable harm that required its dissolution"). Here, 
Plaintiff asserts that the corporate Directors have allowed the Corporation to participate in 
transactions with Gertrude Mccann that subject the corporation to tax penalties. However, if 
there is any merit to that contention, Plaintiff could bring a derivative action to remedy those 
alleged wrongs. 
Plaintiff contends that bringing a derivative action would "consume the energy and 
resources of the Corporation and its principals." That argument, however, would extend to any 
other case and would emasculate the rule that equity will not interfere where there is an adequate 
remedy at law. The law is clear that there is no irreparable injury where the alleged injury is 
monetary or could be remedied by an action at law. Thus, Plaintiff's contention that the actions 
of the Directors subject the corporation to a potential monetary penalty cannot, as a matter of 
law, constitute threat of irreparable injury to the Corporation. 
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4. There Is No Irreparable Injury With Regard To The Speculative Assertion 
That Gertrude McCann Will Not Be Able To Pay Her Receivable To The 
Corporation 
Plaintiff now offers a new and creative theory that the Corporation is threatened with 
irreparable injury because of the possibility that Gertrude McCann might not be able to pay her 
receivable to the Corporation. 1bis argument fails for the same reasons explained above. First, 
the potential injury is monetary and could be remedied by an action at law. 
More importantly, Plaintiff's assertion is purely speculative and lacks any evidentiary 
support. Plaintiff has presented no evidence of Gertrude Mc Cann, s financial status other than 
Plaintiff's admission that she owns approximately 100 acres of real property. Gertrude 
McCann's obligation to the Corporation, especially when offset by the amount owed to her by 
the Corporation, is relatively insubstantial. Gertrude McCann owes the Corporation 
approximately $198,945. See Affidavit of Dennis Reinstein, 'If 4.2. Toe majority of that 
obligation was incurred long before 2001. The amount owed by Gertrude Mccann to the 
Corporation is mostly offset by the amount owed by the Corporation to Gertrude Mccann for 
rent. Thus, any assertion that Gertrude McCann would not be able to pay her obligation to the 
Corporation is purely speculative and not supported by any evidence. 
5. The Corporation's Cash Flow And Ability To Pay Dividends Is Irrelevant To 
This Motion For Summary Judgment 
Much of Plaintiff's argument to date and the affidavit of Mr. Reinstein are directed at the 
Corporation's cash flow and ability of the Corporation to pay dividends. For example, the 
Exhibits to Mr. Reinstein' s affidavit purport to set forth the Corporation's "cash available to pay 
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dividends."8 The Corporation's ability or inability to pay dividends is not relevant to this motion 
for summary judgment, which is limited to the statutory requirement that "irreparable injury to 
the corporation is threatened or being suffered" before judicial dissolution of a corporation. 
Wbether a shareholder receives the dividends to which he believes he is entitled has nothing to 
do with whether the corporation is threatened with irreparable harm. 
The dividend issue is a red herring and, in any event, Plaintiff has no entitlement to 
dividends at all. Ultimately, the decision to issue or not issue dividends is in the discretion of the 
directors of a corporation. See Idaho Code§ 30-1-640 ("A board of directors may authorize and 
the corporation may make distributions to its shareholders subject to restriction by the articles of 
incorporation and the limitation in subsection (3) of this section.") (emphasis added); see also 
Wabash Ry. Co. v. Barclay, 280 U.S. 197, 50 S. Ct. 106 (1930) (holding that prior to a 
declaration of dividends, there is no vested right to share in the assets of the corporation; the 
stockholder's right is merely to have the assets devoted to the proper business of the corporation 
and to receive from the current earning or accumulated surplus such dividends as the directors, in 
their discretion, may declare); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S. Ct. 189 (1920) (holding 
that, as a general rule, the mere fact that there are net profits or earnings, or that a surplus has 
accumulated, does not entitle the shareholder to dividends, but rather shareholders have no 
8 Plaintiffs assertion that shareholders are entitled to dividends in the amount the 
corporation's positive cash flow is absurd, especially in the current market of declining real 
estate values. If the Corporation were to issue dividends anywhere near the amount of its 
profits or positive cash flow, it would leave itself dangerously vulnerable to fluctuating real 
estate values and the risk of a substantial change in cash flow., i.e., if another tenant, like 
Tidymans, goes bankrupt. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MCCANN RANCH'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT-19 
# 21/ 24 
02-18-10;03:03PM; ;2083366912 
individual or property interest in the profits of the corporation and are not entitled to any portion 
of the accumulated earnings until the declaration of a dividend or its equivalent). 
6. The Question Of Whether This Court Can Order An Equitable Remedy 
Short Of Dissolution Is Irrelevant To This Motion For Summary Judgment 
The final section in Plaintiff's Responsive Brief is dedicated to whether this Court could 
order an equitable remedy short of dissolution, i.e., a corporate reorganization or spin-off. This 
is another red herring. Idaho Code § 30-1-1430(2) authorizes judicial dissolution of a 
corporation only when specific statutory requirements are met, including that "irreparable injury 
to the corporation is threatened or being suffered." The statute makes no mention of any other 
remedy. In any event, the question of whether the statute or this Court's equitable powers allow 
some other form of remedy should be left for another day. If Plaintiff cannot establish that 
"irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered,•• Plaintiff is entitled to no 
remedy under the statute. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff cannot establish that '"irreparable 
injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered." The best Plaintiff can come up with is 
that the Corporation may someday be required to pay some unquantified amount of tax liability. 
This assertion is purely speculative in that it relies on a long string of consecutive contingencies 
that would have to occur prior to any injury being suffered. First, Plaintiff's theory of injury 
would only occur in the event of a corporate audit by a trucing authority, and no taxing authority 
has given any indication that an audit is forthcoming. Second, even if an audit were to occur, 
Plaintiff's theory assumes that the auditor would agree with Plaintiff's assertion of tax fraud. 
Third, even if an audit were to occur and even if the taxing authority found tax fraud, Plaintiff's 
theory assumes that an audit would result in a significant tax penalty - a penalty that Plaintiff 
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does not even attempt to quantify. Fourth, Plaintiff's theory assumes that a tax penalty would be 
so large that that Corporation, which has been profitable each of the last seven years and which 
Plaintiff values at over $20 Million, could not pay it. 
In addition to this host of contingencies that makes plaintiff's theory of irreparable injury 
wholly speculative, Plaintiff's argument is simply that the Corporation might someday be 
subjected to a mone:ta;a tax penalty. A monetary injury, however, does not constitute irreparable 
injury as a matter oflaw. Finally, Plaintiff's speculative theory of injury, even if it were to 
occur, is not an irreparable injury in that it could be compensated for by an action at law. For 
each of these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to raise a material issue of fact as to the element that 
"irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered." Accordingly, summary 
judgment should be granted in favor of Defendants. 
/le 
DATED THIS _j£_ day ofFebruary, 2010. 
MCDEVITT & MILLER LLP 
# 23/ 24 
By~=',Z~~~ 
Charles F. McDevitt, ISB No.85 
Attorneys for Nominal Defendant McCann 
Ranch & Livestock Co. 
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Rules of Evidence 
Rules 702 through 705 are the same as their federal counterparts, and the same as the 
expert witness rules followed in the State of Washington. 
Rule 703, Basis of Opinion Testimony by Experts: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an 
opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the 
expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by 
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon 
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in 
order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. 
As noted in Washington Practice, Volume 5B Evidence: 
The admissibility of an expert's opinion under Rule 703 should not be 
confused with the weight of that opinion after it is admitted as evidence. 
Rule 705. Disclosure of Facts or Data Underlying Expert Opinion. 
Washington Practice, Volume 5, at page 287-88 
Rule 705 allows an expert to state an opinion or inference, with reasons, 
without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court 
requires otherwise .... 
Rule 705 applies only to the testimony of an expert witness and has no 
effect upon prerule foundation requirements with regard to lay testimony. 
Dorothy Snowball Affidavit/ Opinions 
In moving for summary judgment, the defense has filed the affidavit of their expert, CPA 
Dorothy Snowball. She notes in Paragraph 5 she is providing expert opinion testimony. Her 
opinions include: 
I understand that an allegation has been made by Plaintiff in this litigation 
that the Corporation is being irreparably harmed as a result of the 
management of the Corporation. Based upon my knowledge of the 
financial affairs of the corporation, I know of no basis for that allegation. 
(Snowball affidavit, paragraph 9) 
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.... It is my understanding that Plaintiff alleges these payments subject 
the Corporation to liability for tax fraud. I see no basis for this allegation . 
. . . The amount paid to Gertrude McCann for maintenance and repairs to 
the property is an amount which the Board of Directors and Mrs. McCann 
have determined is a reasonable amount to reimburse her for her time, and 
the maintenance and repairs to the property. In my opinion, this is a 
legitimate expense of the corporation and does not expose the Corporation 
to any risk of liability for tax fraud. (Snowball affidavit, paragraph 16) 
Neither the Idaho State Tax Commission nor the IRS have ever objected to 
.... the payments to Gertrude McCann for the maintenance and repairs to 
the property upon which she resides. (Snowball affidavit, paragraph 17) 
Even if the IRS were to question these payments, the only conceivable 
consequence would be the time involved in satisfying the IRS that these 
expenses are reasonable, and legitimate, deductible expenses of the 
Corporation. (D. Snowball affidavit, paragraph 18) 
.... Neither the IRS nor the State Tax Commission have questioned the 
depreciation deductions nor the interest income reported by the 
Corporation on the receivables from the McCann Estate and Gertrude 
McCann since that settlement was reached with the IRS. (Snowball 
affidavit, paragraph 20) 
It is my understanding that Plaintiff seeks dissolution of the Corporation 
and a distribution of assets of the Corporation to shareholders. It is my 
opinion that dissolution of the corporation and the distribution of assets of 
the Corporation to shareholders in redemption of stock would have 
potentially devastating tax consequences to the Corporation. . . . 
(Snowball affidavit, paragraph 26) 
Dorothy Snowball's opinions are based upon what she personally knows of the 
transactions, for example, having been involved in the preparation of promissory notes, what the 
corporate directors have told her (hearsay), and her knowledge of the "financial records". The 
defense believes that this information provides an adequate foundation for Ms. Snowball's 
opinions, yet characterizes the opinions offered by Plaintiff's expert as lacking sufficient 
foundation. As noted, Rule 705 does not require an expert's opinion to include the underlying 
facts/foundation, unless so ordered by the court. Nevertheless, Plaintiff's affidavits in great 
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detail disclose the foundation for their opinions. Plaintiff's experts reviewed the following 
financial material: 
the state and federal income tax returns, trial balances, income statements 
and balance sheets from 1996 through 2008, the 706 estate tax return for 
the William McCann Sr. Estate, the general ledgers for the years 2001 
through 2008, the Quick:Books records since 2004, minutes of the 
shareholder and director meetings, as provided since 1997, corporate 
resolutions for these years, the Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws of the 
Corporation, the work papers of Dorothy Snowball, as provided, including 
the supplemental papers per the Court's order and other documents 
provided by Defendants. 
Plaintiff's 0 ~·~ 0 ~•n reviewed the detailed explanations of the transactions at issue, given 
by the participants William McCann, Jr., Gary Meisner, Lori McCann, Gertrude McCann and 
Dorothy Snowball: 
I have reviewed the deposition testimony of William McCann, Jr., Gary 
Meisner, Lori McCann, Gertrude McCann and Dorothy Snowball. I have 
also reviewed the summary judgment affidavits recently filed by the 
defense, those of Gary Meisner, Dorothy Snowball and William McCann, 
Jr. and James Schoff. 
Further, Plaintiff's experts reviewed the corporate resolutions and minutes of the 
corporate meetings at which these transactions were discussed, explained, and agreed to. 
Defendants' assertion that Plaintiff's opinions lack foundation lacks merit. 
As noted in Washington Practice, one should not confuse admissibility with weight. The 
weight should be decided at trial. Today, the affidavits should be admissible. This point was 
clearly made by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847; 934 P.2 20 (1997), a 
case in which the trial court granted the defendant summary judgment dismissal on the issue of 
fraud. The facts of are extremely similar to McCann. The trial court's summary judgment 
dismissal was reversed on appeal because the Supreme Court held the trial court confused 
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admissibility with weight and wrongfully rejected the affidavits of appellant's expert 
accountants, as the court explained at page 852: 
In an attempt to demonstrate that Linda's statements were not true, 
William's expert witness in accounting filed three affidavits and 
supporting financial calculations. The district court summarily struck the 
first affidavit, explained in a fair amount of detail his reasons for 
disregarding the second, and summarily disregarded the third as irrelevant 
and inconsistent with the second. We have determined that it was error for 
the district court to disregard at least the second affidavit and have 
concluded that the second affidavit presents a genuine issue of material 
fact that precludes the granting of summary judgment. 
In the second affidavit, William's expert challenges the manner in which 
the corporation was showing its profits and losses. He particularly 
focuses on the characterization of certain of Linda's personal 
expenses as business expenses, the propriety of certain loans Linda 
apparently withdrew from the corporation, the manner in which the 
corporation booked depreciation expenses, and Linda's salary draw, which 
was in excess of the amount set forth in the property settlement agreement. 
We believe this demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether the corporation and Linda were being honest in their financial 
calculations when Linda told William that the corporation was showing a 
loss every month. ( emphasis supplied) 
The district court refused to consider this second affidavit, reasoning that 
the evidence presented in the affidavit was inadmissible because there was 
no foundation and, based upon the district court's knowledge of 
accounting principles, the expert's basis for his opinion was "flawed or 
fundamentally unsound." We recognize that a district court is required to 
determine the admissibility of evidence prepared by an expert witness by 
examining the foundational issues before ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment. Helca Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 
839 P.2d 1192 (1992). However, the district court in the present case was 
not using "foundation" in the sense that the expert had not properly 
identified his qualifications or the basis for his opinions. See I.R.E. 702, 
703. Rather, the district court was using the term "foundation" to criticize 
the facts considered and opinions held by the expert. This is nothing more 
than a weighing of evidence and a determination of the witness's 
credibility, which is improper in a motion for summary judgment. See 
Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 168, 868 P.2d 496 (Ct.App. 1994). 
Consequently, we have concluded that it was error for the district court to 
strike the second affidavit prepared by William's expert. 
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The defense memorandum summarizes dicta from a string of citations. But when one 
reads the actual cases, learns the facts and the Court's holding, the cited authority actually 
supports Plaintiff's position. For example, in Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1988), 
which the defense cites for the proposition that "federal courts condemn the practice of 
attempting to introduce law into evidence" (Defendant's Memorandum page 5) one learns that 
the plaintiff's had suffered an illegal search. They called an attorney as an expert and he testified 
regarding whether consent had legally been given and whether illegal searches had occurred. 
The trial court allowed this testimony on the ultimate opinion, which was reversed by the Court 
of Appeals, holding that testimony on ultimate issues of law is inadmissible as it would tend to 
confuse the jury if one side's legal expert testified that the law favored the plaintiff and the other 
side's legal expert said that the law favored the defendant and the judge set forth a third legal 
standard. It should be noted, that in this equitable, non-jury action, this danger, which was a 
primary basis for the court's holding, does not apply. The court also stated at pages 809-810: 
The line we draw here is narrow. We do not exclude all testimony 
regarding legal issues. We recognize that a witness may refer to the law 
in expressing an opinion without that reference rendering the testimony 
inadmissible. Indeed, a witness may properly be called upon to aid the jury 
in understanding the facts in evidence even though reference to those 
facts is couched in legal terms. For example, we have previously held 
that a court may permit an expert to testify that a certain weapon had to be 
registered with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. United 
States v. Buchanan, 787 F.2d 477, 483 (10th Cir. 1986). In that case, 
however, the witness did not invade the court's authority by discoursing 
broadly over the entire range of the applicable law. Rather, the expert's 
opinion focused on a specific question of fact. See also Huddleston v. 
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534,552 (5th Cir. 1981), modified on other 
grounds, 459 U.S. 375, 103 S. Ct. 683, 74 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1983) (attorney 
expert in securities law allowed to testify that a statement in a prospectus 
was standard language for the issuance of a new security because this 
information helped the jury weigh the evidence of defendants' scienter); 
United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979) (trial court erred in 
refusing to let experts on income tax law testify regarding whether failure 
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to report funds received for sale of blood plasma constituted income tax 
evasion). 
These cases demonstrate that an expert's testimony is proper under 
Rule 702 if the expert does not attempt to define the legal parameters 
within which the jury must exercise its fact-finding function. However, 
when the purpose of testimony is to direct the jury's understanding of the 
legal standards upon which their verdict must be based, the testimony 
cannot be allowed. In no instance can a witness be permitted to define the 
law of the case. ( emphasis added) (footnote omitted) 
In our case, our experts have not given an opinion on the ultimate issue, i.e., they have 
not testified that these transactions constitute fraud. They have set forth the facts and, quite 
appropriately the standards which a knowledgeable tax auditor would apply. In this regard, their 
affidavits are clearly admissible under relevant federal authority. For example, in U.S. v. 
Bedford, 536 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2008), the defendant was charged with various crimes related 
to tax fraud. The government presented an expert witness, an IRS agent, to testify concerning 
the deductibility of expenses claimed by defendant and the potential inaccuracy of defendant's 
tax returns. The trial court allowed this testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that this was 
appropriate, stating at page 1158: 
" [ e Jxpert testimony by an IRS agent which expresses an opinion as to the 
proper tax consequences of a transaction is admissible evidence", US v. 
Windfelder, 790 F.2d 576, 581 (7th Cir. 1986), so long as the expert does 
not "directly embrace the ultimate question of whether [the defendants] 
did in fact intend to evade income taxes," US v. Sabino, 274 F.3d 1053, 
1067 (6th Cir. 2001). 
As we stated in a recent unpublished opinion: 
"We agree that a properly qualified IRS agent may analyze a transaction 
and give expert testimony about its tax consequences." U.S. v. Wage, 203 
F.App'x 920, 930 (10th Cir. 2006) 
And at page 1158: 
An expert may not state legal conclusions drawn by applying the law to 
the facts," but "[ a ]n expert may ... refer to the law in expressing his or her 
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opinion." (Citing A.F. ex rel Evans v. Independent School District No. 25, 
936 F.2d 472, 476 (10th Cir. 1991). 
With these principles in mind, we will now repeat the defense objections and provide a 
response to each. 
Defense Objection 
~NO. 
2 
STATEMENT 
I have assisted Dennis Reinstein in this 
Matter and have reviewed all the .... 
Plaintiff's Response 
OBJECTION 
The statements lack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility .... 
Rule 705 does not require the expert to set forth the facts upon which he relies unless so 
ordered. Nevertheless, Karen Ginnett states that she reviewed all of the material mentioned in 
Mr. Reinstein's affidavit and Mr. Reinstien's affidavit sets forth that information in detail. In 
fact, there is a far more detailed foundation for the opinions of Plaintiff's expert than simply the 
"financial records" relied upon by defense expert Snowball. 
Defense Objection 
,TNO. STATEMENT OBJECTION 
3 The term "fraud" as used in the tax These statements constitute 
Law, means an actual and deliberate. . . . improper legal argument and .... 
Plaintiff's Response 
Ms. Ginnett's affidavit is appropriate under the ruling in U.S. v. Bedford, infra supra. 
Ms. Ginnett is not telling this court what the law should conclude, she is telling the court what 
standards are applied by a knowledgeable tax auditor of the State of Idaho Tax Commission in 
determining whether the characterization by a corporation of financial transactions is proper. As 
CPA Ginnett states in her affidavit, she spent seven years as an auditor and this is the standard 
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she applied. This should be compared to Dorothy Snowball's affidavit which essentially gives 
the same opinion ( although opposite). Ms. Snowball states that the transactions are proper and 
provides essentially no basis other than: 1) this happens to be her opinion, and 2) the tax 
authorities have not objected. As pointed out in Plaintiff's affidavits, the tax authorities have not 
objected most likely because they in fact have not audited since 1986. 
Defense Objection 
~NO. 
4 
STATEMENT 
In appears that during the 1986/1987 
Audit, the taxing authorities did review 
Plaintiff's Response 
OBJECTION 
The statements lack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility in .... 
The defense's objection is confusing - in actuality Plaintiff's expert is not expressing an 
opinion, but rather is repeating factual information set forth in the defense expert's affidavit. To 
the extent that Ms. Ginnett's statements can be construed as an opinion, the rule is that "the 
opinion based upon the opinion of another expert is admissible, so long as the testifying expert 
reasonably relied upon the opinion." Washington Practice, Opinion Based upon Other Opinions, 
Volume SB, page 245, accord, Long v. Hendricks, 109 Idaho 73, 705 P .2d 78 (Ct. App. 1985). 
Defense Objection 
fNO. 
5. 
STATEMENT 
The fact that Gertrude McCann reports 
Some income on her tax return does not 
change the question .... 
OBJECTION 
These statements constitute 
improper legal argument and 
improper assertions .... 
The defense presents an affidavit in which their expert repeatedly expresses opinions 
such as "it is my understanding that Plaintiff alleges these payments subject the corporation to 
liability for tax fraud. I see no basis for this allegation .... In my opinion this is a legitimate 
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business expense to the corporation and does not expose the corporation to any risk of liability 
for tax fraud", Snowball affidavit paragraph 16. So does the defense object when Plaintiff's 
expert, who reviews in detail the same transactions, not only how they are characterized on the 
books, but how the participants explain them in their depositions and affidavits, expresses a 
counter opinion?. Our experts, licensed CPAs, simply dispute the expert testimony offered by 
Ms. Snowball, and bolster their opinions with far greater factual foundation. 
Defense Objection 
'ilNO. 
6. 
STATEMENT 
It is my opinion, and for the reasons set 
Forth in detail in Dennis Reinstein's 
affidavit .... 
Plaintiff's Response 
OBJECTION 
The statements lack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility in that 
they do not set forth .... 
In fact the foundation for his opinion is given in far greater detail than the opinion of Ms. 
Snowball which Plaintiff's experts are responding to. And as noted, Rule 705 does not even 
require an expert to set forth in detail the underlying facts that form the foundation of their 
opinion unless so ordered by the court. We don't believe the court, just the same as a jury, is 
necessarily conversant with accounting standards. We don't believe it would be appropriate for a 
court to attempt to take judicial notice of accounting standards - such as the trial judge did in 
Hines. These issues are appropriate for expert testimony. There happens to be conflicting expert 
testimony and the proper weight must be decided at trial, not on summary judgment. 
Objections to the affidavit of Dennis Reinstein 
Defense Objection 
'JNO. 
4.1 
STATEMENT 
Gertrude McCann Compensation .... 
OBJECTION 
This Court has indicated that it will 
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only consider facts subsequent to 
January 5, 2001 .... 
To begin with, the Defendants have filed summary judgment affidavits which are replete 
with specific factual assertions concerning pre-2001 events. When we asked at deposition about 
these events, they strenuously objected, asserting that the Court's order prohibited discovery. 
Has the defense not waived that objection, has the defense not opened the door at least in this 
summary judgment proceeding, when it files affidavits in which, for example, Defendant 
McCann discusses the formation of the corporation in 1974, his activities as president since 
1997, his parents' actions between 1974 and the 1986 audit, the results of the 1986-1987 audit, 
the corporate actions taken post-1987 and pre-2001 in response thereto, and, in particular, the 
actions of the directors at the September 6, 2000, board meeting (William McCann affidavit 
paragraph 4, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15). 
Second, Evidence Rule 401 defines relevant evidence to mean: "evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than would be without the evidence." E.R. 402 provides, 
"all relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided .... " 
We allege that the post-2001 transactions between the Corporation and Gertrude McCann 
serve no legitimate corporate purpose but rather are a continuation of the Defendants' oppression 
of Plaintiff. The Defendants dispute this. (Although, for purposes of their summary judgment 
motion they admit sufficient evidence of oppression can be omitted.) We assert that the pre-
2001 transactions, such as phony consulting fees, such as a voted down effort to provide a 
lifetime annuity, are relevant to explain that the post-2001 transactions have occurred because 
Plaintiff in fact had successfully put an end to the earlier misconduct. Such evidence is 
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admissible under the rules set forth in Aldape, Jr. v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 668 P.2d 130 (1983) 
wherein the Court stated at page 258: 
Change of circumstances. Material operative facts occurring after the 
decision of an action with respect to the same subject matter may in 
themselves, or taken in conjunction with the antecedent facts, comprise a 
transaction which may be made the basis of a second action not precluded 
by the first. See Illustrations 10-12. 
Illustration (12). The government fails in an action against a defendant 
under an antitrust statute for lack of adequate proof that the defendant 
participated in a conspiracy to restrain trade. The govermnent is not 
precluded from a second action against the same defendant in which it 
relies on conspiratorial acts post-dating the judgment in the first action, 
and may rely also on acts preceding the judgment insofar as these 
lend significance to the later acts. [ emphasis supplied] 
We are not asking this Court to find that the pre-2001 payment of consulting fees by the 
Corporation to Gertrude McCann constitute oppression for which relief should be granted, we 
ask the Court to find that the post-2001 transfers to Gertrude McCann serve no legitimate 
purpose and are acts of oppression. Defendants dispute this. Defendants characterize them as 
proper. In determining how those post-2001 transactions should be characterized, it is relevant 
to learn that they were prompted by Plaintiff's successful effort to stop the continuation of the 
pre-2001 practices. ·william McCann, Jr. let his guard down when he candidly testified that the 
reasons for the post-2001 transactions were that his mother "needed the money." 
And as Plaintiff's expert Ginnett states in her affidavit, an auditor in evaluating whether a 
transaction is fraudulent, must necessarily consider "the entire record of transactions." (Ginnett 
Affidavit paragraph 3) 
Defense Objection 
~NO. 
4.2 
STATEMENT 
Advances for Expenses .... 
OBJECTION 
The time period before 2001 is 
Irrelevant in this action. 
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Plaintiff's Response 
We make the same response and state further there is a detailed foundation laid - the very 
detailed minutes of the directors meeting and resolutions adopted. To the extent factual 
assertions are made, they simply repeat what the Defendants admitted in their own affidavits. 
Defense Objection 
~NO. 
4.6 
STATEMENT 
I have asked Plaintiff's attorneys to 
ascertain what amount .... 
Plaintiff's Response 
OBJECTION 
The statements lack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility, 
irrelevant .... 
Plaintiff's response details the "agreement" entered into between Defendant Meisner, 
William McCann, Jr. and Gertrude McCann whereby William McCann, Jr. and bis wife, Lori, 
agreed to advance additional sums to Gertrude. Defense has refused to provide us with the 
balance purportedly owed by Gertrude to William McCann, Jr. (this is a different "debt" than the 
Corporation claims Gertrude owes it). But the fact is, upon Gertrude's death there apparently will 
be claims made against her estate not only by the Corporation, but by Defendant William 
McCann, Jr. as well. This is extremely relevant because Defendants assert that even if transfers 
by the Corporation to Gertrude are improper, the Corporation is not hanned because they can be 
recovered. There is a substantial threat that that simply is not accurate. 
Defense Objection 
~NO. 
4.7 
STATEMENT 
Gertrude McCann testified that she 
Does not owe the Corporation any 
money .... 
OBJECTION 
Inadmissible hearsay and improper 
attempt to present hearsay 
testimony .... 
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Plaintiff's Response 
Gertrude did in fact testify as alleged. This is not offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted therein, this is offered to prove that the Corporation's assertion, that it will have no 
difficulty in recovering the funds improperly transferred to Gertrude is in fact far from a 
certainty. And further, Defendants participated in the deposition - what the witness testified to, 
based on her own knowledge, is not hearsay. It's not "an out of court statement." 
The Corporation claims it will recover the money from Gertrude. It is relevant that 
Gertrude has testified that she doesn't owe it. 
Defense Objection 
,TNO. 
4.7 
STATEMENT 
I have been provided no 
Documentation or deposition testimony 
That would suggest that Gertrude .... 
Plaintiff's Response 
OBJECTION 
The statements lack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility .... 
Defendants' shotgun objection is genuinely unhelpful. This witness has in fact laid a 
very detailed foundation of what he has reviewed - virtually every scrap of paper pertaining to 
the Corporation's business over the last ten years. In discovery we asked the Corporation to 
provide all documents relevant to the transactions with Gertrude. And in turn, our expert has 
reviewed those documents and notes there is nothing therein that suggests Gertrude and/or her 
husband claimed rent was owing. 
Defense Objection 
,TNO. 
5.1 
STATEMENT 
In my opinion, the financial 
transactions a corporation has engaged 
in with Gertrude McCann .... 
OBJECTION 
The statements lack the necessary 
foundation or admissibility, .... 
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Plaintiff's Response 
The defense asserts that whether the Corporation's transactions with Gertrude are for a 
necessary business purpose or improper, is not relevant - this is a frivolous objection to the 
extreme. Likewise, their claim that the opinion lacks foundation ignores the detailed facts upon 
which Mr. Reinstein relies. They argue that his opinion is conclusory. It is a conclusion. That is 
what an opinion is. 
Defense Objection 
'i!NO. 
5.2 
STATEMENT 
Plaintiff's counsel has asked me to 
assume that an appropriate definition 
of "threat of irreparable hann" 
Plaintiff's Response 
OBJECTION 
The statements lack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility .... 
Despite no case law analysis or statutory definition of the statutory element "threat of 
irreparable hann", Defendants object when we offer a suggested definition. And to ask our 
expert to assume this definition is certainly allowed under the rules. "An expert may base an 
opinion upon a hypothetical question, posed by counsel on direct examination." Opinions and 
Expert Testimony, Section 703.4 Washington Practice, Volume 5B, page 229. 
Defense Objection 
'i!NO. 
6.1 
STATEMENT 
If the business affairs of the 
corporation were selected for audit by 
either the Idaho State Tax .... 
Plaintiff's Response 
OBJECTION 
The statements lack the necessary 
foundation for admissibility .... 
To the contrary, the facts in support of this opinion are set forth in detail. 
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Defense Objection 
~NO. 
6.3, 6.4, 
6,4,1, 6.5.2 
STATEMENT 
Further, as I understand a life estate, 
the life tenant retains rights and .... 
Plaintiff's Response 
OBJECTION 
These statements constitute 
Improper legal argument .... 
To the contrary, valuation of a life estate, in comparison with the remainder interest, is a 
matter properly considered by CP As utilizing IRS tables. 
As to each of these objections, the defense is confusing weight with admissibility. They 
don't like our experts' opinion, but the opinions are based upon a detailed foundation. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' motion to strike should be denied. At trial the Court, as the fact finder, will 
determine what weight to give the competing opinions. 
Frankly, that a closely held corporation transfers hundreds of thousands of dollars to the 
controlling director/shareholder's mother, for no legitimate corporate purpose, but rather because 
"she needs the money", at the very time cash flow won't allow dividends, threatens irreparable 
harm, whether or not the Corporation might someday recover the money and regardless of what 
any expert witness might opine. 
DATED: This 22nd day of February 2010. 
Esser & s7LLC 
By_........,..attf.~_e_~_7'2_~_ 
Timothy Esser #6770 
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WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and 
GARY E. MEISNER, individually 
as a director of McCann Ranch 
Livestock Company, Inc., and as a 
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Trustee of the William V. McCann, 
Sr. Stock Trust, 
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McCANN RANCH & ) 
LIVESTOCK COMP ANY, INC., ) 
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No. CV08-01226 
PLAINTIFF'S CORRECTION I 
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 
A word was left out of the of the second sentence on page 10 of Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendant McCann Ranch & Livestock's Motion to Strike. The sentence should read: 
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So why does the defense object when Plaintiff's expert, who reviews in 
detail the same transactions, not only how they are characterized on the 
books, but how the participants explain them in their depositions and 
affidavits, expresses a counter opinion? 
In response to the dissolution element "threat of irreparable harm" the Court is asked to 
consider I.C.30-1-1434. Defendants McCann and Meisner could have, but were not required to 
institute the remedy provided by this statute. They could have elected to have the Corporation 
and/or themselves purchase Plaintiff's shares and if they could not have reached an agreement 
with Phintiff co!lcerning the "fair value" of his shares, the statute; proviGes for that determination 
to be made by the Court. These Defendants have chosen not to implement the buyout remedy 
provided by this statute. Assume that they indeed have engaged in oppression, which for 
purposes of their summary judgment motion, they concede. The Defendants' position is that the 
Corporation has spent $250,000 in defending their personal oppression and argue that despite 
that oppression, Plaintiff is not entitled to a remedy. The Defendants could have saved the 
Corporation the $250,000 (probably in excess of $400,000 by the time trial is completed) of 
attorney fees prompted by their oppression, and could further save the Corporation from the 
damage they allege the remedy of dissolution will cause (adverse tax consequences) by simply 
providing the Plaintiff the statutory remedy set forth in LC. 30-1-1434. And if in fact they have 
oppressed Plaintiff, this is only equitable. 
In the alternative, if the Defendants have in fact perpetrated oppression and yet do not 
want to provide Plaintiff this statutory remedy, they could have, and should have, defended 
themselves in this action at their own expense. This Corporation in fact is irreparably harmed by 
spending $250,000 to defend Defendants McCann and Meisner's acts of oppression, when that 
expense could have and should have been avoided by implementation of the statutory alternate to 
distribution. The Defendants may be motivated by I.C. 30-1-1434(5): 
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. . . .If the court finds that the petitioning shareholder had probable 
grounds for relief under section 30-l-1430(2)(b), Idaho Code, it may 
award to the petitioning shareholder reasonable fees and expenses of 
counsel and of any experts employed by him. 
In any event, for purposes of the Defendants' summary judgment memorandum, the facts 
are that they have caused the Corporation to spend in excess of $250,000 defending their 
oppressive conduct. The Corporation could have avoided this expense if the Defendants had not 
committed oppression. The Corporation could have avoided this expense if the Defendants paid 
their G'Nn fo~s. Tht Corporation could 11::ive avoided thi~. expense if the Deftndanis had offered 
Plaintiff a buyout of his shares pursuant to the statutorily authorized procedure. The Corporation 
is irreparably harmed by having lost in excess of $250,000 caused by the Defendants oppression 
and their refusal to accept personal responsibility therefore. The Court may chose to consider 
that in the context of an Idaho closely held corporation in which the controlling shareholders 
have engaged in oppression, the corporate dissolution statute may in fact only require one 
element: oppression. Because if those committing the oppression refuse to implement the 
statutory buyout of Plaintiff's shares, and at the same time cause the Corporation to pay to 
defend their oppressive conduct, the Corporation is irreparably harmed. 
DATED: This 23rd day of February 2010. 
Esser & ~' PLLC 
By /£a,e4If V-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, 
PLAINTIFF, 
V. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., AND ) 
GARY E. MEISNER, INDIVIDUALLY) 
AND AS DIRECTOR OF McCANN ) 
RANCH & LIVESTOCK COMP ANY, ) 
CASE NO. CV 08-01226C 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
CONCERNING VARIO US 
MOTIONS 
INC., AND AS A SHAREHOLDER OF) . , 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK ) ~ 1/t f f..v.- ~ ~~ 
COMPANY, INC., IN HIS CAPACITY) V-~___,_-
AS TRUSTEE OF THE WILLIAMV. ) ;7lN2 d_;t 'UJ//l _3 !J2-p ~ -
McCANN SR. TRUST, ~ 4 _ 1 /f 
DEFENDANTS, ) t' ~ ~~ / 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, INC., 
\ c}1 ' µ, ~ ) Fl 
) 
) 
) NOMINAL DEFENDANT. 
This is an on-going dispute between Plaintiff Ronald R. McCann and his 
brother, Defendant William V. McCann, Jr., concerning the operation of McCann 
Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc., a closely-held Idaho corporation created by their 
father many years ago. An earlier case involving this dispute was decided against 
Ronald McCann by the Idaho Supreme Court in McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 
61 P.3d 585 (2002). 
In the current case this court dismissed Ronald McCann's first cause of action, 
leaving only a claim for corporate dissolution. The case is set for a non-jury trial in 
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July 2010. 
The defendants now have moved for summary judgment dismissing the 
dissolution claim. They also have moved to strike some of the material contained in 
the plaintiffs affidavits opposing the motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff has 
moved to allow him to file an additional document, to which the defendants have 
objected. The court indicated that it would hear the motion to strike and the motion to 
file an additional document even though they were filed just a short time before the 
hearing date scheduled for the motion for summary judgment. 
For the reasons explained below, the motion for summary judgment will be 
granted. 
PRELIMINARY MOTIONS 
PLAJNTIFF'S MOTION TO FILE ADDITIONAL DOCUMENT. 
Plaintiff Ronald Mc Cann seeks to file a four page document entitled "Plaintiff's 
Correction/Supplemental Authority." In the document he seeks firstly to correct a 
typographical error in one of his prior memoranda and secondly to argue that the 
corporation or its shareholders could have bought out his interest in the corporation 
and thereby saved the cost of defending against his claims. In effect it is an additional 
reply brief. 
Permission to file a document belatedly is within the discretion of the court. 
IRCP Rule 56(c). Although there does not appear to be good cause for changing the 
time requirements in this instance, the defendants have not been nor will they be 
disadvantaged by consideration of the document. The court will consider the 
docum~nt and allow its filing. Compare, Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, 
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Rober-tson & Tucker, Chartered, 133 Idaho 1, 6, 981 P .2d 236 (1999) (suggesting that 
"disadvantage" to the opposing party is a legitimate concern). 
ITI IS SO ORDERED. 
**** 
DEFENDAl~TS' MOTION TO STRIKE. 
The defendants have asked that portions of the plaintiffs various affidavits be 
stricken and disregarded in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. 
"Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, 
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein .... " IRCP Rule 56(e). If a 
witness is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education, he or she 
may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise on a matter involving scientific, 
technical , or other specialized knowledge, if the testimony will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. IRE Rule 702. Mere 
conclusory statements that do not provide specific, admissible facts fail to satisfy the 
admissibility and competency requirements ofIRCP Rule 56(e). Hecla Mining 
Company v. Star-Morning Mining Company, 122 Idaho 778, 786, 839 P.2d 1192 
(1992). Likewise statements that are speculative do not satisfy the requirements of 
admissibility and competency. Dulaney u. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 
Idaho 160, 164, 45 P.3d 816 (2002). Furthermore, "The requirements of Rule 56(e) are 
not satisfied by an affidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay, and not supported 
by personal knowledge." State v. Shama Resources Limited Partnership, 127 Idaho 
CIVIL.SJ/CORPORATEDISPUTE.McCANN 3 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CONCERNING VARIOUS MOTIONS qq 0 
·-,•--·----
267, 271, 899 P.2d 977 (1995). 
An expert opinion or inference may be based on facts or data not admissible in 
evidence if the facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
particular field. IRE Rule 703. Even so, "An expert opinion that is speculative or 
unsubstantiated by facts in the record is inadmissible because it would not assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact that is at issue." Swallow 
u. Emergency Medicine of Idaho, 138 Idaho 589, 592, 67 P.3d 68 (2003). Expert 
opinion that merely suggests possibilities properly may be excluded. Bromley v. 
Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999). 
The defendants seek to strike portions of the affidavits of Karen A. Ginnett 
and Dennis R. Reinstein, both of whom are certified public accountants hired to assist 
the plaintiff in this litigation. The court will consider only those parts of the affidavits 
of Ms. Ginnett and Mr. Reinstein that meet the requirements ofIRCP Rule 56(e) and, 
where appropriate, the requirements ofIRE Rule 702. In the body of this 
memorandum the court may make specific reference to portions of the affidavits that 
it considers to be inadmissible or otherwise of no evidentiary value in a summary 
judgment proceeding. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
**** 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS 
Summary judgment " ... shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
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depositions, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter oflaw." IRCP Rule 56(c). The trial court must liberally 
construe the facts in the existing record in favor of the non-moving party and should 
draw all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving party. 
Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 660, 651 P.2d 923 (1982). In this process the 
court must look to the totality of the motions, affidavits, depositions, pleadings, and 
attached exhibits, not merely to portions of the record in isolation. Central Idaho 
Agency u. Turner, 92 Idaho 306, 442 P.2d 442 (1968). Circumstantial evidence can 
create a genuine issue of material fact. Petriceuich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 
Idaho 865, 452 P .2d 361 (1969). All doubts must be resolved against the moving 
party. Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 593 P.2d 402 (1979). The motion must be 
denied "if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn therefrom 
and if reasonable [people] might draw different conclusions." Id. 
Controverted facts are viewed in favor of the party resisting the motion for 
summary judgment. When a jury has been requested, the non-moving party also is 
entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the 
evidentiary facts. Anderson v. Ethington. Thus the burden of a party, when faced 
with a motion for summary judgment, is not to persuade the judge that an issue 
will be decided in its favor at trial. Rather, it "simply must present sufficient 
materials to show that there is a triable issue." 6 MOORE, TAGGART & WICKER, 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 56.11(3), at p. 56-243 (2d ed. 1988). 
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A triable issue exists whenever reasonable minds could disagree as to the 
material facts or the inferences to be drawn from those facts. Petricevich u. Salmon 
River Canal Co.; Snake River Equipment Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 691 
P.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1984). Therefore, although a party carries the ultimate burden at 
trial of proving facts to a standard of probability, the court in a summary judgment 
proceeding does not weigh the evidence for probability. The court determines only 
whether the evidence frames an issue upon which reasonable minds could disagree. 
Beyond this threshold of reasonableness, weighing the evidence is a task reserved 
to the trier of fact, who will have a first-hand opportunity to consider conflicting 
evidence and observe the cross-examination of witnesses. Earl u. Cryovac, A 
Division of W.R. Grace, 115 Idaho 1087, 1094, 772 P.2d 725 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Nevertheless, in a case in which the non-moving party has the burden of 
proof at trial, summary judgment is appropriate if that party fails to make a 
showing of the existence of an element essential to its case, provided that an 
adequate time for discovery has passed. Celotex Corp. u. Catrett, 4 77 U.S. 317 
(1986); Sparks v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, 115 Idaho 505, 768 P.2d 768 
(1988). A mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt is insufficient to 
withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 
730 P.2d 85 (1986). "[T]he party opposing the motion must present more than a 
conclusory assertion that an issue of fact exists." Coughlan v. Beta Theta Pi 
Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 401, 987 P.2d 300 (1999). The non-moving party cannot 
rest its case upon mere speculation. Finolt u. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 897, 155 P.3d 
CIVIL.SJ/CORPORATEDISPUTE.McCANN 6 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CONCERNING VARIOUS MOTIONS qq3 
695 (2007). Furthermore an unsworn allegation in a pleading does not create a 
disputed issue of fact in the face of affidavits or other materials provided for in the 
summary judgment rule. IRCP Rule 56(e); Tafoya v. Fleming, 94 Idaho 3, 479 P.2d 
483 (1971). Summary judgment should be granted whenever, on the basis of the 
evidence before the court, a directed verdict would be warranted or whenever 
reasonable minds could not differ as to the facts. Snake River Equipment Co. v. 
Christensen. 
Finally, when evidentiary facts are not disputed and when, as here, a judge 
will be the trier of fact, summary disposition may be appropriate, despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences, because the judge alone will be responsible for 
resolving the conflict between those inferences. Riverside v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 
519,650 P.2d 657,661 (1982). "When an action will be tried before the court 
without a jury, the trial court as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most 
probable inferences based on the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant 
summary judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. Inter mountain 
Forest Management, Inc. v. Louisiana Pacific Corporation, 136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P. 
3d 233 (2001). 
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS, UNDISPUTED FACTS AND DISCUSSION 
The procedural and factual background of this dispute is germane to the 
motions for summary judgment. As noted in a previous memorandum issued by this 
court, the background has been described at length in the Supreme Court opinion in 
McCann v. McCann: 
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.... Ron (Plaintiff Ronald R. McCann] and Bill McCann [Defendant William V. 
McCann, Jr., who is Ronald's brother] each were gifted 36.7% of the shares of the 
corporation [Defendant McCann Ranch and Livestock Co.1 in the 1970's. The 
remaining stock was held by their father, William McCann, Sr. In 1997, Bill began 
working part time for the corporation. In that same year William, Sr. passed away 
and his interest in the corporation transferred to a trust [Defendant William V. 
McCann Sr. Stock Trust] set up to benefit his wife, Gertrude. The trustee, Meisner 
[Defendant Gary E. Meisner], was given the power and discretion to redeem shares of 
stock to provide an income for Gertrude. Following Gertrude's death, the shares were 
to pass to Bill. 
Beginning in the latter part of 1998, the parties' attorneys began working to 
resolve differences between Ron and the corporation. Among the issues raised by Ron 
were: the use of corporate funds to pay for estate taxes, an increase in the amount of 
salary paid to Bill, the failure to seek repayment for a corporate loan, the payment of 
consulting fees when no services were rendered, the logging of timber belonging to the 
corporation and the improper characterization of employee payments. The corporation 
gave financial and property-related information, which Ron was entitled to as a 
shareholder, to Ron's attorney. 
Following a series of letters between the attorneys, a special board of directors 
meeting was scheduled in August 2000 to address the many issues raised by Ron. 
Despite the scheduled board of directors meeting, Ron's attorney sent a letter to the 
corporation's attorney and directors pursuant to I.C. Section 30-1-742 on June 9, 
2000, demanding immediate action be taken by the corporation on various matters 
[including a loan made to the estate and Gertrude instead of redeeming shares of 
stock, payments to Gertrude as consulting compensation, improper tax 
characterization of employee accounts, corporate funds paying for non-corporate work, 
expenditures for automobile services, corporate vehicles being used for personal use, 
and logging of the corporate timber property]. The corporation's attorney responded, 
requesting time to inquire into the allegations and prepare a response. Ten days 
later, however, on June 19, 2000, Ron filed his complaint. The complaint alleged both 
derivative and individual claims relating to the following causes of action: breach of 
fiduciary duties, negligence by the directors, conversion of corporate property, self-
dealing and conflict of interest transactions. The defendants filed motions to dismiss 
for failure to comply with the requirements of I.R.C.P. 23(t) and LC. Section 30-1-742. 
Gary Meisner's motion also asserted that Ron lacked standing to sue him as a trustee. 
On August 3, 2000, Ron filed a motion to amend his complaint. 
**** 
The board of directors of the corporation met on August 9, 2000, and addressed 
a majority of Ron's claims. Another meeting of the board of directors was held on 
September 6, 2000, to address the remaining claims. At that meeting, Ron was 
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removed as a director by a majority vote of the shareholders. 
McCann u .. McCann, 138 Idaho at 231-232. 
On January 5, 2001, Ronald McCann's motion to amend was denied and his 
complaint was dismissed with prejudice by the district court, because the complaint 
alleged derivative claims, and there had been no compliance with the requirements of 
I. C. Section 30-1-742. He appealed the decision. The Supreme Court affirmed but 
noted: 
Although the district court's determination that the dismissal would be with 
prejudice has not been directly challenged on appeal, we conclude that this dismissal 
would affect only the claims that Ron attempted to pursue in his complaint prior to 
the dismissal, and would not prevent him from properly asserting new, unresolved 
claims complying with I. C. Section 30-1-7 42 that may arise following the order of 
dismissal. 
McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho at 232, fn. 2. 
In 2008 Ronald McCann instituted the current litigation. In his amended 
complaint, the plaintiff asserted in his first cause of action that the defendants 
breached fiduciary duties they owed to him. In his second cause of action he sought 
dissolution of the corporation or alternative equitable relief by way of a forced buyout 
of his shares or a reorganization of the corporation. 
In dismissing the first cause of action, the court held that the claims contained 
in it were derivative in nature and that Ronald McCann had failed to comply with 
conditions precedent to bringing a derivative action. 
With respect to the second cause of action, the court found that Ronald 
McCann had stated a claim for relief under the applicable dissolution statute. I. C. 
CIVIL.SJ/CORPORATEDISPUTE.McCANN 9 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CONCERNING VARIOUS MOTIONS w {, 
Section 30-1-1430. The statute provided in relevant part that: 
The Idaho district court ... , may dissolve a corporation: 
**** 
(2) In a proceeding by a shareholder if it is established that: 
**** 
(b) The directors or those in control of the corporation have acted or are acting in a 
manner that is illegal, oppressive or fraudulent, and irreparable injury to the 
corporation is threatened or being suffered by reason thereof; ... 
After :finding that the plaintiff had stated a claim for dissolution in 
Count Two, the court noted that it likely would consider only events that took place 
after January 5, 2001. The court also held that the dissolution claim was personal to 
Ronald McCann as a shareholder and not derivative. See, e.g., Fletcher Cyc Corp, 
Section 5326.10 (Perm Ed); Kalabogias u. Georgou, 627 N.E.2d 51 (Ill. App. 1993); see 
also, Idaho Reporter's Comment to LC. Section 30-l-1430(2)(b) (suggesting 
inferentially that a shareholder's action for dissolution under this statute is not 
derivative). 
Neither the corporation nor any of the other shareholders has elected to 
purchase the shares owned by the plaintiff as a statutory alternative to dissolution. 
I. C. Section 30-1-1434(1). 
The court has ruled that as an alternative to dissolution, the court may grant a 
remedy by way of an equitable forced buyout of Ronald McCann's shares or by way of 
a reorganization of the corporation. The court noted that numerous authorities have 
suggested that these forms of equitable relief are appropriate as somewhat less 
onerous methods of remedying corporate oppression. See, e.g., Gillingham u. Swan 
Falls Land & Cattle Company, 106 Idaho 859, 862, 683 P.2d 895 (Ct. App. 1984) 
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(interpreting a similar statute). Nevertheless, as a condition of obtaining any type of 
equitable relief Ronald McCann must prove both of the statutory requirements 
contained in I.C. Section 30-l-1430(2)(b). 
In Idaho, unlike other jurisdictions that have adopted the model business 
corporation act, evidence of illegal, oppressive or fraudulent conduct by the directors 
is insufficient if there is no evidence that irreparable injury is threatened to the 
corporation or being suffered by the corporation by reason of the directors' wrongful 
conduct. LC. Section 30-l-1430(2)(b). There must be proof that both elements of LC. 
Section 30-l-1430(2)(b) were violated; only then is the court authorized to fashion 
relief, whether the relief is authorized by statute or by equitable principles. In other 
words, before a plaintiff is entitled to a remedy, he must prove his underlying claim 
for relief. 
As the court initially understood the record, it believed that Ronald McCann 
contended that the directors of the corporation acted illegally, oppressively, or 
fraudulently since January 5, 2001, in the following respects: 
1. They refused to declare dividends or declared dividends in an insufficient 
amount, considering the business and finances of the corporation; 
2. They caused the corporation to pay William McCann, Jr., an unreasonably 
high salary and other benefits as compensation for his services as president 
of the corporation; 
3. They caused the corporation to spend to date over $250,000.00 in defending 
itself and its directors in this proceeding; 
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4. They caused the corporation to enter into unsound and unreasonable 
financial transactions with Gertrude McCann, the widow of William 
McCann, Sr.; and the transactions may subject the corporation at some 
time in the future to federal and state income tax audits and liability, 
including principal, interest, and penalties. 
During his argument in opposition to the motion for summary judgment the 
attorney for Ronald McCann disclaimed any contention that William McCann, Jr., 
received an unreasonably high salary or benefits as compensation for his services as 
president of the corporation. The court, therefore, will ignore any suggestion to the 
contrary. 
For the purpose of the summary judgment proceedings only, the court will 
treat the other alleged acts as if they were illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive. This does 
not mean that court has made a determination that in fact the actions of the directors 
were illegal, fraudulent, oppressive, or otherwise wrongful. For example, it is clear 
that in many circumstances it is lawful and sometimes mandatory for a corporation to 
indemnify its directors against liability and expenses incurred in the course of or as a 
result of corporate litigation. See, I.C. Sections 30-1-850 -- 30-1-859. 
A threshold issue in this summary judgment proceeding is to define 
"irreparable injury." In the context of a public utility rate case, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has defined a similar term, "irreparable damage", as "that injury which cannot 
be adequately compensated monetarily." Utah Power & Light Company v. Idaho 
Public Utilities Commission, 107 Idaho 47, 51, 685 P.2d 276 (1984). Black's Law 
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Dictionary defines irreparable injury as "[a)n injury that cannot be adequately 
measured or compensated by money and is therefore often considered remediable by 
injunction." Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition, at 801. Case law also suggests 
that a threatened injury must be "real" and "imminent." See, Miller v. Ririe Joint 
School District No. 252, 132 Idaho 385, 388, 973 P.2d 156 (1999). It must be likely 
and not merely a possibility. Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable 
injury. Caribbean Marine Services Company Inc. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668 (9 th Cir. 
1988). Similarly, potential exposure to civil liability has been treated as wholly 
speculative and not a threat of real and immediate irreparable injury when no 
lawsuit was currently threatened. City of South Lake Tahoe v. California Tahoe 
Regional Planning Agency, 625 F. 2d 231 (9th Cir. 1980). 
The emphasis on a lack of remedy by way of monetary damages may not be 
totally satisfactory in every instance. "It is sometimes said, in this regard, that an 
injury is irreparable where there is no adequate remedy at law, as where there exists 
no certain pecuniary standard for measuring the damage, although it has been 
observed that the inadequacy of a recovery of damages is not synonymous with 
irreparable injury in determining grounds of equitable relief." 27A Am. Jur. 2d 
Equity, Section 34. Nevertheless, the definition adopted in Utah Power & Light is a 
more accurate statement of the law than the definition suggested by the plaintiff and 
for which he cites no authority whatsoever - "harm that cannot be repaired and 
which harm involves a material financial amount." Plaintiff's Responsive Summary 
Judgment Memorandum, P.2. 
.., :,-'¾t~:i1M~tt:~-
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Another threshold issue is a determination of who must suffer irreparable 
injury or be threatened with irreparable injury. The applicable statute contains the 
answer. LC. Section 30-1-1430(2)(b) specifically provides that the corporation is the 
entity that must be threatened with or suffering irreparable injury by the action of 
the directors. Vv'bether Ronald McCann is suffering or being threatened with 
irreparable injury by the action of the directors is irrelevant to a determination of 
whether there is a valid claim for dissolution under LC. Section 30-1-1430(2)(b). Of 
course, if the court reaches the conclusion that a valid claim for dissolution has been 
established, then the best interests of all the shareholders, including the plaintiff, 
may be considered in fashioning a remedy, which may or may not amount to actual 
dissolution. See, Gillingham u. Swan Falls Land & Cattle Company. 
**** 
It is undisputed that McCann Ranch and Livestock Company is an Idaho 
corporation with real estate and livestock assets in the Lewiston area. When William 
McCann, Sr., formed the corporation in 1974, he and his wife, Gertrude McCann, 
transferred ranch, timber, undeveloped commercial land, and cash to the corporation. 
Over several years William Mc Cann, Sr., gifted 36. 7% of the shares of the corporation 
to each of his sons, William McCann, Jr., and Ronald McCann. Following the death of 
William McCann, Sr., in 1997, the remaining shares in the corporation were 
bequeathed in trust to Defendant Gruy Meisner for the benefit of Gertrude McCann 
during her life, with the shares held in trust to be distributed to William McCann, Jr., 
upon Gertrude's death. The ownership interest in the shares has remained 
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unchanged since the death of William McCann, Sr. 
The corporation has been managed by a board of directors that currently 
consists of William McCann, Jr., James A. Schoff, Defendant Gary Meisner) and Lori 
McCann. The corporation has a compensation committee and a dividend committee, 
each of which consists of Mr. Schoff and Mr. Meisner. 
Between 2002 and 2008, the corporation has had annual net income as follows: 
2002 $ 69,764.60 
2003 $129,160.13 
2004 $ 23,180.69 
2005 $ 106,309.54 
2006 $ 309,067.25 
2007 $ 75,865.77 
2008 $ 138,139.62 
TOTAL $851,487.60 
The corporation is profitable and financially sound, but it is experiencing 
reduced cash flow as a result of: 
1. Litigation expense to date of $250,000.00 incurred in defending itself and 
the defendant directors in the captioned case; 
2. Loss of income from the closure of one of its larger tenants, Tidymans; 
3. Amortization of a $6,100,000.00 loan from Protective Life Insurance 
Company at the rate of $58,741.00 per month. 
The Protective Life loan was obtained in 2004 at a fixed interest rate of 5.75%. 
It was used to refinance several existing loans with higher interest rates. As of 
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December 1, 2009, the remaining balance was $3,935,646.00, which will be paid off at 
the current rate in 6 ½ 
The corporation has paid dividends since 2001 as follows: 
12/28/2004 $10,000.00 at $.04 per share 
1/17/2007 
3/3112008 
$25,000.00 at $.10 per share 
$35,000.00 at $.14 per share 
Ronald McCann has asserted in the course of the litigation that the corporation 
is worth $20,000,000.00. For the purpose of the summary judgment motion, the 
defendants have not disputed that figure. 
From 2001 until the end of 2006, the corporation paid William McCann, Jr., an 
annual salary of $144,000.00 for his work as corporate president. Beginning in 2007, 
his annual salary was increased to $160,000.00. He also receives the use of a 
corporate vehicle and a mobile phone. He receives no other compensation or benefits. 
He devotes approximately 80% of his work time to corporate duties and 20% of his 
time to a private law practice. 
The financial transactions between the corporation and Gertrude McCann are 
confusing. Although the court indicated that it will consider only events occurring 
after the dismissal of the first case on January 5, 2001, it is necessary to look at the 
entire history of the financial transactions between the corporation and Mr. and Mrs. 
McCann, Sr., in order to gain some understanding of what has occurred since January 
2001. 
Throughout the corporation's existence, it paid many of the personal expenses 
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of William McCann, Sr., and Gertrude McCann, which have been accounted for as 
"receivables", since an IRS audit in 1986 and 1987. There has been no state or federal 
audit of the corporation since that time; nor has the corporation been notified by any 
taxing authority that an audit may take place at some time in the future. 
When William McCann, Sr., died in 1997, the balance of the receivable 
account was $81,360.29. At that time the corporation created another receivable 
account for Gertrude McCann's personal expenses. It is undisputed that the 
corporation has paid and continues to pay many of Gertrude McCann's personal 
expenses, including utilities, fuel, telephone, and auto repairs. These have been 
posted to the receivable account. 
In 1988 the corporation constructed a 40' x 100' shop on ground owned by the 
senior McCanns but paid no rent for the use of the land. The corporation eventually 
decided that a fair amount to recognize as unpaid rent from and after March 1, 1988, 
was $106,000.00. It executed and delivered to Gertrude McCann its promissory note 
in that amount. 
In 2006 Gertrude McCann executed and delivered to the corporation a 
promissory note for $165,341.00, apparently for accrued personal expenses paid by 
the corporation. When asked at her deposition about the indebtedness, Mrs. McCann 
stated that she owed nothing to the corporation. 
Gertrude McCann lives in the former family home located on a thirty-five acre 
tract. In December 2000 the corporation purchased the house and acreage from Mrs. 
McCann, subject to her retained life estate. Since January 2001, the corporation has 
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paid Mrs. McCann for time and expenses incurred in maintaining and repairing the 
property, currently at a rate of $1,000.00 per month. In addition the corporation 
continues to pay for the assistance of a handyman who works on the property. 
There is no competent, admissible evidence in the record about Gertrude 
McCann's financial situation other than the facts that she owns 100 acres of land 
near Craigmont, that she is the current beneficiary of the McCann trust and the 
residential life estate, and that she receives payments from the corporation. 
Dorothy Snowball, a certified public accountant, has served as the corporate 
accountant since 1988. She prepares its state and federal income tax returns, reviews 
its general ledger, provides journal entries for preparation of its financial reports, and 
provides general accounting arid tax advice. She works as an independent contractor 
and not as a corporate employee. 
**** 
The plaintiffs opposition to the summary judgment motion centers primarily 
on the corporation's past and current financial dealings with Gertrude McCann. The 
plaintiff contends the directors' allegedly illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive conduct 
has caused or threatens to cause irreparable injury to the corporation for two reasons: 
1. If, as conceded for the purpose of the summary judgment motion only, the 
financial dealings are illegal, fraudulent, or oppressive, Mrs. McCann will 
be unable to reimburse the corporation; 
2. If, as conceded for the purpose of the summary judgment motion only, the 
financial dealings are illegal, fraudulent or oppressive, they could trigger a 
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state or federal tax audit that in turn could result in liability for back taxes, 
interest, and penalties. 
With respect to the ability or inability of Ms. McCann to repay the corporation, 
there is authority for the proposition that the established inability of a debtor to 
satisfy a debt or judgment may constitute irreparable harm, even though the 
availability of a claim for monetary damages as a remedy ordinarily forecloses a 
finding of irreparable injury. See, e.g., Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc., 903 
F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1990); Alvenus Shipping Co., Ltd. V. Delta Petroleum (U.S.A.) Ltd, 
876 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
The plaintiffs argument that Mrs. McCann will be unable to repay the 
corporation is based not upon concrete evidence in the record but upon mere 
conjecture about her financial condition. The burden is on the plaintiff at the 
summary judgment stage to present some evidence from which the court can infer the 
existence of the elements of his claim, that is, (1) wrongful conduct by the directors 
and (2) irreparable injury -- in this instance through Mrs. McCann's inability to 
repay the corporation. The burden is not on the defendants at the summary judgment 
stage to present evidence negating the existence of a required element of the 
plaintiff's case. See, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. As the Idaho Supreme Court has noted: 
"If a party resists summary judgment, it is his responsibility to place in the record 
before the trial court the existence of controverted material facts which require 
resolution by trial." Berg v. Fairman, 107 ldaho 441,444,690 P.2d 896 (1984). 
Likewise the United States Supreme Court has held: "In our view, the plain language 
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of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for 
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that partys case, and on which that 
party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. u. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 322. 
The only competent and admissib"te evidence of Mrs. McCann's financial 
condition that the plaintiff can point to in the record are the facts noted previously --
that she owns 100 acres of land near Craigmont, that she is the current beneficiary of 
the McCann trust and the residential life estate, and that she receives payments from 
the corporation. To infer from this evidence that she may not be able to pay a debt or 
judgment in favor of the corporation is the grossest type of speculation and 
conjecture. In stark contrast is the evidence in the Aluenus case, which 
demonstrated to the court that the defendant corporation had no assets, no cash, no 
employees, no office, and did practically no business. 
The plaintiff has failed to present any competent and admissible evidence from 
which the fact finder, in this case the court, may infer an inability of Mrs. McCann to 
repay money or benefits allegedly wrongfully paid to her by the corporation. 
As an alternative theory the plaintiff postulates that the payments to Mrs. 
McCann may at some time in the future trigger a state or federal tax audit of the 
corporation, which in turn may result in liability for back taxes, interest, and 
penalties. According to the plaintiff this possibility establishes evidence of the threat 
of irreparable injury to the corporation. 
As of the date of this hearing, no such audit has taken place and no such audit 
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has been threatened by any taxing authority. Compare, City of South Lake Tahoe v. 
California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 
In order to accept the argument advanced by Ronald McCann the trier of fact 
will have to accept all of the following propositions, none of which is supported by 
any competent and admissible evidence in the record, but only by speculation and 
conjecture, albeit speculation and conjecture coming from the certified public 
accountants hired by the plaintiff: 
1. A taxing authority at some time in the future will decide to conduct an 
audit of the corporation because of the way the corporation treated its 
financial transactions with Mrs. McCann for income tax purposes: 
2. The taxing authority conducting the audit will conclude that the 
corporation in fact owes back taxes, penalties, or interest because of the 
way the corporation treated its financial transactions with Mrs. McCann 
for income tax purposes; 
3. The amount of any back taxes, penalties, and interest assessed will be so 
great as to cause irreparable injury to the corporation. 
The threat that all of these things actually will occur is not real and imminent. 
It is at best speculative and is patently insufficient to amount to evidence of actual or 
threatened irreparable injury. 
Turning to Ronald McCann's other arguments, the failure to pay dividends in 
some years and the amount of dividends paid in other years cannot conceivably be 
interpreted as causing or threatening irreparable injury to the corporation. 
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Ronald McCann no longer asserts that the salary and benefits paid to his 
brother as president of the corporation are excessive. In any event there is not a 
scintilla of evidence that the salary and benefits, whether excessive or not, have 
caused or threaten to cause irreparable injury to the corporation. 
Finally the plaintiff argues that the directors' action in having the corporation 
pay $250,000.00 in current litigation expenses and in having the corporation pay 
undetermined future litigation expenses somehow is fraudulent, illegal, or oppressive. 
Accepting for the moment this novel contention, there is no competent evidence, 
considering the undisputed current financial condition of the corporation, from which 
an inference may be made that current and future litigation expenses have caused or 
actually threaten to cause irreparable injury to the corporation. 
**** 
A principle purpose of Rule 56 is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported 
claims. The defendants in this case are entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw, 
because the plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient showing of any competent and 
admissible evidence on an essential element of his claim for dissolution of the 
corporation, an element with respect to which he has the burden of proof. See, Celotex 
Corp. v. Catrett, at 323, 324. 
Since there are no additional pending claims in this case, final summary 
judgment will issue dismissing the plaintiff's amended complaint in its entirety. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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ORDER 
It hereby is ordered as follows: 
1. The plaintiffs motion to file an additional document is granted. 
2. The defendants' motion to strike is granted to the extent noted in the foregoing 
memorandum. 
3. The defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, ) 
) 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) CASE NO. CV 08-01226C 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR:, AND ) JUDGMENT 
GARY E. MEISNER, INDIVIDUALLY) 
AND AS DIRECTOR OF McCANN ) 
RANCH & LIVESTOCK COMPANY, ) , ri ,,! /, _ -
INC., AND AS A SHAREHOLDER OF) ~ / ~ ~--' 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK ) .rv1// d-, ~ ~/0 J j_ /~ ~ 
COMPANY, INC., IN HIS CAPACITY) /'ttL{ \ 'r1 
AS TRUSTEE OF THE WILLIAM V. ) / 0 
McCANN SR. TRUST, ) · f./\ ~  
) - ---7" 1// 
DEFENDANTS, ; ~ , ' , V' U -t !1-
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK ) 
COMPANY, INC., ) 
) 
NOMINAL DEFENDANT. ) 
Based on the court's orders, it hereby is ordered, adjudged and decreed as 
follows: 
1. The amended complaint of Plaintiff Ronald R. Mc Cann is dismissed with 
prejudice, the plaintiff to obtain no relief thereby. 
2. Upon timely submission of a cost bill the defendants will be entitled to 
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recover costs from the plaintiff, to the extent permitted by statute, rule, or 
contract. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF :NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, ) 
) 
Plain tiff/Appellant, ) 
) 
) 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and ) 
GARY E. MEISNER, individually ) 
as a director of McCann Ranch 
Livestock Company, Inc., and as a 
shareholder of McCann Ranch & 
Livestock, Inc., in his capacity as 
Trustee of the William V. McCann, 
Sr. Stock Trust, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Defendants/Respondents, ~ 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK ~ 
COMP ANY, INC., ) 
Nominal Defendant/Nominal ~ 
Respondent. 
No. CV08-01226 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, WILLIAM V. MCCANN, JR., GARY E. 
MEISNER AND MCCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK COMP ANY, INC. AND THEIR 
ATTORNEYS, MERLYN CLARK, CHARLES MCDEVITT AND MICHAEL 
MCNICHOLS 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 1 
AND TO: THE CLERK OF THE A.BOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant, Ronald R. McCann, appeals against the above-named 
Respondent(s) to the Idaho Supreme Court from the: 
1) Memorandum and Order, and Partial Summary Judgment, both filed March 4, 
2009, and entered in this action by the Honorable George D. Carey, Sr. District 
Judge; 
2) The Second Memorandum and Order Concerning Discovery filed August 31, 
2009, and entered herein by The Honorable George D. Carey, Sr. District Judge. 
3) The Memorandum and Order Concerning Various Motions, and the Judgment, 
both filed herein March 5, 2010, entered by The Honorable George D. Carey, Sr. 
District Judge. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court the judgments or orders 
described in paragraph 1 above because the Memorandum and Order Concerning Various Motions 
and the Judgment, filed March 5, 2010, are final judgments as interpreted by Rule ll(a)(l), I.A.R. 
which in turn, makes the Memorandum and Order and Partial Summary Judgment filed March 4, 
2009, and the Second Memorandum and Order Concerning Discovery fi1.:-d August 31, 20G9, fi~al 
orders. And therefore, Appellant appeals as a matter of right. 
3. The primary issue on appeal is: 
1) The question of whether a minority shareholder of a closely held Idaho for profit 
corporation, who is the subject of a squeeze out, perpetrated by those in control of the 
corporation, may bring an individual, direct action for relief, as opposed to a 
derivative action for the benefit of the corporation and: 1) did the Court err in 
dismissing Count I of the Amended Complaint; 2) if the shareholder was oppressed 
by a squeeze out, can he bring an individual direct action for relief, and can the Court 
grant as the remedy a forced redemption of his shares for fair market value and/or 
order a corporate dissolution? Other issues include: 
2) What is the appropriate definition of oppression in circumstances involving a 
minority shareholder's interest in a closely held Idaho for profit corporation and, does 
the concept of oppression in these circumstances include frustration of the 
complaining shareholder's reasonable expectation? 
3) Are facts which were known, or with the exercise of reasonable diligence could 
have been known, and litigated during an earlier derivative action, which action was 
dismissed for failure to follow proper procedure, admissible in a later individual, 
direct action, brought by a minority shareholder of a closely held Idaho for profit 
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corporation, and involving the same corporation and party defendants and, if not 
admissible as substantive evidence, nevertheless, admissible to prove the 
significance/meaning of later actions taken by those in control of the corporation. 
4) And whether these earlier actions are admissible in a subsequent action either 
substantively or to explain subsequent behavior, should the plaintiff be precluded 
from engaging in discovery of circumstances which occurred before the dismissal of 
the earlier action 7 
5) What is the appropriate definition/analysis of the term "threat of irreparable 
harm" as set forth in LC. 30-1-14307 
6) Can a court grant relief to a plaintiff shareholder in a dissolution action 
brought pursuant to LC. 30-1-1430 other than ordering dissolution of the corporation, 
for example, can the court order the corporation to redeem the plaintiff's shares for 
their fair market value? 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. Because a trial never occurred, no reporter's transcript is requested. 
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR. 
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DOCUMENT NAME DATE FILED 
Complaint for Equitable Relief and Damages 
Motion to Dismiss (filed on behalf of Def Gary Meisner) 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Responsive Memorandum to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief and Damages 
6/10/2008 
7/14/2008 
7/16/2008 
9/17/2008 
10/15/2008 
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief and Damages 10/24/2008 
(filed by Def William McCann) 
Motion to Dismiss (filed by Def Gary Meisner) 10/24/2008 
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief and Damages 10/24/1008 
(filed by Def McCann Ranch) 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Reply Memorandum 
1/5/2009 
1/15/2009 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 3 
.. 
0 
" 
" 
.. 
.. 
" 
• 
.. 
a 
.. 
Memorandum and Order (filed in Chambers 3/4/09 by Judge Carey) 
Court's Partial Summary Judgment (filed in Chambers 3/4/09 by Judge 31912009 
Carey) 
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of His Motion for Reconsideration 
Nominal Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
4/20/2009 
5/7/2009 
Reconsideration 5/8/2009 
Nominal Defendant McCann Ranch & Livestock Company Inc.'s Answer 
to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for Equitable Relief and Damages 5/8/2009 
Defendant Gary Meisner's Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for 
Equitable Relief and Damages 5/11/2009 
Defendant McCann's Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for 
Equitable Relief and Damages 
Memorandum and Order on Various Motions 
Plaintiff's: 1) Motion to Compel Discovery; 2) Declaration: 3) SupiJorting 
Memorandum 
Affidavit of Timothy Esser 
5/15/2009 
8/6/20096 
8/14/2009 
8/17/2009 
8/17/2009 
0 Motion for Protective Order (Def William McCann) 
.. 
.. 
" 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Protective Order and in Opposition 811912009 
to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel 
Supplemental Affidavit of Timothy Esser 
Plaintiff's Responsive Discovery Memorandum 
8/19/2009 
8/19/2009 
8/31/2009 
"' Motion for Protective Order (filed by Def Gary Meisner) 
" 
" 
.. 
.. 
Second Memorandum and Order Concerning Discovery 
McCann Ranch Motion for Summary Judgment 
Memorandum in Support of McCann Ranch Motion for Summary Judgment 
1/15/2010 
1/15/2010 
1/15/2010 
Affidavit of William McCann in Support of Def McCann Ranch Motion for 111512010 
Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Gary Meisner 1/15/2010 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 4 
e 
" 
" 
.. 
• 
e 
e 
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" 
Affidavit of James Schoff in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of Dorothy Snowball in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Def Gary Meisner's Joinder m McCann Ranch Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Def William McCann's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiff's Responsive Summary Judgment Memorandum 
Affidavit of Dennis Reinstein CPA 
Affidavit of Karen Ginnett CPA 
Affidavit of Ronald McCann 
Motion (McCann Ranch) to Strike and Disregard Testimony from Affidavits 
of Karen Ginnett and Dennis Reinstein and the Related Argument Contained 
in Plaintiff's Responsive Summary Judgment Memorandum 
Memorandum in Support of Motion (McCann Ranch) to Strike and 
Disregard Testimony from Affidavits of Karen Ginnett and Dennis 
Reinstein and the Related Argument Contained in Plaintiff's Responsive 
Summary J ;1dgment rvfemoraudum 
Reply Memorandum of McCann Ranch's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Affidavit of Counsel in Support of McCann Ranch's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Plaintiff's Correction/ Supplemental Authority 
Plaintiff's Response to Defendant McCann Ranch & Livestock's Motion to 
Strike 
Memorandum and Order Concerning Various Motions 
Judgment 
7. I certify: 
That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's record has been paid. 
That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 5 
1/15/2010 
1/20/2010 
1/19/2010 
2/12/2010 
2/12/2010 
2/12/2010 
2/12/2010 
2/17/2010 
2/17/2010 
2/18/2010 
2/24/2010 
2/25/2010 
3/5/2010 
3/5/2010 
DATED THIS / 7 day of March 2010. 
Timothy Esser 
Esser & Sandberg, PLLC 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _/2 day of March 2010, I caused to be served a true copy of the 
foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
Merlyn W. Clark 
Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
Attorneys for Defendant William McCann 
Charles F. McDevitt apd Dean Miller 
McDevitt & Miller, LLP 
P.O. Box 2564 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorneys for Defendant McCann 
Michael McNichols 
Clements, Brown McNichols, P.A. 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Attorneys for Defendant Gary Meisner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -- 6 
XX U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
XX Email- mclark@hawleytroxell.com 
Telecopy 
XX U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
XX Email- clrns(cfmccievitt-miller.com 
Telecopy -
XX U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
XX Email- nuncnichols@)clbrmc.com 
Telecopy 
Tirrfuthy Esser 
oj-1s-10:02:31PM: 
Chas. F. McDevin (ISB No. 835) 
Dean J. Miller (ISB No. 1968) 
MCDEVITT & MILLER LLP 
420 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2565-83701 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Tel: 208-343-7500 
Fax: 208-336-6912 
Attorneys for Nominal Defendant 
McCann Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc. 
;2083366912 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and 
GARY E. MEISNER, 
Defendants. 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY, INC., 
Nominal Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
----------------
Case No. CV 08-01226 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The above-named Defendants, by and through their respective counsel of record, and 
pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,jointly submit this Memorandum 
of Costs and Anorneys' Fees sening forth the costs and anomey fees incurred by the Defendants 
in the defense of this case as follows: 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND A TIORNEY FEES - 1 
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40100,0000.19409()8, 1 
97( 
03-18-10;02:31PM; ;2083366912 
COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT 
PURSUANT TO RULE 54(d)(l)(C) 
Costs Incurred by McCann Ranch and Livestock Company, Inc. ("Mccann Ranch"): 
Clerk of the District Court filing fee 
Dorothy Snowball Expert Witness Fee 
Ronald McCann Deposition Transcript 
Gary Meisner Deposition Transcript 
Dorothy Snowball Deposition Transcript 
William V. Mccann, Jr. Deposition Transcript 
Lori Mccann Deposition Transcript 
Costs Incurred by Defendant William V. Mccann, Jr.: 
Clerk of the District Caun filing fee 
Gertrude McCann Deposition Transcript 
Costs Incurred by Defendant Gary E. Meisner: 
Clerk of the District Coun filing fee 
Iotal co~ts t\s 8 !Y.Jatwr Of~t: 
DISCRETIONARY COSTS 
PURSUANT TO RULE 54(d)(l)(D) 
Discretionary Costs Incurred by; Defendant McCann Ranch: 
Postage charges: 
Copy charges: 
FedEx charges: 
Research charges: 
Dorothy Snowball Expert Witness Fee (amount in 
excess of $2,000) 
Discretionaa Costs Incurred by Defendant William Y. Mccann. Jr.: 
Copy charges: 
FedEx charges: 
Westlaw charges: 
Hearing Transcript re: Motion for Reconsideration 
$ 58.00 
$2,000 
$ 739.20 
$313.15 
$ 78.39 
$ l,Dl 7.18 
$ 225.57 
$ 58.00 
$ 179.69 
$ 58.00 
S 4,.727,18 
$ 104.31 
$ 297.16 
$ 419.30 
$ 482.60 
$ 1.943.34 
$ 63.34 
$3,001.16 
$ 221.00 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 2 
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Discretionarv Costs Incurred by Defendant Gary E. Meisner: 
Copy charges: 
Long distance telephone charges: 
Postage charges: 
Facsimile charges: 
West Payment Center Research charges: 
Presnell Gage PLLC witness fees: 
Transcript of Hearing re Motion to Stay Discovery 
and Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint 12/30/08 
Total Disq:ceJign;gy Costs: 
ATTORNEY FEES 
'2083366912 
$ 121.30 
$ 9.50 
$ 66.11 
$ 3.50 
$ 478.52 
$ 912.00 
$ 263.25 
$9,927.43 
Defendants respectfully ask the Court to award the following as reasonable attorney fees 
incurred, pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3); 12-:121 and/or 30-1-746, in favor of Defendants. 
Attorney fees incurred by McCann Ranch: 
Attorney fees incurred by William V. McCann, Jr.: 
Attorney fees incurred by Gary E. Meisner; 
Total ano.m~y__fees incurq;g: 
$ 22,837.50 
$ 266,596.75 
$50,606.00 
S 340,040.25 
To the best of the undersigned counsel's knowledge and belief, the items of costs, 
disbursements and attorney fees set forth above are correct, have been necessarily incurred in 
defending against Plaintiffs claims, and are in compliance with Rule 54 of the ldaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Idaho Code§§ 30---1-746, 12-120 and 12-121. 
This request for costs and attorney fees is supported by the Affidavits of Chas. F. 
McDevin, Merlyn W. Clark and Michael E. McNichols, filed concurrently herewith, stating the 
basis and method of computation of the attorney fees claim. 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 3 
•01 oo.oooe. 1 S40iSll., 
# 4/ 6 
OJ-18-10;02:31PM; '2083366912 
~ 
DATED THIS ///' day of March, 2010. 
McDEVITT & MILLER LLP 
By~L~J~ 
Charles F. McDevin, ISB No. 835 
Attorneys for Nominal Defendant McCann 
Ranch & Livestock Co. 
DATED THIS --l-9- day of March, 2010. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
By~SB No. 1026 
D. John Ashby, ISB No. 7228 
Attorneys for Defendant 
William V. McCann, Jr. 
~ 
DATED THIS ~y of March, 2010. 
CLEMENTS BROWN 
By I( f'::>/( 
Michael E. McN ichols 
Anorneys for Defendant Gary Meisner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \~day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDA1'.1TS' JoiNf '"'MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS' FEES by the method indicated below, and adclressed to each of the following: 
Timothy Esser 
ESSER & SANDBERG, PLLC 
520 East Main Street 
Pullman, WA 99163 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Andrew Schwam 
SCHW AM LAW FIRM 
514 South Polk, #6 
Moscow, ID 83843 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS BROWN 
321 13th Street 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501-1510 
[Attorneys for Defendant Gary Meisner] 
Merlyn W. Clark 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
[Attorneys for Defendant William V. McCann, Jr.] 
_b U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
~E-mail 
__ Telecopy: 509.334.2205 
-f-U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_:f:=:__E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy: 208.746.0753 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy 208.336.6912 
# 6/ 6 
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Chas. F. McDevitt 
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Chas. F. McDevitt (ISB No. 835) 
Dean J. Miller (ISB No. 1968) 
lvICDEVITT & MILLER LLP 
420 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2565-83701 
Boise, ID 83702 
Tel: 208-343-7500 
Fax: 208-336-6912 
Attorneys for Nominal Defendant 
Mccann Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc. 
;2083366912 
zoio nPiR 1s Fr'l 3 cs 
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF TIIE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR, and 
GARY E. MEISNER, 
Defendants. 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK 
COMP ANY, INC., 
Nominal Defendant. 
) 
l ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_________________ ) 
Case No. CV 08-01226 
DEFENDANTS'JOINT 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
REQUEST FOR COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
The above named Defendants. by and through their respective counsel, submit the 
following memorandum in support of their request for costs and attorney fees. 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 1 
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I.PROCEDURALBACKGROUND 
The present dispute between Plaintiff Ronald R. McCa.nn and the Defendants began over 
nine years ago and is now in its second round through the courts. Plaintiff is a shareholder of the 
McCann Ranch and Livestock Company, Inc. (the "Corporation"). On June 19, 2000, Plaintiff 
filed an action in Nez Perce County District Court, Case No. CV-00-01111 (McCann I). naming 
as defendants two shareholders of the Corporation, William V. McCann, Jr. and Gary E. Meisner 
(the "Director Defendants"). Plaintiff's 2000 lawsuit alleged a variety of causes of action against 
the Director Defendants, including breach of fiduciary duties, negligence, conversion, self-
dealing and conflict of interest transactions. See Complaint filed in McCann I (the "McCann I 
Complaint"). ,r,r 4.1 - 8. 7, attached as Exhibit 1 to Defendants' Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Dismiss previously filed in the current action. 
The Director Defendants moved to dismiss the Mc:Cann I Complaint for failure to follow 
the written demand requirement for bringing a derivative action against the directors of a 
corporation. See LC.§ 30-1-742 ("No shareholder may commence a derivative action until ... 
ninety (90) days have expired from the datethe [written] demand was made [upon the 
corporation to take suitable action]"). The District Court concluded that the causes of action 
were derivative claims subject to the written demand requirement set forth in LC.§ 30-1-742. 
See Opinion and Order Re: Pencling Motions (the "McCann I District Court Opinion", attached 
as Exhibit 4 to Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss previously filed in 
the current action) at p. 4. ,In McCann I, the District Court stayed the action for ninety (90) days 
to allow Plaintiff to comply with the written demand requirement and ordered that "issues raised 
in the complaint which are not resolved by the Board of Directors under I.C. § 30-1-742(2), can 
be raised after the expiration of the 90-day period." Id. ( emphasis added). 
# 3/ 19 
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Plaintiff failed to comply with that order from the District Court. Plaintiff made a written 
demand on the Corporation, but then filed an Amended Complaint just ten (10) days after the 
\Wi.tten demand. The Amended Complaint asserted the same causes of action as the original 
Complaint and included a variety of allegations against William Mccann, Jr. and Gary Meisner, 
including: (1) that the Board was paying Gertrude McCann (the mother of Ronald Mccann and 
William V. McCann, Jr.) an annual consultation fee; (2) that the Board had increased William V. 
McCann Jr.'s salary in 1999 to $144,000 per year; and (3) that Ronald McCann was removed as 
a director of the Corporation. See id.; see also McCann !District Court Opinion, pp. 2-5. 
The Director Defendants again moved to dismiss the McCann I Complaint on grounds 
that Plaintiff had failed to comply with the demand requirements ofl.C. § 30-1-742. Plaintiff 
opposed the motion to dismiss on grounds that his claims were not derivative, but instead were 
direct actiop.s that did not require written notice to the CoIJ)oration. The District Court granted 
the motion to dismiss with prejudice, concluding that the causes of action were derivative and 
that Plaintiff had failed to comply with the written demand requirements for a derivative action. 
See McCann I District Court Opinion, p. 8 ("The defendants are also correct that the plaintiff, in 
both complaints, is attempting to assert individual claims which are actually derivative claims on 
behalf of the Corporation."). 
In dismissing the McCann I Complaint, the District CoUrt concluded that Plaintiff should 
not be permitted to amend his· complaint in light of his refusal to follow the statutory written 
demand requirements: 
[B]ecause Plaintiff's counsel failed to follow the dictates ofl.C. § 
30-1-742 for a second time, this Court is forced to use its 
discretionary authority to dismiss this action with prejudice. 
Otherwise, the purpose behind Section 30-1-742 et seq. will be 
thwarted. and the shareholders will never be forced to cooperate 
with each other in the corporate context as anticipated by the 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT lv.IBMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 3 
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Id. atp. 8. 
statute. This Court believes it is only encouraging controversy by 
allowing this action to proceed, at the cost of the corporation's and 
the individual parties' pocketbooks. 
The Director Defendants then moved for attorney fees pursuant to I. C. § 3 0-1-7 46. which 
allows for attorney fees in a derivative action,where the court finds "that the proceeding was 
commenced or maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper motive." The District 
Court granted the motion for attorney fees based on Plaintiff's failure to follow the dictates of 
LC.§ 30-1-742. See McCann !District Court Opinion. p. 10. 
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's conclusion that the causes of 
action against the Director Defendants, including the cause of action for breach of fiduciary 
duties, are derivative in nature and may be pursued only after serving a derivative demand. See 
McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 61 P.3d 585 (2002) ("McCann l'). The Idaho Supreme 
Court also affirmed the award of attorney fees and awarded fees on appeal based on Plaintiff's 
failure to comply with the written demand requirements set forth in LC.§ 30-1-742. Id. 
Six years later, Plaintiff again brought suit against the Corporation and William V. 
McCann, Jr. and Gary Meisner as directors of the Coiporation ("McCann II"). Despite the fact 
that the Idaho Supreme Court expressly held that his earlier lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duties 
was derivative in nature, Plaintiff once again brought a claim for breach of fiduciary duties 
against the Director Defendants without complying with the written demand requirement set 
forth in LC. § 30-1-742. The allegations in McCann II are virtually identical to the allegations in 
' McCann I, except that Plaintiff also alleged transactions occurring after 200 l that are similar in 
nature to the pre-2001 allegations asserted in McCann I. 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT I\IIBMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR 
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Just as he did in McCann I, Plaintiff incredulously asserted that his cause of action for 
breach of fiduciary duties was an individual cause of action, not a derivative cause of action. See 
Complaint, ,i,r 28-29. Not surprisingly, this Court held that Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duty 
cause of action is derivative and dismissed that cause of action because Plaintiff failed to comply 
with the derivative demand requirement in Idaho Code§ 30-1-742. See March 4, 2009 Order. 
While the Court did not dismiss Plaintiff's cause of action for dissolution of the 
Corporation, the Court's Order put Plaintiff on notice of the burden of proof plaintiff would face 
to survive summary judgment: 
The court is unwilling to dismiss the second cause of action under 
a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis or under a summary judgment analysis. It 
is well aware, however, that the proved circumstances will have to 
be quite significant before any of the equitable relief sought by 
Ronald McCann may be granted. It is also aware that the plaintiff 
will have to prove irreparable rather [than] reparable injury to the 
corporation. 
Id. at p. 11 ( emphasis in original). 
Unsatisfied with the Court's decision. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, again 
arguing that his breach of fiduciary duty cause of action is not derivative. See Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, filed April 19, 2009. The Court denied 
Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration. 
After sen,ing a derivative demand on the Corporation) Plaintiff then filed a Motion to 
Amend Amended Complaint seeking to add a derivative cause of action arising out of the same 
allegations that served that basis for his previously dismissed breach of fiduciary duty cause of 
action. In his motion to amend, Plaintiff again asked the Court to reconsider its ruling that 
Plaintiff's breach of fiduciary duties cause of action is derivative in nature. In a November 12, 
2009 Order, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion, holding that "Plaintiff's attempt to revive bis 
DEFENDAl\lTS 1 JOTI\l'T MEMORANDUM JN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR 
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derivative action by belatedly making a demand on the board is nothing more than a somewhat 
revised version of his tactic, attempted in the first McCann case, of bringing a derivative action 
without bothering to comply with Idaho Code § 30-1-742." Id. at p. 3. The Court also denied, 
again, Plaintiffs request for reconsideration of its prior ruling that Plaintiffs breach of fiduciary 
duty cause of action was derivative in nature. Id. ("In one of his memoranda the plaintiff has 
asked the court a second time to reconsider its original summary judgment decision .... The 
court is not inclined to re-hash what it has ruled on twice."). 
During this same time, the parties conducted discovery in light of the Court's Rule 16(b) 
scheduling order that required that discovery be completed by November 20, 2009. Given that 
Plaintiff continued to assert his derivative causes of action, and given that Plaintiff's judicial 
dissolution cause of action was based on the same factual allegations as his derivative cause of 
action, the discovery related to both causes of action. The discovery sought by Plaintiff was 
voluminous and included several requests for information related to pre-2001 transactions that 
were the subject of McCann l Plaintiff insisted on conducting extensive pre-2001 discovery, 
necessitating intervention of the Court on two occasions. See March 5, 2009 Memorandum and 
Order Concerning Discovery (holding, in response to Plaintiff's motion to compel, that 
Defendants' discovery responses "may be limited to financial transactions since January 5, 
2001); see also August 31, 2009 Second Memorandum and Order Conceming Discovery. 
After completing discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's 
judicial dissolution cause of action. As foreshadowed by the Court's March 4, 2009 Order, the 
motion for summary judgment focused on the element required in Idaho Code§ 30-1-1430 that 
Plaintiff establish that "irreparable injury to the corporation is threatened or being suffered" by 
reason of illegal, fraudulent or oppressiv~ conduct. The Court entered summary judgment in 
# 71 19 
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favor of Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff failed to present any admissible evidence that 
irreparable injury to the Corporation is threatened or being suffered as a result of any conduct on 
the part of defendants. A final judgment having been entered by the Court, the Defendants now 
request an award of costs and attorney fees. 
II. ARGUlVIENT 
A. Defendants Arc Entitled To Attorney Fees Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 30-1-746 
Because Plaintiff's Derivative Cause Of Action Was Commenced And Maintained 
Without Reasonable Cause 
Idaho Code § 3 0-1-746 provides, in relevant part: 
On termination of the derivative proceeding the court may: 
2. Order the plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, 
including counsel fees, incurred in defending the proceeding if it 
finds that the proceeding was commenced or maintained without 
reasonable cause or for an improper purpose; or 
3. Order a party to pay an opposing party's reasonable expenses, 
including counsel fees, incurred because of the filing of a pleading, 
motion or other paper, if it finds that the pleading, motion or other 
paper was not well grounded in fact, after reasonable inquiry, or 
warranted. by existing law ... and was interposed for an improper 
purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. 
I.C. § 30-1-746 (2) and (3). 
In McCann I. the District Court entered an award of attorney fees under this statute, 
concluding that Plaintiff's cause of action was without reasonable cause because Plaintiff failed 
to comply with the derivative demand requirement set forth in Idaho Code§ 30-1-742. See 
Opinion and Order Re: Pending Motions, p. 10 (attached as Exhibit 4 to Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss previously filed in the current action) ("The 
Court finds that this action was commenced without reasonable cause in light of the clear 
dictates ofI.C. § 30-1-742"). The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed that award of attorney fees. 
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The "without reasonable cause" standard is even more clearly satisfied here than it was in 
McCann I. Plaintiff not only failed to comply with the derivative demand requirement in 
violation of the ''clear dictates ofl.C. §30-1-742," but he did so after already having been told 
once by the Idaho Supreme Court that his cause of action for breach of fiduciary duties is 
derivative in nature. See McCann I, 138 Idaho 228 (2002). 
Moreover, Idaho law authorizes an award of attorney fees where a derivative cause of 
action is "commenced or maintained without reasonable cause or for an improper purpose." 
Idaho Code § 3 0-1-746 ( emphasis added). Here Plaintiff repeatedly attempted to maintain his 
derivative cause of action even after the Court's March 4. 2009 Order of dismissal. Plaintiff 
pursued (I) a motion for reconsideration; (2) a motion to amend complaint; and (3) what the 
Court characterized as a "renewed motion for reconsideration" asking the Court to "re-hash what 
it has ruled on twice." See November 12. 2009 Order. These motions kept Plaintiffs derivative 
claims alive without reasonable cause until November 12, 2009 and caused Plaintiff to incur 
additional attorney fees. 
B. An Award Of Attorney Fees Is Appropriate Under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) 
Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides for a mandatory award of attorney fees to a prevailing 
party in an action involving a commercial transaction: 
Id. 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account 
stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty. or contract 
relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or 
services and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise 
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as 
costs. 
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As explained in Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), "a party 
may be awarded attorney fees in any civil action where a commercial transaction is involved." 
140 Idaho 702, 715, 99 P.3d 1092, ll05 (Ct. App. 2004). An award of attorney fees is 
appropriate where "the case involves a 'commercial transaction' and that such transaction is the 
gravamen of the lawsuit." Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364,370, 79 P.3d 723 (2003). 
A "commercial transaction" is defined as "all transactions except transactions for 
I 
personal or household purposes." Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). "Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) does not 
require that there be a contract between the parties before the statute is applied; the statute only 
requires that there be a commercial transaction." In re University Place/Idaho Water Center 
Project, 146 Idaho 527,541, 199 P.3d 102, 116 (2008). Moreover, the Idaho Supreme Court 
"has given a broad meaning to the word 'transaction."' Id; see also Blimka v. My Web 
Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594,599 (2007) (''The commercial transaction 
ground in I.C. § 12-120(3) neither prohibits a fee award for a commercial transaction that 
involves tortious conduct ... nor does it require that there be a contract_"). 
Here, Plaintiffs claims fall squarely within Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) because they involve 
multiple commercial transactions entered into by the Corporation that Plaintiff contends are 
wrongful. The transactions alleged in the Complaint involve commercial transactions with 
Getrude McCann and with Plaintiff, himself. For example, Plaintiff acknowledges that the 
Corporation has paid dividends to Plaintiff and the other shareholders, but Plaintiff alleged that 
he is being oppressed becaijse of the Corporation's failure to pay more dividends. Moreover, the 
remedy Plaintiff sought in this case was either a dissolution of the corporation or an order from 
the Court requiring the Corporation create a spin-off corporation owned by Plaintiff and transfer 
36.68% of the Corporation's assets to that corporation- essentially a forced commercial 
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transaction with Plaintiff. These transactions constitute commercial transactions in that they are 
not for personal or household pUIJ)oses. Thus, they fit within the broad definition of commercial 
transactions. An attorney fee award under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) is appropriate. 
C. An Award Of Attorney Fees Is Appropriate Under Idaho Code§ 12-121 
Idaho Code§ 12-121 permits an award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party 
if the action was brought or pursued :frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. See J-U-B 
Engineers, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 146 Idaho 311,318, 193 P.3d 8581 865 (2008). 
This is not the first time Plaintiff has filed a derivative demand against the CoI]Joration without 
complying with the statutory demand requirement. Rather, this is the second time Plaintiff has 
engaged in the same frivolous conduct. If taking an action in litigation in defiance of both a 
clear statutory requirement and an express Idaho Supreme Court holding does not constitute 
frivolous conduct, then just about nothing else would. 
Moreover, this Court plainly explained to Plaintiff at the very beginning of this case that 
Plaintiff would "have to prove irreparable rather [than] reparable injury to the corporation" to 
survive summary judgment See March 4, 2009 Order, p. 11 (emphasis in original). 
Nevertheless, Plaintiff proceeded with this litigation even though he had absolutely no evidence 
ofirreparable injury to the Corporation. Plaintiff had not evidence to support bis claim when he 
filed his Complaint, and he still had not evidence to support his claim after taking voluminous 
discovery and requiring the Corporation to incur substantial attorney fees. This Court ultimately 
granted summary judgment because Plaintiff could present absolutely no evidence to support his 
claims. Bringing a cause of action without a shred of evidence to support that cause of action fits 
squarely \Vi.thin§ 12-121 's provision for an attorney fee award for an action brought 
unreasonably or without foundation. 
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D. Defendants' Request For Attorney Fees Is Reasonable Under The Rule 54(e)(3) 
Factors 
The "reasonableness" of an attorney fee award is based on the trial court's consideration 
of the factors in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 
139 Idaho 761, 769, 86 P.3d 475 (2004). The factors of Rule 54(e)(3) include: time and labor; 
difficulty; skill required; prevailing charges; fixed or contingent fees; time limitations; amount 
and result; undesirability of the case; relationship with the client; awards in similar cases; costs 
of automated research; and any other factors. Id. Attorney fees are a discretionary matter for the 
trial court and are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. Although a trial court is 
not required to make "specific findings demonstrating how it employed any of the factors in Rule 
54(e)(3)," it is required to consider those factors when determining the amount of fees to award. 
Id. 
l. The Time and Labor Required 
The time and labor required in defending against Plaintiffs claims is set forth in detail in 
the daily billing itemizations attached to the affidavits of Defendants' respective counsel. 
Notably, this case involved several factors that made this a relatively time consuming and 
expensive case to litigate. First, Plaintiff brought claims not only against the Corporation, but 
also against the Director Defendants, William V. McCann, Jr. and Gary E. Meisner. The claims 
against the Defendants involved allegations of fraud and breaches of fiduciary duties. The nature 
of these claims, even though meritless, created potential conflicts of interest between the 
Corporation and the Director Defendants. Thus, William V. Mccann, Jr. and Gary E. Meisner 
were required to obtain separate counsel, which significantly increased the cost of litigation in 
that multiple attorneys were required to attend hearings and depositions and otherwise participate 
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in the defense of Plaintiff's claims. Under Idaho Code Section 30-1-853, the Corporation 
advanced payment for the litigation expenses of the Director Defendants. 
Despite the fact that the Defendants were required to obtain separate counsel, the 
Defendants took measures to keep litigation costs as low as possible. The Defendants entered 
into a joint defense agreement pursuant to which the Defendants shared research and jointly 
prepared pleadings and briefing. The Defendants agreed that most of the briefing in th.is case 
would be handled by John Ashby, an associate with Hawley Troxell, counsel for William V. 
Mccann, Jr. This agreement not only avoided duplicative research and briefing, but allowed the 
briefing to be prepared at a billing rate significantly lower than the rates charged by Mr. 
McDevitt, Mr. McNichols or Mr. Clark. 
Second, the cost of defending against Plaintiff's claims was relatively high in light of the 
very high stakes involved. Plaintiff sought dissolution of the Corporation, which Plaintiff 
contends is worth at least $20,000,000. Thus, this truly was "bet the company'' litigation. Given 
the extremely high stakes and the serious nature of Plaintiffs allegations, Defendants were 
required to take Plaintiffs allegations seriously and put forth their best efforts. 
Third, Plaintiff's tenacious litigation tactics increased the cost of the litigation. Plaintiff 
asserted not only a corporate dissolution cause of action, but also a derivative claim without first 
complying with the statutory demand requirement. Defendants successfully had the derivative 
cause of action dismissed, but only after multiple motions. After the Court dismissed the 
derivative cause of action, Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Plaintiff then 
moved to amend bis Complaint to add a derivative cause of action after purporting to comply 
with the derivative demand requirement. That motion to amend also asked the Court to 
reconsider its prior ruling for a second time. Defendants successfully defended against these 
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motions. This case also involved extensive discovery, the cost of which was increased 
substantially by Plaintiffs attempts to take discovery related to pre-2001 events. resulting in 
multiple motions resolved by the Court. Plaintiff served multiple sets of written discovery on 
each Defendant and also took several depositions. Defendants took only Plaintiff's deposition. 
but Plaintiff took the depositions of William V. Mccann, Jr., Lori Mccann. Gary E. Meisner, 
Gertrude McCann and Dorothy Snowball. 
The nature of Plaintiffs claims and Plaintiffs litigation tactics significantly increased the 
cost of this litigation. As explained by the United States Supreme Court, a party "cannot litigate 
tenaciously and then be heard to complain about the time necessarily spent ... in response." 
City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580 n. 11 (1986). 
2. The Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions 
This case involved a claim for dissolution of the Corporation. That claim is relatively 
straightforward in the required elements for such a drastic remedy, but Plaintiff complicated the 
case by his novel, but meritless, theories. Plaintiff's novel arguments, i.e., that the corporation 
was irreparably harmed by a speculative and remote risk of tax liability, by a speculative 
inability to collect debts owed to it and even by the fact that it has had to incur attorney fees to 
defend itself, complicated the defense of this case. Defendants were required to obtain the 
assistance of an accountant expert witness to rebut these novel assertions. 
3. The Skill Requisite to Perform the Legal Service Properly and the 
Experience and Ability of the Attorney in the Particular Field of Law 
Given the nature of Plaintiff's claims and the drastic remedy he sought, the Defendants 
reasonably sought the assistance of experienced and skilled counsel. Mr. Clark, Mr. McNichols 
and Mr. McDevitt each represented their respective clients in McCann I, and brought their 
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knowledge from that prior case to this litigation. As set forth in their respective affidavits, Mr. 
Clark, Mr. McNichols and Mr. McDevitt are each skilled and experienced attorneys. 
4. The Prevailing Charges for Like Work 
The hourly rates charged by counsel for the defendants are the same hourly billing rates 
they generally charge to clients for their services. Numerous cases have held that the actual rate 
charged by counsel to clients is generally held to the "best evidence" of the proper hourly rate to 
be allowed in statutory fee cases. See Black Grievance Camm. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 802 
F.2d 648, 652 (3d Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 483 U.S. 1015 (1987) (market-rate 
value is "generally reflected in the attorney's normal billing rate")~ Tamazzoli v. Sheedy, 804 
F.2d 93, 98 (71.h Cir. 1986) ("For private counsel with fee-paying clients, the best evidence is the 
hourly rate customarily charged by counsel or by her law firm."); see also Ohio-Sealy Mattress 
Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, inc., 776 F.2d 646, 660 (7'h Cir. 1985) ("The hourly rates used to compute the 
lodestar are typically the rates lawyers charge clients who pay on a regular basis. n). Their rates 
are comparable to, if not lower than, rates charged by similarly experienced counsel in Idaho. 
See LaPeter v. Canada Life Ins. of America, 2007 WL 4287489, *1-2 (D. Idaho) (Wirunill, C.J.) 
(approving rates of $300 and $335/$355 for attorneys with 20 and 30 years e:x--perience 
respectively). 
5. Whether the Fee is Fixed or Contingent 
The fees charged by counsel for the Defendants were fixed hourly rates that were based 
upon the knowledge and experience of each attorney and agreed to by Defendants. 
6. Time Limitations Imposed by the Client or the Circumstances of the Case 
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The Defendants desired this matter to be resolved as quickly as possible as this litigation 
was expensive not only in terms of dollars but in the time and personal resources of the 
Defendants. 
7. The Amount Involved and the Results Obtained 
As set forth above, this was a "bet the company" case in that Plain.tiff sought dissolution 
of the Corporation. Defendants prevailed on all claims asserted by Plaintiff. Notably, by 
prevailing on summary judgment, Defendants were able to save the substantial cost of a trial. 
Plaintiff's counsel stated at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment that he estimates 
attorney fees would have been approximately $500,000 by the end ofa trial. 
8. The Undesirability of the Case 
Plaintiff sought the dissolution of a long-standing family corporation. The case involved 
several undesirable aspects, including the fact that this case involves disputes between family 
members, which brings with it unique emotional implications. For example, Plaintiff taking the 
deposition of his own Mother created an uncomfortable and undesirable situation. 
9. The Nature and Length of the Professional Relationship With the Client 
Mr. McDevitt, Mr. Clark and Mr. McNichols have had a longstanding relationship with 
their respective clients, including prior representation in McCann I. 
10. Awards in Similar Cases 
The District Court in McCann I awarded attorney fees in the amount of $101,016.83. 
Unlike this case, which was resolved only after substantial discovery and a motion for summary 
judgment, McCann I was resolved on a motion to dismiss. In McCann I, very little discovery 
took place and no depositions were taken. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed and awarded 
DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 15 
# 16/ 18 
40100,000B.184128B.2 
~:¥:-.: -.:-:-:-.:-:-:---:-:-:-:-:-:->:-:<-:-:-:-. --. --:--.. ::: :_ .. -=------. -. -.---------------.-.-.-.-.-. -- .-.---•• -. -.. ; 
03-18-10;02:28PM; ·2083366912 
attorney fees on appeal. Other than the award of attorney fees in McCann I, Defendants are not 
aware of other similar cases. 
11. The Reasonable Cost of Automated Legal Research 
Defendants used Westlaw to perform legal research in this case. Given the limited Idaho 
case law interpreting the corporate dissolution statute, Westlaw was used to research decisions 
from other jurisdictions. Westlaw expenses were billed to Defendants as set forth in the invoices 
attached to the Affidavit submitted by Mr. Clark. 
E. Defendants' Request For Costs as a Matter of Right and Exceptional Costs Should 
Be Granted 
In addition to its costs as a matter of right, Defendants request an award of non-taxable 
costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). Rule 54(d)(l)(D) states that additional, non-tax.able, costs 
'"may be allowed upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably 
incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." 
Discretionary costs may include costs related to long distance telephone calls, photocopying, 
faxes, travel expenses, and eJ\.-pert witnesses. See Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 
109. P.3d 161, 168 (2005). 
This is an exceptional case warranting an exceptional award of non-taxable costs. 
Plaintiff sought the extraordinary remedy of dissolution of the Corporation. Moreover, this was 
the second in a series of long and drawn-out cases and the second time Plaintiff has failed to 
comply with the clear statutory requirement of serving a written demand prior to filing a 
derivative action. The Court made a light-hearted reference during the summary judgment 
hearing about a McCann JJilawsuit in the future. An award of attorney fees, costs and 
exceptional costs may deter future meritless litigation. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defcndams respectfully ask. this Court to issue an award of 
attorney fees and costs in favor of Defendants in the amount of $340,040.25 in anomcy fees, 
$4,727.18 in' costs as a matter of right, and $9,927.43 in discretionary costs. 
DATED THIS /~of March, 2010. 
McDEVITT & MILLER LLP 
~~~< By c::::...--.....-ie ~~ 
Charles F. McDevitt, ISB No. 835 
Anomeys for Nominal Defendant McCann 
Ranch & Uvesrock Co. 
DA TED THIS _l8__ day of March, 20 l 0. 
1--u\ WLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
By ~ _:fs;g ~ fm 
~B No. 1026 
Anomeys for Defendant 
William V. McCann, Jr. 
DATED THIS l~dayofMarch, 2010. 
CLEMENTS BRO\VN 
By Michael E. lN;~Jf 
Anomeys for Defendant Gary Meisner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~y of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' JOINT MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST 
FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of 
· ----the-fo1fowing: · · · · 
Timothy Esser 
ESSER & SANDBERG, PLLC 
520 East Main Street 
Pullman, WA 99163 
[ Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Andrew Schwam 
SCHW AM LAW FIRM 
514 South Polk, #6 
Moscow, ID 83843 
[ Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS BROWN 
321 13th Street 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501-1510 
[ Attorneys for Defendant Gary Meisner] 
Merlyn W. Clark 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
[Attorneys for Defendant William V. Mccann, Jr.] 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_}L_E-mail 
__ Telecopy: 509.334.2205 
...X. U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
_$,_E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
~ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
~E-mail 
__ Telecopy: 208.746.0753 
-¼:- U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy 208.336.6912 
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Chas. F. McDevitt 
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Tel.: 208-343-7500 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
RONALD R. McCANN, 
Plaintiff, · 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
WILLIAM V. McCANN, JR., and GARY E. ) 
MEISNER, ) 
Defendants. 
McCANN RANCH & LIVESTOCK 
COMP ANY, INC., 
Nominal Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
----------------
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV 08-01226 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHAS F. MCDEVITT 
CHAS F. McDEVITT being :first duly sworn on oath deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am an adult citizen of the United States ofAmeric~ competent to testify as a witness, 
and make this Affidavit based on my personal knowledge. 
2. I have been retained by Nominal Defendant, Mccann Ranch & Livestock Company, Inc., 
to defend it in this case. McCann Ranch & Livestock Company is advancing the costs of 
defending the Corporation, including the payment ofmy legal fees incurred on its behalf. 
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3. I have cooperated with counsel for the other Defendants pursuant to the terms of a Joint 
Defense Agreemenl entered into between all of the Defendants. 
4. I agreed to participate in the defense of this case for fees on an hourly basis calculated 
from April 18, 2008, to March 12, 2010, at the rate of $250.00 an hour. 
5. I have performed generally the following legal services in connection with this case: 
1) Numerous individual telephone conversations with clients and other counsel. 
2) Numerous conference telephone ca1ls with clients and co-counsel. 
3) Attendance and participation at corporate meetings. 
4) Filing, drafting and serving of pleadings. 
5) Filing, drafting and serving of written discovery to Plaintiff and responses to 
written discovery from Plaintiff. 
6) Attendance and pa1ticipation in depositions of Defendants William V. Mccann, 
and Lori McCann. 
7) Attendance and participation in depositions of Dorothy Snowball. 
8) Participation in the research for and preparation of Motions to Dismiss and a 
Motion for Summary Judgment and suppmting affidavits and papers; 
· participation in oral argument on Motion to Dismiss; participation by telephone in 
arguments on discovery motions; personal participation in oral argument on 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(5, The total fees charged to the client in this matter are in the amount of $22, 837.50. 
a) The time that I have spent on this matter is a total of 91.3 5 hours, performing the 
tasks set forth in paragraph herein above as well as those identified on the billing 
statements attached as exhibits to this Affidavit which are all of the invoices 
submitted by my firm to Mccann Ranch and Livestock Co., since the 
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commencement if this action. Of the amounts biHed $19,750.00 were for legal 
services prior to November 12, 2009. 
b) This action required knowledge of corporate structure, corporate performance and 
ability to identify accounting transactions and the reflection of those on the 
records of the Company. 
c) Representation in this matter required experience in corporate law and corporate 
matters, as well as the knowledge of accounting. The attorney performing this for 
our fin11 has practiced law for more than fifty (50) years, has also been a corporate 
executive and general counsel of major firms required in this matter. 
d) The charges for this type of work prevailing in this community by attorneys of 
like background are from $250.00-$350.00 per hour. 
e) The engagement was for the services to be performed at a rate of $250.00 per 
hour. 
t) The client desired this matter to be terminated as quickly as possible as it was 
expensive not only in terms of dollars but in the time and personal resources of 
the corporate executives involved. 
g) The Plaintiff in this action sought to divide what the Plaintiff alleged to be a 
Twenty Million Dollar Company into three parts. This liquidation and dissolution 
of the firm was prevented in this action. 
h) This action was a dispute between family members which is always a contentious 
type of litigation in which to engage. 
i) This firm has represented this client in a similar matter nine years previous. 
j) I am not aware of results in similar actions as they are not frequently brought in 
this jurisdiction. 
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7. All of the legal services performed by my firm were necessary and reasonable and the 
hourly rates and the time spent are reasonable. 
8. Attached as exhibits to this Affidavit are all of the invoices submitted by my firm to 
Mccann Ranch & Livestock Co., since the commencement of this action. 
Dated this ffiay of March, 20 I 0. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of ADA ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this le!: day of March, 2010. 
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... _J> ........ ·~~ 
il'6,,, 1' A TE 0~ ,..,,,'" 
,,, ,..,, 
NotaryPubf~ 
Residing at \. SQ.) , \ 
My commission expires \..2. \ '?J) 1/) 12. 
......... ,,, ~ 
Respectfully Submitted lfr day of March, 2010; 
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McDEVfIT & MILLER LLP ~ /"/ 
By: ,z::;--£-d ~R"~ 
Chas F. McDevitt (ISB No. 835) 
DeanJ. Miller (ISB No. 1968) 
Attorneys for Nominal Defendant 
# 5/ 14 
03-18- 1 0;02:26PM; ;2083365912 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTJFY that on this ~day of March, 2010, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF CHAS F. MCDEVITT by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to each of the following: 
Timothy Esser 
ESSER & SANDBERG, PLLC 
520 East Main Street 
Pullman, WA 99163 
Andrew Schwam 
SCHWAMLAWFIRM 
514 South Polle, #6 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Michael E. McNichols 
CLEMENTS BROWN 
321 13th Street 
P.O. Box 1510 
Lewiston, ID 83501-1510 
Merlyn Clark 
HAWLEYTROXELLENN1S 
877 Main Street, Suite 1000 
P.O. Box 1617 
Boise, ID 83701-1617 
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Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
Telecopy 
~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
___ Overnight Mail 
~E-mail 
Telecopy 
_J/_ U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
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__ Hand Delivered 
__ Overnight Mail 
E-mail 
__ Telecopy 
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Lawyers 
(208) 343-7500 
(208) 336-6912 (Fax) 
420 West Bannock Street 
P.9. Box 2564-83701 
Boise, Idaho &3702 
I 
July 1, 2009 
Mr. William McCmnJr. 
McCann Ranch & livestock Co. 
1027Bryden 
Lewiston, ID 83505 
Professional Secvices re: Mccann v. McCann 
10-0ct 
15-0ct 
17-0ct 
21-0ct 
24-0ct 
27-0ct 
3-Nov 
12-Nov 
14-Nov 
4-Dec 
15-Dec 
16-Dec 
20-Dec 
22-Dec 
31-Dec 
5-Jan 
8-Jan 
10-Jan 
13-Jan 
6-M.ru: 
Acririry 
Receive and Review Plaintiffs First Interrogatories 
Draft TransminalLetter to Mr. McC:mn 
Receive and Review Amended Complaint; Draft 
Transmittal Lettc.r to all Parties. 
Reccive and Review Motion to Dismiss; Receive and 
Review Email Co:rrespond~cc; P.repare and Pai:cicipate 
in Telephone Hearing. 
Draft Motion to Dismiss A.mended Complaint; 
Revise and Review Motion to Dismiss Amended 
Complaint 
Receive and Review Order of Recnsal 
Receive and Review Motion to Stay Discovery 
Draft Motion to Stay Discovery 
Receive :md Review Email Correspondence re: Judge 
Rccdve and Review Plnintiffs Motion to Compel 
Discovery; Memornnd= in Support, Affidavit of 
Esser; Notice of Hi>aring 
Receive and Review Amended N orice of Hearing 
Heaong on all Motion; Prepare and P:rrticipate 
D:ruft Memorandum ia Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion to Compd Discovery 
Receive and Review Defendant's Reply Memo in 
Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Rc:ccive :and Rcvi= Sales Agreement 
Review Memorandum & O.tdcr 
Receive and Review Email Correspondence 
Receive and Review Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum 
Receive aP.d Review Plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsiderncion; R.ev:ic:w Emails; 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHAS F. MCDEVITT 
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Chas. F. McDevitt 
Dean J. (Joe) Miller 
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Page 2 
1-Jul 
IO-Mil 
11-l:vfar 
13-Mar 
17-Ma:c 
20-Mar 
25-Mar 
30-Mar 
31-Mar · 
4-Apr 
1-Apr 
14-Apr 
23-Apr 
24-Ap,: 
27-Apr 
30-Apr 
12-May 
14-May 
18-May 
Receive and Review Parcial Summary Judgment; 
Memorandum and order, Memo and Order 
Concerning Discovery 
Telephone Conference Call 
Receive and Review Attorney Client Memo=dum. 
Receive and Review Memorandum to Courisel; Notice 
of Hearing 
Receive and Review Email T:ransmitt.-us 
Receive and Review Transmin:al Letters from Mi:. 
McNichols; Gary Meisner's Answers to Plaiutlffs 1st 
Int=ogatories; Telephone Conference 
Receive and Review Notice of Compliance 
Drafr Response to Plaintiffs ?irst Intecrogatories and 
Requests for Production; Draft Transmittnl Letters to 
Court 
Draft Motion to Set Oral Argument; Motion to 
Schedule Pre-Trial Conference 
Receive and Review Transmittal Letter from T. Esser 
and Plaintiffs first Set oflntei:rogatoi:ies & Request 
for Production of Documents; Revise letter from T. 
Esser re: Pi:e-t.cial Conference 
Receive and Review Letter from L. McCann re: 
Financials 
Receive Email Correspondence from Judge Carey; 
Receive Notice of Hearing and Letter to Judge Carey 
from T. Esser; 
Prepare for and Attend Telephonic Conference Call 
Receive Email Correspondence from all Parties te: 
Confor=cc Call 
Prepare for and Attend T elephooic Conference Call 
Receive and RC'liew Email Correspondence from L. 
Mccann & M Clark 
Draft Motion to Bifurcate; Molion to Reconsider: 
Decision and Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Reconsider; Drnft Correspondence to Courr; 
Receive and Review Email Trnnsminals; Draft letter 
and Plaintiffs 2nd Requests to W. McCannJr. 
Prepare foe and Att~d Hearing T dephonic 
Conference Call 
Receive and Review Correspondence &om T. Esscr re: 
Gcrt:rudc McCann; Review Responses to Phint:i£Fs 2nd 
Production Requests 
;2083366912 # 3/ 14 
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1-Jul 
29-May 
~ 
14--Nov 
4-Dec 
13-Jan 
25-Mar 
25-Mru:-
30-Apr 
7-May 
8-May 
11-May 
21-May 
Receive and Review from T. Esser Plaintiff's 
Suppkmcnt:il Answer to Defendant Meisner's 
Inrerrog:atorie.s; Plaintiff's Th.ird Request for 
Production ofDocumems; Receive and Review 
Correspondence from Essei:- re: Deposition Dates; 
Notice ofD,cpositlon of Ge.rttude McCann;.Subpoena 
to Attend Deposition. 
Receive and Review Email Correspondence: from L. 
McCann & M Clai:k 
illID 
Copies 
Postage: 
Alaska Airlines 
Copies 
Copies (Interrogatories) 
Copies 
Postage 
Copies (Motions) 
Copies (Mouons) 
Postage 
Copies 
Postage 
Copies 
Postn.ge 
Copies 
Postage 
Copies 
Postage 
T~tal Attorney's Fees: 
Total Costs: 
Total Attorney's Fees and Costs: 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHAS F. MCDEVITT 
;2(:83366912 
amru 
102 
5.77 
192.00 
33 
118 
8.12 
38 
98 
6.04 
45 
2.95 
so 
2.95 
20 
2.44 
29 
1.39 
$7,650.00 
.cm.t 
$15.30 
$5.77 
$19200 
$4.95 
$17.70 
$8.12 
$5.70 
$14.70 
6.04 
.$6.75 
2.95 
$7.50 
2.95 
$3.00 
2.44 
$4.35 
1.39 
$301.61 
$1,951.61 
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Lawyers 
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(208) 343-7500 
(208) 336·6912 (Fax) 
420 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 256~83701 
Bol.se, Idaho 83702 
Chas. F. McDevitt 
Dea11 J. (Joe) Miller 
Mr. William McCann, Jr. 
McCann Ranch & Livestock Co. 
1027 Bryden 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
McCann v. McCann 
February 4, 2010 
Professional Services Rendered June 2009 through December 2009 
STATEMENT OF ACCRUALS 
Chas F. McDevitt Attorney Hours (@ $250/hr) 
I 
Receive and review Amended N otlce of Deposition re: Gertrude McCann; Prep:u:e and file McCann 
Response to Plainci.ffs 2"0 Intc:.o:ogatox:y Requests; Receive aud Ieview correspondence Ie: depositions; 
Review and respond to emrul co:a:espondence from parties re: Summary Judgment Motion; Review 
Responses m Plaintiff's 3rd Production Requests; Receive and Review Deposition Notice; Receive and 
review d.rn.fc of Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; 
Dr:aft Opinion Letter; Prepate :md file Notice of Wai.vet of Pru:ticiparion in the taking of Deposition of 
Ronald McCan.o; Review and respond to email correspondence from parties re: Reinstein; Review :and 
respond to em.ill cottespondence from parties re: discovery; Receive and review QuickBooks files; Review 
and respond to email correspondence from parties re: discovery; Order pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 16; 
Review and tespond to email co.r:respondence from parties re: Reinstein; Review and respond to email 
cotrespondence from parties :i:e 1099's; Review and respond to email correspondence from parties; Receive 
and review correspondence from T. Answers to McCann's first: Disco'liex:y Requests; 
Review and tespond to email correspondence from pru:ties; Receive and Review from. r. Esser Plaintiffs 
Motion to Compel Discovery, Declatation and Memorandum of Authorities; Recei11e and review Memo in 
Support of Motion for Protective Order; Receive and xevie:w Affidavit of 't. Essex; Draft and file Motion for 
Protective O:t:der; Diaft letter to McCann xe: Opinion of Deimm.d; Review and respond to email 
con:espondence from parties; Prepare for and attend hearing; Review and :respond to email couespondence 
from p:u:ties; Receive and xcvie:w Second Memoi:andum and Order Concemmg Discovety from Judge; 
Receive and xevicw co:a:espondence from T. Esser re: depositions; Receive and x:c-view Histoi:y of notes 
fi:om. ~cC:mn; D.caft lette:c to T. Esser. Minutes, Wm.ver of Notice, Demand Letter and Opinion letter, 
Prepare IUld participate in telephone con!exence; Receive and review coII:espondence from T. Esser: re: work 
papers; Re'tllew a.n.d :r:espond to email co.r.respondencc &om parties; Receive and review Plaintiffs Motion to 
· Amend Amended Complaint and Affidg,-vit of T. Esser, Review and respond to emrul conespondence fi:om 
parties xe: T.rustee; Receive and review co:c;espondence re: Ms. Snowball. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHAS F. MCDEVITT 1003--
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Statement of Professional Services 
Continued Page 2 
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Draft and file Nominal Defendant's Responses to Plaintiffs Fourth Discovery Requests and Notice of 
Compliance; Review and respond to email correspondence ,from pai::ties; Draft letter to T. Esser, Receive 
Notice of Heru:ing and correspondence from T. Esser; Review and .tespond to email correspondence from 
par:cies re: Hearing on Motion to Amend; Review and respond to email correspondence from parties; 
Receive and review correspondence from T. Esser; Review and respond to email correspondence from 
parties; Prepare for and participate in telephone couference; Travel and prepare for depositions; Receive and 
Review Phlntiffs Responses to 2nd Set of McCann Iutettogato:cies; Receive and review correspondence 
from T. Esser; Draft and tile Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Amend Amended Complaint; 
Receive and review Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum re: Morion to Amen.d Amended Complaint; Review G. 
Meisner's J oinder; Review and 1:espond to email correspondence from parties; Review and respond to email 
con:espondencc from Mr. Clark; Review Stipulation for Revised Pretrial Schedule; -
Review and respond to email correspondence from patties re: Privilege Logs; Review and respond to emruJ, 
, correspondence from parties re: Petition for Rehearing; Prepare for and attend hearing re: Motion to 
Amend Amended Complaint; Receive and review Plaintiffs Motion for Re:view of Privilege Log; Review and 
respond to cma.il correspondence. from parties; Dnft correspondence to T. Esser re: Ms. Snowball.. Drnft 
and file Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Review of Pnv:ilege Log and Supplemental Autho.city in Response 
to Plaintiffs Motion for Review of Priv.ilege; Review and respond to emrul correspondence from parties; 
Review and respond to email correspondence from parties; Review and .i:espond to em.ail con:espondence 
from parties; Motion for Summa:ty Judgment; Review Receive and review email corrc.spondence from T. 
Esser re: e..-.:hibits; Receive and review correspondence from T. Essei: re: Second Set of Interrogatories~ 
Receive and .review Order and Stipulation from T. Esser. P.repare for and participate in depositions; 
Receive and Review Memorandum and Order on Motion to Amend Previously Amended Complaint and 
Memorandum to Counsel Receive·and review communication from Esser .re: deposition ofDornthy 
Snowball; Draft letter to Esser re: lease ag:ceements; Receive and review Affidavit of T. Esser m Support to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Review of Privilege Log; Review and respond to email correspondence from parties; 
Receive and review email correspondence from McCann re: Dorothy Snowball; Review notebook; Hand 
Deliver notebook re: 46 documents withheld to Judge Carey; Receive and review email correspondence 
from L. McCann .re: journal entries; Review draft of Affidavit of Dorothy Snowball.. 
\ 
Draft Nominal Defendant's Response to 5rh Production Requests; Review andr:espond to email 
correspondence from parties; Receive and review exhibits to Responses; Participate in conference cnl1; 
Revise draft Nominal Defendant's Response to 501 Pr:oductiou Requests; Finalize Nominal Defendant's 
Response to 5rli Production Requests; Draft con:espondence to Esser; Review and respond to email · 
correspondence from parties re: letter to Esser, Revise letter to Esse1:; Participate in conference call; Fin:illze 
letter to Esser 
TotalAttomey Hours 51 Hours 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHAS F. MGDEVITT 1001/ 
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McCann Ranch & Livestock Co, 
Stotcmcnt of Professional Services 
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Copies (166 copies x .15) 
Postage 
Federal Express: · 
Research: 
Airline Fees: 
Hotel Fees: 
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COSTS 
24.90 
32.34 
47.05 
482.60 
279.20 
328.00 
Total Costs $ 1.,194.09 
· Total Attorney's Fees $12,750.00 
Total Amount Due $13,944.09 
03-18-10;02:26PM; 
(208) 343-7500 
(208) 336-6912 (Fa;,;) 
Mr. William McCann, Jr. 
McCann Ranch & Livestock Co. 
1027 Bryden 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
McCann v. McCann 
McDevitt & Miller LLP 
Lawyers 
420 West Bannock Street 
P.O. Box 2564-83701 
Boise. Idaho 83702 
March 12, 2010 
Professional Services Rendered ,fanµary 2010 through February :2010 
STATEMENT OF ACCRUALS 
;2083366912 
Chas F. McDevitt Attorney Hours (@ $250/hr) 
# 13/ 14 
Chas. F. McDevitt 
Dean J. (Joe) Miller 
Review and respond to email correspondence from parries re: Motion fm: Summary Judgment; Participate in 
telephone conference; Prepare and file with the Court Motion and Memorandum in Support of McCann 
Ranch's Motion fo:r Summary Judgment, Affidavit of Dot0thy Snowball. Affidavit of William v. McCann, 
Affidavit of James A. Schoff, and Affidavit of Gary Meisner. Paxticipate in telephone conference re: 
Summ.-u:y Judgment; Prepare and file Notice of Heru:ing; Participate in telephone conferences. 
Receive and review Stipulation to .Amend Orda re: Expert Witness Depositions, and Order ; Receive and 
review Ph.intiffs Responsive Summary Judgment Memorandum and Affidavits; Review and respond to 
email correspondence &om parties re: Motion for S11mmary Judgment; Participate iu telephone conference 
call; Prepare and file Affidavit of Counsd (CBv.1) in Support of McCann Ranch's Motion for Summary 
Judgment; Participate in telephone conference call; Receive and review· exhibits re: Defendant's E>..-pert 
Witness List; Prepru:e and file with the Court Defendant's E:ll..-perr Witness List; P:cepru:e and file McCann's 
Motion to Strike and Disregard Testimony, and Memorandum in Support of Motion; Receive and review G. 
Meisner's Joinder; Receive and Review Plaintiffs Response to McCann's Motion to Strike; (No chru:ge for 
preparation for and attendance at Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing-subpar performance); Review 
and respond to email correspondence &om parties re: Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary 
Judgment; Receive and Review Plaintiffs Correction/Supplemental Authority; Prepare and file 
Supplemental Authority; 
Total Attorney Hours 9. 75 Hours 
/Do(p 
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Copies (534 copies x .15) 
Postage 
Federal Express: 
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COSTS 
Total Costs 
Total Alforney ·s Fees 
Total Amount Due 
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80.10 
38.90 
59.21 
$ 178.21 
$2,437.50 
$2,615.71 
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